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With increasing competition for economic development, the importance of a metropolitan region 
as a unit of governance has been recurrently stressed. But in light of a fragmented local political 
environment, encouraging local governments to participate in collective actions is theoretically 
unexpected and empirically difficult. How has each metropolitan region dealt with this problem? 
Are there different patterns of collaboration that are undertaken by each region? And how can we 
systematically characterize different approaches inherent in the governance of metropolitan 
regions? 
 This dissertation states that existing literature on regional governance is not able to 
answer these questions correctly because they do not acknowledge the multiple dimensionality of 
governance. Not only the level of structural fragmentation but also the political and cultural 
aspects of governance should be seriously considered as the significant factor that determines the 
forms of regional governance. 
 Two highly fragmented regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh are selected as the 
empirical cases to which theoretical models are tested. From a macro point of view, this study 
systemizes governance structures in two regions and identifies two models of regional 
governance: Integrated and Isolated models. In the integrated model represented by Minneapolis, 
inter-organizational relationships are metropolitan-wide, intergovernmental oriented, and 
politically and culturally integrated at the metropolitan level. In the isolated model represented 
by Pittsburgh, this dissertation empirically proves that inter-municipal collaboration is less 
favored, and the metropolitan region is built upon intergovernmental competition along with 
high level of vertical integration at state level.  
This argument on regional governance is supported from the micro perspective, by 
empirical analyses on the extent and patterns of inter-organizational collaboration in the field of 
economic development in the Minneapolis and Pittsburgh regions. Based on the modal approach 
to governance, this study proves that along with structural factors such as the level of 
fragmentation and institutional forms of government, the intensity of political integration of local 
government is also strongly associated with the extent of inter-organizational collaboration. In 
addition, it also describes the regional differences in the patterns of collaboration and how the 
inter-organizational networks are differently structured in two regions.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing competition for economic development, the importance to of a metropolitan 
region as a unit of governance has been recurrently stressed. The phenomenon of globalization 
has blurred the boundaries of nation-states, and at the same time is forcing cities in the US to 
adjust to both new economic and geographical scales that can maximize collective 
competitiveness as a whole. But in the light of a fragmented local political environment where no 
local municipality is likely to sacrifice its autonomy for uncertain collective objectives, 
encouraging local governments to participate in collective actions is more difficult than might be 
expected. How can we overcome this problem and create a collaborative culture at the regional 
level? In other words, how can we increase the level of collaboration among individual as well as 
organizational actors in metropolitan regions?  
Two schools of thought exist with respect to the issue of collaboration within 
metropolitan regions. Polycentrists define collaboration as a strategic and voluntary joint action. 
They argue that cross-boundary collaboration is possible only when expected benefits from joint 
actions surpass transaction costs from inter-organizational interactions. Meanwhile, new 
regionalists believe that an institutional rules or norms at the regional level function to facilitate 
collaboration and eventually generate efficiency and collective competitiveness. 
Neither theoretical position assures inter-organizational collaboration with a great 
certainty. However, if collaboration is important for economic development, or if it is the best 
strategic alternative for sustainable regional economic development, several questions have to be 
appropriately answered. First, under what conditions will independent local municipalities decide 
to collaborate with other organizations? Second, what social and political factors influence the 
extent of collaboration? And thirdly, how are the regional actors connected and to what degree of 
strength are they interrelated?  
This dissertation attempts to demonstrate that there is a considerable relationship between 
governance structures and the pattern of collaboration. While previous studies exclusively focus 
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on finding determinants of collaboration at various levels of analyses, this dissertation starts with 
building an integrative framework for modal approaches to regional governance. The empirical 
exploration of the relationship between governance structures and the collaboration follows. This 
study compares the two metropolitan regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh, to show that a 
comparatively hierarchical decision-making system is more effective at mobilizing collaboration 
of local municipalities on the one hand, and at providing tough “glue” that strengthens 
intergovernmental network ties on the other hand.  
Political mechanisms enabling collaboration emerge not only from internal needs for 
resources but also from external stimulation for collaborative behaviors. Particularly in a highly 
fragmented political structure such as the US local governance system, policy objectives at the 
metropolitan level, such as those concerning economic development, can easily become pointless 
without the credible commitment of decision-making units within a region. Hierarchical 
coordination of local behaviors can be an effective mode of governance at the metropolitan level. 
It does not have to be regarded as a turning-back to the bureaucratic model. Instead, we can see 
this mode of governance facilitate deliberate joint action for collective benefit. Empirical 
comparative analysis will show how much this mode of governance influence on inter-
organizational collaboration and evaluates its effectiveness compared to other modes of 
governance. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1.1 Searching for ‘Good Governance’ 
In the new era of public management, it is often said that governance replaces government. 
Collaborative relationships through horizontal networks have emerged as an alternative to the 
hierarchical bureaucratic system. This fundamental transformation in the governing mechanism 
seems inevitable in the light of the fast changing and extremely complex environment. It is also 
true however that the traditional values of stability, accountability, equality and predictability of 
public services have been replaced by others such as efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. As 
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the new public management (NPM) movement emphasizes the importance of these values by 
creating the decentralized, networked, and horizontal governance mechanism, concern about the 
decreasing focus on the above-mentioned traditional values is increasing.  
However, concerns about the recent public management movement do not necessarily 
mean that the old system of bureaucracy should be kept at any costs. Rather, it implies that, as 
the collaborative approach to social problems is getting more popular, it should be more 
thoroughly analyzed and carefully pursued. At the heart of this intellectual process is a systemic 
understanding of governance structures. In this respect, this study becomes a part of the never-
ending search for a system of „Good Governance.‟ As Thompson & Perry (2006) maintain, 
systematic knowledge on governance is critical in probing the issue of collaboration because, to 
a considerable extent, governance defines both the content and the scope of collaborative 
activities. Thus without a comprehensive understanding of governance, any attempts to describe, 
explain and predict collaboration become pointless. Governance studies should provide theories 
with which empirical analysis on collaboration can be conducted, and set the conceptual 
boundaries beyond which studies on collaboration may go completely astray.  
At present, the problem is no universal model of governance exists yet. Given the inter-
disciplinary nature of the field, systemization of knowledge on the issue of governance needs 
extreme endurance for noises for a while. 
With this study, I do not aim to contribute to this complexity. Instead, I intend first to 
aggregate significant theoretical backgrounds of governance, and then develop an integrative 
model of governance by incorporating various governance-related theories in an appropriate 
manner. The search for a model of good governance is fruitless unless it is supported by accurate 
theoretical guidelines. Empirical evaluations of effectiveness of governance structures can be 
derived from theoretical speculation. Without articulation of governance studies, empirical 
analyses either become astray or mistakenly practiced in the field of policy studies. 
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1.1.2 Why Collaboration? 
Collaboration matters.
1
 Particularly in competition for scarce resources, collaboration may be the 
best strategy to produce high rate of cost-effectiveness from the economy of scale. This strategy 
is attractive to local governments, which most often operate with limited power and resources. 
Hence there is no logical obstacle keeping local governments from participating in collaborative 
activities. 
But history tells us that collaboration is more of an exception than the rule. More often 
witnessed is the heavy competition between cities, most of which is spurred by jurisdiction-
centered interests. In this context, the collaborative strategy suddenly becomes less favorable 
because every government has to consider the possibility of being defected by its neighbors. This 
phenomenon may be best described as a zero-sum game, in which each government is helplessly 
forced to compete for their own survival. This results in a situation where only a small number of 
winners gain much of the resources at the cost of the others. 
Even though the latter statement depicts metropolitan regions as a brutal field full of 
competition and conflicts, some regions have still successfully built a collaborative culture in 
which their constituents are pursuing shared objectives in harmony. This observation has 
challenged the traditional collective action theories. Both academics and practitioners, in this 
regard, need to discover the factors facilitating collective actions or collaboration. Institutional 
theories, which have gained popularity in various disciplines of social sciences, are expected to 
provide strategies to overcome the problems associated with collective action problems. 
However, no matter what explanations institutional theories generate on successful collective 
actions, doubts still remain, and one might ask, „What institution?‟ This study believes that one 
possible answer resides in the governance structure, which refers to the organizing principles of 
the public sector (Hamilton et al, 2004). 
                                               
1 Collaboration is a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating multi-organizational 
arrangements for solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations 
(McGuire, 2000:278). 
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1.1.3 Governance and Collaboration 
Built upon this theoretical speculation, this research attempts to identify the relationship between 
governance structure and the pattern of collaboration. An effective collaborative strategy cannot 
emerge without a clear understanding of intergovernmental institutional structures. This study 
begins by introducing an institutional framework in which political dynamics that create 
collaborative activities are more clearly delineated.  
Specifically, two metropolitan regions, Minneapolis in Minnesota and Pittsburgh in 
Pennsylvania, provide cases which best fit into this framework. Methodologically, demographic 
and statistical similarities between the two regions qualify the adoption of the most similar 
research design. This research design goes along with the institutional framework as well. Many 
structural differences embedded in the two metropolitan regions can be controlled at the 
conceptual level, which makes it easier to determine the causal linkage between governance 
structures and the patterns of collaboration in these two regions. 
Theoretical speculation identifies four different modes of governance. Two major 
perspectives on governance, the structural and the procedural perspective, are used for 
delineating the distinctiveness of each mode. In this study, modes of governance are understood 
as institutional structures that formulate and circumscribe the collaborative activities between 
local governments.  
Among the four modes of governance, only two are practically useful when they are 
actually applied in the field. Those are the modes of Cooperation and Coordination, each of 
which is found in the Pittsburgh and Minneapolis regions. By comparing the modes of 
governance of these two regions, this study claims that hierarchical policy coordination in the 
Minneapolis region has created a strong incentive for local governments to develop a concept of 
regional identity, upon which cooperative relationships are founded. This pattern of relationships 
is believed to play a positive role in increasing policy effectiveness and, at the same time, in 
controlling fiscal disparity.  
To examine these hypotheses, this study conducts an empirical analysis of why the 
collaborative culture is maintained in one region and not in the other. A key institutional 
infrastructure for successful collaboration is the existence of a regionalized political process in 
which the dynamics of vertical and horizontal relations are creatively balanced. This implies that 
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a collaborative turn in the discipline of public administration should not be understood as a 
discontinuation of old experiences. We cannot discredit the bureaucratic hierarchical system 
without further consideration of its applicability. When this traditional idea of governance can be 
creatively incorporated to the polycentric structure of a metropolitan region, we may expect to 
successfully escape the notorious dilemma of administrative efficiency and political inequity. 
A unique empirical contribution of this study comes from the tests of multiple 
hypotheses concerned with the relationship between the likelihood and extent of collaboration 
and governance structures. These hypotheses were developed based on the idea that cultural as 
well as political integration at regional level tends to increase the level of collaboration. This idea 
is against the well-known proposition that a hierarchy impedes horizontal cooperation. This 
study also shows significant progress from existing references of collaboration studies in that this 
study successfully overcomes the structural deterministic explanation of collaboration. While 
variances in the level of collaboration used to be explained by level of structural fragmentation, 
in the new conceptual framework, collaboration is understood not only as an accommodation of 
fragmented interests, but a deliberate cultural integration of political identity. By this mechanism 
collaboration can engender structurally stable and functionally efficient social outcomes. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation is intended to advance our understanding of local and regional governance in 
six ways. 
First, it extends the existing knowledge of local governance and economic development 
by incorporating sophisticated collective action theories. Given the assumption that the rational 
actors are unlikely to cooperate and defect others in order to pursue their self-interests, 
autonomous local governments are expected to pursue their self-interests at the costs of others. 
This is why practitioners in the field of local governance are eager to build institutions that 
prevent the mutually destructive zero sum game. However, as stated, it is clear that some 
metropolitan regions have performed better than others in terms of economic growth. How have 
they been able to overcome the inherent collective action problem while others have failed? 
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What has contributed to their unusual success? This dissertation reasons that the governance 
mode at the regional or metropolitan level may account for the observed divergences in the 
collaborative activities at the intergovernmental level. 
The second objective is to provide a useful theoretical framework to evaluate different 
modes of governance systematically. With the help of the new theories of institutionalism, this 
dissertation introduces a unified framework of regional governance which integrates structural 
and procedural perspectives. Empirical analyses were performed to test the validity, 
applicability, and generalizability of this framework. 
The third objective is to reevaluate the managerial advantages of the hierarchical system 
in the field of local governance. This dissertation challenges the strong belief in the efficiency of 
the decentralized decision-making process and fragmented structure. Efficiency gains of 
decentralization should not be presumed but rather be strategically pursued in a variety of 
contexts. It is more a subject of empirical research. While still counting efficiency gains as 
significant, this research claims that a hierarchical coordination of a fragmented local governance 
system is considerably effective. At the same time, this study disregards the theoretical 
effectiveness of the unidimensional dichotomy of centralization and decentralization, and instead 
introduces a practical alternative by which theoretical weaknesses of structural perspective on 
governance are effectively managed. 
The fourth objective of this study is to explore the relationship between modes of 
governance and the pattern of economic development policy activities. Influenced by recent 
works on network and social capital, this study agrees with the argument that a region‟s 
competitive advantage lies in reciprocal collaboration among actors, organization, and 
governmental units within society. What distinguishes this study is a search for an explanation 
why reciprocal collaboration is maintained by a particular political process in some regions yet 
not in others. 
Closely related to the fourth objective, the fifth is to provide empirical evidence 
supporting the significance of modal approach to regional governance by explaining the 
differences in the extent and patterns of inter-organizational collaboration between two regions. 
It is expected that the hierarchically integrated region will be more active in horizontally 
cooperation, which in turn works to strengthen the perception of collective identity and regional 
interests. 
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The final objective is to build practical stereotypes of regional governance. Once properly 
recognized, these models of metropolitan governance will enable future studies to categorize 
metropolitan regions more easily.   
1.3 BEYOND STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM IN  
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE STUDIES 
The mode of structural explanation is the most frequently adopted strategy in research on social 
relationships. The virtues of clarity inherent in structuralism provide methodological simplicity 
to field researchers. Knowledge accumulation on regional governance and inter-organizational 
collaboration owes a lot to this research tradition. 
However, structuralism as a research ideology has been increasingly challenged for 
several reasons. The one major weakness embedded in structural perspective is that it cannot 
account for the interactive dynamics of social structures and the political process. In addition, 
with an emergence of the methodologically-specified and empirically-oriented studies in social 
science in general, explorations of the interactive effects of various social factors have been 
ignored. 
The fields of governance and collaboration studies are not an exception. Only Stone 
(1989) and other regime theorists found this problem irritating,
2
 while a majority of schools such 
as Institutional Collective Action (ICA) and Collaborative Public Management (CPM) do not 
address the interactive effects of structures and political processes on municipal decisions on 
collaboration. The latter two schools explain patterns of inter-organizational collaboration as 
rational calculation of transaction cost determined by institutional rules, or as a strategically 
selected course of action with vertical and horizontal partners in complex environments, 
respectively. 
                                               
2 Scholars make sense out of the particulars of political and social life by thinking mainly in terms of 
abstract structures... Although these are useful as shorthand, the danger in abstractions is that they never 
capture the full complexity and contingency of the world… But students of history see a world 
undergoing change, in which various actors struggle over what the terms of that change will be (Stone, 
1989: 9-10). 
  9 
<Figure 1-1> provides a simplified version of the dominant perspective in regional 
governance and collaboration studies. According to (a) structural approach, the level of 
fragmentation at the regional level determines the governance mechanism to a great extent, so 
the patterns of inter-organizational collaboration are easy to predict in isolation from other social 
contexts. The ground-breaking study of Tiebout (1956) represents this perspective, in that his 
explanation of the effectiveness of his voting by feet sorting system is entirely dependent on the 
structural fragmentation of local governance system. At the same time the Progressive movement 
advancing regional consolidation falls under this approach as well because its argument is built 
on a strong belief in the efficiency of a structural solution to policy problems. 
The schools of ICA and CPM present perspectives too developed and sophisticated to be 
included as part of the structural approach along with Tiebout and Progressive movement. In 
fact, they clearly acknowledge the significance of relational perspective in explicating inter-local 
cooperation, and each theory proposes excellent theoretical models of governance and 
collaboration. They make use of various institutional factors, including forms of government and 
policy networks as explanatory variables. However, they do not address the complex 
mechanisms by which those factors are interrelated and produce collective results.  
Institutional approach (b) in <Figure 1-1> suggests an alternative conceptual framework 
for studies on regional governance. First, it recognizes the interactive effects between structural 
and procedural factors in regional decision-making. Second, it gives considerable attention to 
collective problem solving, which is described as a regionalized decision-making process 
(Lewis, 1996). This political process is structured by inter-organizational dynamics, and at the 
same time confines the scope of structural and procedural attributes of regional governance in 
return. Patterns of collaboration are always vulnerable to changes of any kind, so they cannot be 
fully comprehended as pre-determined behavioral routines by any means.  
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But the problem inherent in the institutional framework is its applicability to empirical 
analyses. Requirements this framework asks for are extremely hard to follow. Given the 
constraints of limited resources and a lack of relevant data, this dissertation employs cross-
sectional analysis rather than an in-depth longitudinal case study. Absence of any time-series 
explanation of the pattern of collaboration is, therefore, a major weakness of this dissertation.  
However, it will contribute to the field of regional governance and collaboration studies by 
introducing a set of procedural variables and categorizing regionalized policy process with an 
integrative framework of governance.  
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1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 describes the problem statement of this 
study. It outlines the problem, the significance of the study, and last but not least, how this study 
was conducted.  
Chapter 2 starts with a summary of theoretical discussion on governance. The strengths 
and weaknesses of various theories will be carefully analyzed, and at the same time, an 
integrative framework and its background will be proposed. Since most current theoretical 
perspectives on governance are inherently uni-dimensional, their empirical applicability is 
fundamentally limited. The governance phenomena they are supposed to analyze are too 
complicated for the theories to handle. To remedy this incompatibility between theory and 
reality, this dissertation builds a more comprehensive framework, integrating structural and 
procedural perspectives on governance. 
Chapter 3 presents issues related to research methodology. Knowledge gaps existing in 
collaborative studies and this study‟s empirical contributions will be fully discussed. The 
methodological advantage of comparative case study will be briefly mentioned, and 
methodological issues such as operationalization, measurement, and variables are discussed. 
Chapter 4 and 5 are devoted to empirical analysis of the major research question. Chapter 
4 presents the research outcomes with respect to the determinants of inter-organizational 
collaboration in the two distinctive metropolitan regions examined.  
Chapter 5 describes the differences in patterns of collaboration in those regions. While 
Chapter 4 exclusively focuses on the level or extent of collaboration of local municipalities in the 
two regions, Chapter 5 deals with the question of „how‟ the inter-organizational relationships are 
differently structured according to type of actors and policy activities. Network measures such as 
actor and activity centrality help delineate the pattern of connections between local 
municipalities and other organizations and determine the central network partners and policy 
activities in local and regional economic development. 
Moving from the microlevel perspectives presented in Chapters 4 and 5, Chapter 6 
analyzes the situation using a more holistic approach. The metropolitan regions are defined as 
organic wholes where integration of local governments is maximized. In order to accurately 
describe the regional differences between Minneapolis and Pittsburgh, this chapter suggests a 
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cataloging approach to regional governance and presents endogenous differences as reflected in 
aggregate data collected from surveys.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes and provides policy implications for future research, as well 
as presents limitations of the study. 
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2.0  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the theoretical basis for this dissertation. First, it begins with a survey of 
the collective action problems literature. Since the main research subject of this study is the level 
and scope of collaborative policy activities among local municipalities, a systemic understanding 
of the strategic choice of collaboration is a crucial prerequisite. Collective action studies look 
into why collaboration is difficult to achieve and how collective action problems could be 
overcome. 
The second part of this chapter describes the theoretical debate about governance, 
regional governance in particular. Governance studies have allowed for significant theoretical 
advancement in the field of public administration by addressing the issue of collaboration. While 
it looks as if the emergence of governance is an irreversible phenomenon, our understanding of 
governance is still very limited both in theory and practice. A new and integrative perspective on 
governance is developed, based on the institutional approach to collective action problems. 
2.1 COLLECTIVE ACTION, COLLABORATION AND INSTITUTIONS 
2.1.1 Collective Action Problems and Metropolitan Regions 
The recent interest in collaborative policy activities in the field of public administration mirrors 
the increasing complexities of policy problems. Collaboration had become favorable for 
development-minded public officials because first, the developmental capacity of a given 
government is intrinsically limited regarding usable resources, second, these resources are 
usually widely scattered throughout society, and finally, the expected benefits from a 
collaborative strategy are much larger than those to be expected from independent development 
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policy efforts. As a result, in order to utilize resources located outside jurisdictional boundaries, 
public managers are apt to adopt collaborative policy strategies rather than stick to the 
authoritative command and control system.  
However, the collaborative approach to economic development is not necessarily easy to 
apply. Collective action problems occur in situations where rational individual choice would not 
result in optimal collective benefit. Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or 
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in the common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests (Arrow, 1951; 2).  
All the tragedy of the commons, the prisoner‟s dilemma, and the logic of collective action 
represent the same phenomenon that individuals should face when they pursue collective 
objectives. At the heart of each of these models lies the free-rider problem (Olson, 1965: Ostrom, 
1990: 6), which is particularly pervasive when providing public goods is at issue. Since these 
goods are usually non-rivalrous and consumption of them is non-excludable, each individual 
possesses a strong incentive not to contribute his share of the production cost and instead to take 
a free ride on the effort of others (Olson, 1965).  But, if all participants choose to free-ride, the 
collective or social benefit will not be ensured, since “individual rationality is not sufficient for 
group rationality, there is no reason to suppose that a group of individuals will act in their own 
interest” (Olson, 1992). As a result, the pursuit of self-interest by each individual leads to a poor 
outcome for all (Axelrod, 1984: 7). 
Metropolitan governance, which consists of multiple autonomous local governments, 
has been regarded as an example of a collective action problem. Each government is not willing 
to give up its own interests and strives to pass any developmental costs on to other governments 
as much as possible. Adding to this, myopic elected officials tend to sacrifice long-term and 
time-consuming projects which could possibly generate bigger benefits in the future. Pejoratively 
speaking, metropolitan areas are full of governments, but nobody is responsible regionally. 
Accountability is scattered and decisions are made with little concern as to the impact of 
individual local governments‟ policies on regional issues. Everyone speaks out but nobody takes 
charge. It is this context in which the fundamental question is raised, „Who Governs?‟(Hall, 
2004). 
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Three rival schools of thought exist with regards to the direction metropolitan governance 
reform should take in pursuit of collective and region-wide benefits. Although they resemble one 
another to a considerable extent, their solutions to the problem of public sector ineffectiveness 
are certainly distinguishable. In addition, several arguments from each perspective are worthy of 
more thorough scrutinization. The core ideas of iterated prisoners‟ dilemma, new 
institutionalism, and social capital theory will be addressed as important theoretical speculation 
on collective action problems.  
2.1.2 Collective Action without Central Authority 1: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The previous section summarized why collective action problems are the main obstacles for 
social benefits maximization. A simple question then arises: “Under what conditions will 
cooperation emerge in a world of egoists? (Axelrod, 1984: 7).”  
The first solution is proposed in Axelrod‟s seminal study of the evolution of voluntary 
cooperation. By programming Prisoner‟s Dilemma game repeated indefinite times, he found out 
the best strategy for each actor who participates. This strategy, famous as Tit-for-tat, requires 
actors to begin with cooperation on the first move and then do whatever the other player did on 
the previous move. They reciprocate cooperation with cooperation, but reciprocate defection 
with defection. It sounds simple, but it turns out that this “tit-for tat” strategy prevails in the end 
for the collective perspective, because dysfunctional forms of competition are “selected out” and 
there is a greater likelihood that a symbiotic relationship will take hold among actors (LeRoux, 
2006: 28). Under suitable conditions, cooperation based on this reciprocity can even develop 
between antagonists. Axelrod‟s main contribution is he found out that what makes it possible for 
cooperation to emerge is the fact that players might interact again (Wood, 2004: 89). 
This argument is against the belief in a self-regulating capacity of the market system. 
According to Tiebout (1956)‟s articulation of the quasi-public market system of local 
governance, if citizen‟s preferences with respect to local public services are not intervened, a 
market-like sorting system of „voting by feet‟ will produce allocative efficiency so as to result in 
a Pareto optimum at the collective level. In this situation, there is no need for collaboration 
among local governments because every municipality is now better off. But, as noted above, an 
emergence of opportunistic behaviors in the process of joint production of public goods distorts 
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the preference sorting system, and as a consequence, Pareto efficiency can no longer take hold in 
local system. Again, at the heart of this sequence is the inevitable social phenomenon of 
collective action problems.  
However, if actors in a political system acknowledge that the interaction with their 
partners will be reiterated, they are willing to change their strategy in order to minimize the 
probability of future retaliation. In this respect, with a redefined assumption on interaction, the 
structure of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma is transformed from Zero-Sum game to Positive sum game, 
and the possibility of mutual adjustment among actors is greatly increased. 
For two decades this argument has been evaluated as a significant advancement in 
collective action theory. A number of studies have attempted to apply this model to the field of 
local governance (Feiock, 2004a). However, the results from empirical studies have not been 
consistent and sometimes even show evidence the opposite of theoretical expectations. Whereas 
it is apparent that the consideration of future interaction impedes local governments pursuing 
opportunistic strategies, it is doubtful that this is a major determinant of collaborative strategies. 
Regarding the empirical complexity, another school of thought argues that the environmental or 
contextual factors should be included in the collaboration function of local decision-makers. This 
scholarly group is known as „new institutionalists.‟ 
2.1.3 Collective Action without Central Authority 2: New Institutionalism 
The key concept penetrating both the iterated Prisoner‟s dilemma and new institutionalism is the 
concept of „choice.‟ Regardless of the assumptions of rationality, 3  both schools of thought 
                                               
3 Like many social science languages, a concept of rationality does have multiple definitions. Economic 
definition of rationality usually refers to a choice among competing options which yields highest net 
benefit. It is particularly important for classical economists whose major concern is to find a social 
equilibrium at which countless individual rational choices are perfectly balanced. However, in the field of 
public administration, the purpose of action is not limited to benefit maximization. The other public 
values such as equity is as much important as economy or efficiency, this strictly defined concept of 
rationality is more of nonsense. Moreover, since it is well known that individuals make a choice not solely 
based on rational calculation but also on norms, rules, and other social values, adhering to the assumption 
of economic rationality produces more harms than good. Axelrod (1984) clearly acknowledges this limit, 
and writes that rationality does not have to be an assumption for his iterated Prisoner ‟s Dilemma game. 
For institutionalists, particularly who work within a tradition of rational choice perspective, an 
assumption of rationality is still inevitable. However, their definition of rationality conceives of 
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interpret social phenomena as the intended results of strategic choices of individuals. To both 
schools, in this regard, building an optimized decision-making environment is the primary policy 
objective. One of the most important components in this environment is the accurate 
understanding of institutional infrastructures by which the repertoires of strategies are 
constrained. From this perspective it is natural to derive an argument that any reform proposals 
exclusively dependent on game theoretic prediction will be ineffective in practice and even 
harmful to the governing system as a whole. Overcoming collective action problems is a 
continuous search for better institutions, rather than a creating conceptual laboratory only in 
which cooperation is possible.  
 Institutionalists‟ interest in this regards centers on empirical exploration of 
collaboration-friendly environments. From numerous inductive studies, Ostrom and her 
colleagues found that under certain circumstances, rational individuals select collaborative 
strategies rather than a free ride at the expense of others. According to Ostrom (1990), the most 
effective alternative enabling collective action is the self-organization of individuals in the 
absence of a central authority. Although the process of self-organization in itself is exposed to 
possible collective action problems, certainly there are a lot of successes reported, which result in 
collective benefits as a whole.
4
  
The mechanism of self-organization has been posed as an alternative to the market and 
the Leviathan models of collective action. Both market and state systems have critical flaws 
when they are applied to collective action situations for different reasons. As stated, the market 
may provide a field in which interactions occur, but at the same time it is the source of Prisoner‟s 
Dilemma, since the rule of free exchange in the market mechanism does not guarantee iterated 
interactions between actors. It encourages opportunistic behaviors so as to result in collective 
inefficiency. In the Leviathan model, a major weakness can be found in the distorted preference 
sorting mechanism. As Powell (1990) asserts, preferences in hierarchical structure are assumed 
to be dependent on principals‟ interests. There is no way in this context a social equilibrium is 
                                                                                                                                                       
environmental constraints, so it may be better described as „nested‟ definition of rationality.  
4 Ostrom developed eight design principles found in successful institutional arrangement. 1) clearly 
defined boundaries 2) congruence between appropriations and provision rules and local conditions 3) 
collective choice arrangement, for example democratic participation 4) monitoring 5) graduated sanctions 
6) conflict resolution mechanisms 7) minimal recognition of rights to organize and 8) nested enterprise 
among larger groups. Each of these conditions needs further explanation, but it is not critical in my study 
to summarize all of Ostrom‟s ideas. For details, Ostrom (1990; 1994; 2004). 
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achieved because local preferences are easily disregarded by central interference. In short, an 
assumption of free expression of preference is not met in a pure Leviathan model. 
Ostrom and her colleagues claim that, in the process of self-organization and self-
governance, problems inherent in the market and the Leviathan model can be successfully 
resolved. Their framework envisions a system of governance in which collective action problems 
are overcome through voluntary adherence to a universally accepted rule structure and the use of 
sanctions against those who do not conform (LeRoux, 2006: 29). Since all collective actions are 
voluntary, no participant is likely to exploit others in the presence of the high possibility of 
future retaliation. At the same time, an absence of central authority enables the institutional 
infrastructures to reflect the true preferences of actors.  
After one decade, Ostrom further refined her ideas by incorporating concepts of social 
capital and trust into her institutional framework. It is believed that the rationality assumption in 
her original idea had a critical weakness in explaining variances in the level of collaboration 
across hundreds and thousands of human societies. But the initial research strategy on 
institutional diversity remains untouched as “to identify those aspects of the physical, cultural, 
and institutional setting that are likely to affect the determination of who is to be involved in a 
situation, the actions they can take and the costs of those actions, the outcomes that can be 
achieved, how actions are linked to outcomes, what information is to be available, how much 
control individuals can exercise, and what payoffs are to be assigned to particular combinations 
of actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 1990: 55). 
The basic idea of new institutionalism is that the individual behaviors and choices are 
essentially constrained by various kinds of institutions such as rules, norms, and standard 
procedures. Even though the difficulty in defining institutions is still pervasive, institutionalists 
believe that knowledge of social behaviors without clear comprehension of context is 
fundamentally flawed. Individual behaviors and interactions between the same individuals are 
necessarily „nested‟ within institutional infrastructures (Tsebelis, 1990). From the institutional 
frameworks, choices are biased because institutions are created and maintained in order to 
protect the parochial interests that serve only a part of the society (Knight, 1992). In this context, 
even the rationally chosen strategies eventually become nested within institutional contexts, and 
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the concept of rationality should be described as „bounded.‟5 Furthermore, it may be possible to 
argue that understanding collective actions based on nested or bounded rationality is an 
understanding of institutions, which regulate social interactions among actors. Accordingly, in 
order to explain collective actions or collaborations, a clear comprehension of institutionalized 
relationships among social actors should be preceded. 
2.1.4 Social Capital, Network, and Collective Action: A Relational Perspective 
It is noted that social actors do not always make a choice based on rational calculations. An 
assumption of perfect rationality has been criticized as unrealistic (Green & Sharpiro, 1994), and 
except for the cases of pure economic analyses, recent studies in social science in general rarely 
employ the strict version of rationality as a choice mechanism. Simultaneously, an increasing 
interdisciplinary approach to collective action provides opportunities for political scientists and 
public administration scholars to import other theoretical frameworks such as social capital 
theory or network analysis, which do not follow rational choice tradition. These new 
perspectives have gained scholarly attentions surprisingly fast, so that a large numbers of new 
studies can have been benefited from their creativeness.  
Their main contribution comes from the theoretical attention to relationships. This is a 
new turn in social science in the sense that some social phenomena could be better explained by 
examining the interactions of multiple actors. Behavioral theories including methods exclusively 
dependent on the attributes of selected variables (Ragin, 1987) are unable to explain variances 
within a case. In contrast, relational approaches make explanation of these variances possible by 
allowing for manipulation of relational variables such as an intensity of relations or pattern of 
relationships (Powell, 1990: 301).  
The second significant theoretical advancement of relational approaches is closely related 
to their interpretation of rationality. As stated above, if collective action is the sum of individual 
                                               
5
 It has to be mentioned that rationality does not mean the universality of a choice. Rational choices are 
inevitably „nested‟ because they are rational „only‟ in a given condition. The same choices would be not 
rational at another time or in another context. A famous debate on the „embeddedness‟ of economic 
activities illustrates the wickedness of the concept of rational choice as well. For details, see Granovetter 
(1985). 
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strategic choices, rationality has to function at the assumption level, so as to make individual 
calculation of cost and benefit possible. In contrast, in the relational approaches, behavioral 
strategies could either be rationally chosen or imposed by other criteria such as norms, cultures, 
and social values.
6
 Methodologically, whereas variables derived from individual attributes 
remain relatively stable, relational variables are constantly evolving so that the impacts of 
environmental factors can be accurately explained. 
The emergence of networks in the field of public administration reflects the increasing 
dissatisfaction with existing governance systems, including both market and hierarchy systems 
(Fredrickson, 1999; O‟Toole, 1997; Powell, 1990). The limitations of hierarchical systems in 
post-modern society are self-evident and have been constantly debated since the 1980s. The lack 
of confidence, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in public service delivery of hierarchical systems 
is undeniable. However, turning in the opposite direction toward a market solution seems to have 
not been as successful as desired either. Bureaucratic resistance to structural reforms is still very 
strong, and lack of a performance measurement system brings into serious doubt evaluations of 
organizational effectiveness. At the center of all operational difficulties of reform endeavors, 
however, exists a misunderstanding of the market system.
7
 
The market system operates under an assumption of anonymity. Actors do not imagine 
the possibility of future interactions with the same actors. Price is „assumed‟ to give perfect 
information to every player in the market system. Competition is „assumed‟ to produce allocative 
efficiency. However, as explained in the previous section, a market system operating exclusively 
based on price mechanism is unsuccessful at capturing the intricacies of idiosyncratic, complex, 
                                               
6
 This abandonment of the assumption of rationality is far from new, and has been constantly shown in 
literartures. One of the most referred critics to rationality stems from institutional approach, which is 
introduced by March & Olsen (1984, 1989). Quoting Simon‟s seminal concept of „limited rationality,‟ 
they argued origins of social behaviors could be found in social norms and values, which have been 
„institutionalized‟ for a long period of time. The social capital theory, one of the relational approached, is 
in this respect regarded as an institutional theory on collective actions. 
7
 The network form of governance is regarded as one of the results of market-driven reforms in the field 
of public administration. Some scholars use these concepts interchangeably and do not address the 
differences embedded within them (Olsen, 2006). Their arguments could be justified because both 
approaches share a critical view of the bureaucratic system and serve the same objective of decentralized 
decision making and efficiency maximization. However, it should be noted that each approach is 
fundamentally different more than similar in terms of intellectual backgrounds, major assumptions, and 
other methodological issues such as units of analysis. While this dissertation will not delve into details of 
these differences, it clearly acknowledges that the market and network systems are destined to provide 
different contexts for collective actions. 
  21 
and dynamic exchange (Powell, 1990: 302). In a world in which interdependency has become the 
status quo, information on the route of resources exchanges is as important as information on the 
volume of the exchanges. These routes or paths of resource exchange are usually called „ties‟ 
between „nodes.‟ (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992).  
Factors making these nodes collaborate with one another are not the demand and supply 
impulse but the strength of reciprocal norms and mutual trust. The connections make networks, 
and sustainable networks are expected to decrease transaction costs considerably. A network 
system is eclectic in that it is as flexible as a market system, while its internal relationships 
between actors are as durable as hierarchical organizations. Theoretically, the network form of 
governance system could contain the values of flexibility and stability at the same time. 
Norms of reciprocity and mutual trust constitute the social capital theory. Putnam 
(1993)‟s longitudinal analysis on regional economic development in Italy is often regarded as the 
cornerstone of social capital research tradition. He also advances the network perspective on 
collective action by actively adopting institutional paradigm. Unlike Ostrom(1990), and Powell 
(1990), he conceptualizes state and market as complementary in „civic‟ settings (Putnam, 1993: 
181). He posits that what makes collective action possible is not governance systems per se, such 
as market or hierarchy, but institutional junctures at which these systems and civic traditions are 
interwoven. Hence, collective actions are achieved only when policymakers are well aware of 
the civic background and norms of social life. According to Putnam, societies or regions which 
are well equipped with norms of reciprocity among social actors are more likely to overcome 
collective action problems and thrive collectively. 
Now it is apparent that social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness 
of institutions (Putnam, 1993: 182 italic in original). However, a comprehensive understanding 
of the importance of history and context is only the first step for building a model of „Good 
Governance.‟  
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2.2 WHAT IS GOVERNANCE? 
2.2.1 Defining Governance 
The most frequently used concept in public administration for the last two decades is 
„Governance‟, but surprisingly, there is no established research tradition for governance studies 
yet, although some of academics have tried to build one of their own (Hill & Lynn, 2005: Ingram 
& Lynn, 2994: Lynn, Carolyn, Hill, 2000: 2001: Peters, 2001). Accordingly, conceptual and 
operational definitions of governance are as diverse as the research objectives of governance 
studies. For example, governance has been variously conceptualized as a political process in 
which a community identity and shared values are generated (March & Olsen, 1995), a 
collaborative process for building a harmonious partnership (Jacobs, 2000) or a high capacity to 
make, change, and enforce the rules within which provision and production of public services are 
created and modified (Parks & Oakerson, 2000). In contrast to this capacity-building, process-
oriented definition, some scholars believe the essence of governance lies in its network-like 
relationship among actors across social sectors. Scholars such as O‟Toole (1997) and Milward & 
Provan (2000) represent this perspective. They emphasize the effectiveness of a network 
structure in delivering public services in the context of “Hollow State.” According to them, 
governance is replacing government, which means that the formal institutions of the state and 
their monopoly of legitimate and coercive power (Milward & Provan, 2000: 239) are on the 
decline, and social resources of all kinds are becoming shared across social sectors. Studies on 
governance involve a constant search for a social structure that maximizes social benefits and 
empirical testing of its effectiveness in a variety of settings as well. Recent studies from both 
theoretical and empirical perspectives appear to agree that the network structure is the best 
structural alternative for governmental hierarchy in every aspect.  
A more comprehensive definition of governance is given by Lynn et al (2000). From 
their perspective, governance refers to “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and 
administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported 
goods and services through formal and informal relationships with agents in the public and 
private sectors” (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001: 7). They also clearly acknowledge the 
multiplicity of governance, by citing “two separate intellectual traditions have contributed to the 
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etymology of the term „governance‟ (Milward, 1999: O‟Toole, 1999).” The approaches of rule-
bound institutional public choice and a networked social relationship constitute the field of 
governance study. Likewise, Peters (2001) proposes four models for governance: market 
government, participative government, flexible government, and deregulated government. 
Despite characterizing governance as a universal social transformation, he categorizes it by 
means of multiple dimensions such as policy problems, structure, management, and public 
interests. It is prescriptive because it requires that public officials act in a managerial capacity in 
areas such as problem identification and utilization of environmental resources. But no matter 
how this understanding is insightful, it unintentionally exacerbates the conceptual complexity 
inherent in the multiplicity of definitions of governance.  
Given this lack of integrity in the research tradition, a common denominator of various 
governance studies might be the best resources for better understanding. It may help us to clarify 
conceptual definitions of governance and avoid committing mistakes in conducting empirical 
analysis. The very first step is to understand what has changed in the field of governance studies 
and in what direction this change is heading. 
2.2.2 Understanding Governance 
Very often it is said that governance is replacing government. It is not. What has changed is the 
configuration of relationships among various social organizations, particularly the relationships 
including governmental organizations. As briefly stated, a majority of scholars describe this 
change as the emergence of a networked society, in which public organizations share an equal 
part in a governance regime including private and non-profit organizations as well (Bardach, 
1998: O‟Toole, 1997: Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: Milward & Provan, 2000: Thurmaier & 
Wood, 2002).  
Unlike the hierarchical relationship taken for granted as an organizing principle from the 
early to mid 20
th 
century, no particular pattern of relationship is presumed a priori in the new 
governing regime. This is because as social diversity increases and policy problems get more 
complicated, the need for interdependence across sectors increases exponentially. These changes 
have justified structural rearrangement of governance system. However, haven‟t we always 
turned to organizational restructuring whenever we encounter new problems? When society 
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faces difficulties in adjusting to changing environments, it cyclically changes to an alternative 
governing principle that is thought to better handle the vexing problems at present (Kauffman, 
1956: Wise, 2002). And haven‟t we experienced that organizational reform is always 
accompanied by unintentional, unexpected, and severe problems? Here it should be noted that 
the structure-based understanding of governance is in itself very limited since it completely 
ignores the possibility of functional transformation of a given structure when it meets 
unprecedented and unexpected demands of society. Maybe what we need at this point is a more 
systematic understanding of the transformation of governance systems so as to untangle the 
complexities of policy problems at hand. The understanding of governance requires a creative 
framework in which the multi-dimensional aspect of governance can be described. The next 
section begins with critiques of existing models of governance and then sets a theoretical 
foundation for integrative modes of governance. 
2.3 MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNANCE 
2.3.1 Structural Perspective on Governance 
The tradition of behavioralism in the field of public administration has heavily relied on the 
characteristics of governing structures in explaining variances in individual or organizational 
behaviors. Structures, then, constitute the fundamental component of the governing system. They 
can be broadly defined as institutionalized rules or norms of social interactions. They become 
embedded in social systems in such a way that they shape the behaviors of actors by 
circumscribing options for choice. In this manner existing structures tend to be reinforced and 
solidified.  
A countless number of empirical studies have attempted to measure the diversity of these 
structures in an effort to evaluate their influence on human behaviors and organizational 
effectiveness. Overall, degree of fragmentation of governance structure has been regarded as a 
significant factor in explaining such variances. Regarding to my theoretical as well as empirical 
subject, which is an explanation of variances of inter-organizational collaboration, the structural 
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perspective on governance would make an explanation far simpler. If there are institutional 
structures that regulate individuals to cooperate with pre-designated partners, collective actions 
should occur with a great certainty. But a more elementary question remains unanswered. How 
do we conceptualize structure? Is the definition of structure monolithic? 
In order to avoid conceptual ambiguities, a clearer definition of governance structure is a 
necessity. Structure refers to the way in which parts are arranged or put together to form a whole. 
In social sciences, it is often defined as an organizing principle of society. We have 
conceptualized this principle dichotomously. 
Definitions of the structural dichotomy of decentralization and centralization are 
relatively self-evident. But the criteria dividing the two opposing concepts are intrinsically 
complex as well. At least two perspectives on the structural fragmentation and centralization can 
be identified. One stresses the political level at which decisions are made, while the other is 
interested in the number of subunits comprising the whole. It is also related to the question of 
distribution of power and authority. In a fragmented system, actors are likely to have a broad 
range of autonomy in decision-making process, while in a centralized system local discretion is 
generally constrained in order for collective interests to be put forward. 
 
 
 
Fragmented                   Centralized 
 
 
(Market)                       (Network)         (Hierarchy) 
Figure 2-1. Structural Perspective on Governance 
 
 
A centralized governance system, represented as a structural hierarchy in <Figure 2-1>, is 
assumed to have at least two functional advantages. The most significant argument can be found 
in the Weber‟s belief in rational bureaucracy. Since the birth of the discipline of public 
administration, the hierarchical form of bureaucracy has been regarded as the best organizational 
structure for governance as it holds public officials accountable while at the same time 
maximizing functional effectiveness. It works properly under conditions where the task 
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environment is known and unchanging, where it can be treated as a closed system (Chisholm, 
1989: 10). Even when its rigidity to environmental changes and its inability to solve „wicked‟ 
social problems are criticized by the public, this system has survived because of its strength in 
stability. The second structural advantage of a hierarchy comes from transaction cost economics. 
According to transaction cost economists, a hierarchy arises when the boundaries of an 
organization expand to internalize transactions and resource flows (Williamson, 1985). The 
strength of a hierarchical organization is its reliability –its capacity for producing large numbers 
of goods and services of a given quality repeatedly- and its accountability –its ability to 
document how resources have been used (Powell, 1990: 303).  
When it comes to the issue of governance, hierarchy can be most efficient if it does not 
have to deal with massive transaction costs. In other words, as I will argue below, when 
individual benefits are highly compatible with collective interests, the hierarchical mode of 
governance does not incur any serious transaction cost problems at all. 
The same logic can be applied to the fragmented mode of governance. In the context of 
structural fragmentation, there exist a number of independent actors, and so a number of 
individual interests. This structural arrangement represents the situation of a perfect market. No 
one relies on someone else for additional information because the market price carries all 
information needed for exchange. Furthermore, since individual behavior is not dictated by a 
supervising agent, no organ of systemwide regulation is necessary (Powell, 1990: 302). 
However, when transaction costs are taken into consideration in market interactions, in other 
words, when an assumption of the perfect market does not hold any more, information provided 
by price becomes tainted, and finally, interactions in the market system result in social 
inefficiency. 
In sum, theoretically, hierarchy and fragmentation of governing structures engender 
different patterns of collaboration. At the extremes on the continuum introduced above, 
collaboration can be easily achieved regardless of whether there are opportunistic players or not. 
Self-interest (market) and strong chain of command (hierarchy) do not allow a situation that 
requires an actor‟s commitment for future actions. If they worked as theory anticipates, both 
governance structures would optimize social efficiency in private (market) and public (hierarchy) 
sectors respectively. 
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However, real life does not function as theory might expect. There is neither a perfect 
market nor a seamless hierarchy. Every society is located between two extremes of market and 
bureaucracy. Particularly from a managerial viewpoint, the phenomenon of „blurring the 
boundary‟ across social sectors necessitates an alternative organizational structure. In this sense, 
there is no longer a structural dichotomy, even at the conceptual level.  
The more flexible, adaptable and horizontal structure of network has come to be of more 
interest to those who have adopted a relational perspective on collective action problems in the 
field of governance studies. In contrast to hierarchies, networks coordinate through less formal 
and more egalitarian and cooperative means (Thompson et al, 1993: 171). In a network structure, 
in contrast to the market structure, interactions tend to be sustained by ties linking participants. 
As O‟Toole (1997) summarizes, the notion of a network excludes mere formal hierarchies and 
perfect markets, but it includes a very wide of range of structures in between. In networks, 
administrators cannot be expected to exercise decisive leverage by virtue of their formal position 
(O‟Toole, 1997: 45). 
The “wickedness” inherent in modern policy problems also poses challenges that cannot 
be handled by dividing them up into simple pieces in near isolation from each other (O‟Toole, 
1997: 46) as worked in the past. This near-decomposability of policy problems is the one of the 
major reasons the idea of a network is being treated more seriously. 
Besides structural strength dealing with complex problems at hand, a network structure is 
thought to provide a competitive advantage in the context of „Hollow State.‟ History shows that 
both public and private sector have developed specific organizing principles and operate under 
indigenous norms and rules of their own. However, there has been no serious attention paid to 
how to link these two sectors without a severe interference on each sector‟s main principles. Past 
attempts to link the two are full of mistakes that committed by imprudent transplant of one 
sector‟s rules to the other. Just as the application of top-down policy implementation such as 
“great society” programs generate enormous amounts of efficiency loss, a market-based 
approach to public policy has shaken public values such as accountability, equity, and 
representativeness. The network form of governance structure might be a good alternative to 
both the market and hierarchy structures. It should be noted, however, that the interest in network 
as a governance structure does not mean networks are being created to resolve dilemmas 
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embedded in inter-sectoral problems. The network approach still remains merely a theoretical 
lens through which the once invisible connections across sectors can be better described.  
Furthermore, regardless of the rosy promises the network advocates offering, one cannot 
claim that network research successfully constitutes a coherent research tradition.
8
 This 
dissertation strongly believes that the effectiveness of network as a governance structure cannot 
be appraised unless it takes the procedural perspective into consideration.  
2.3.2 Procedural Perspective on Governance 
The procedural perspective on governance is based on two distinctive types of political processes 
- aggregation and integration. Both of them are seen as social and political processes of 
collective decision-making or collaboration. When placed within the context of an American 
public ethos, collective decision-making or collaboration can be understood as a process that is 
founded in two competing political traditions: classical liberalism and civic republicanism. 
According to Thomson & Perry, classical liberalism views collaboration as a process that 
aggregates private preferences into collective choices through self-interested bargaining, while 
civic republicanism views collaboration as an integrative process that treats differences as the 
basis for deliberation in order to arrive at “mutual understanding, a collective will, trust and 
sympathy and the implementation of shared preferences” (Thomson & Perry, 2006: 20).  
Their theoretical background can be traced back to the seminal work on institutionalism 
addressed by March & Olsen. Their definitions of modes of political processes are more 
sophisticated and specific in depth. For them, a mode of aggregation is a political process that 
allocates scarce resources in a way that is satisfactory, without eliminating the pluralism of 
interests and values. In this respect, political systems are similar to economic systems built 
around competitive markets and prices (March & Olsen, 1989: 119-120).  
Understanding the integrative mode of political process requires understanding of the 
somewhat complicated theory of action. March & Olsen argue that, unlike with the aggregative 
mode, under certain circumstances local interests become integrated and a collective identity is 
                                               
8 For example, Thompson (2003) claims that networks are both a conceptual category or tool of analysis 
and an object of analysis in the form of an actual mode of coordination and governance (Thompson, 
2003: 6). 
  29 
shared by members of a community. This process is encouraged by transformation of individual 
cognition of interests from self-centered to society-shared (Argyris & Schon, 1997: Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991: Scott, 1995). Integration of various interests has become particularly important 
in light of recent governance experiences in which multiples actors from diverse social sectors 
coexist and interact, while each actor still carries out its sector-specific rationale of action.  
 
 
Aggregation             Integration 
 
Competition  Cooperation      Coordination        Command/Control 
(Market)    (Mutual Adjustment)      (Policy Integration)    (Bureaucracy)  
 
Figure 2-2. Procedural Perspective on Governance 
 
 
Hidden in this continuum of <Figure 2.2> is the dilemma of duel identity. Every 
individual in society has a dual identity which often creates an intrinsic tension between self-
interest and a collective interest. Thomson & Perry (2006) quotes Huxham (1996), who refers to 
this tension as the autonomy-accountability dilemma. When individual interest is identical to 
collective interest, there is no need for a social mechanism by which the tension can be resolved. 
But reality does not allow for this ideal social equilibrium. But we still need this idealized social 
system for the sake of theoretical and empirical purposes, so that we can develop more practical 
kinds of political mechanisms. 
<Figure 2.2> provides four different types of mechanisms, two of which stand for 
theoretical ideals of governance systems. The first mode of governance, competition, can be 
easily found in economics textbooks. The social process of interaction in this mode is briefly 
introduced in the section above that deals with issues of collective action. Market theory, present 
in the mode of aggregation, predicts that social interactions are not repeated, and the sole cause 
of these interactions is the pursuit of self-interest maximization. Resources are best used by those 
who value those most, so the rate of return for these resources will be maximized. While far from 
what is intended, the aggregate results of countless instances of competition over resources 
produce a socially optimized outcome. This is known as Pareto-Optimum. Although it sounds 
quite appealing, it is also well-known that the competitive strategy is fundamentally limited 
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when it is applied to reality. The perfect market based on perfect information is no more than an 
ideological myth. Especially in the public sector, full of public goods and services, the mode of 
competition is hardly visible.  
At the opposite extreme, we can see the governing process of command and control. 
Actors in this system are not allowed to pursue their own interests. Individual interests are 
perfectly integrated into the collective or group interest, so that individuals function only as a 
functional unit in the whole system. Scholarly efforts to find the perfect span of control at the 
dawn of public administration represent the core idea of this mode of governance. 
The remaining two modes of governance are worth a more detailed explanation. In 
<Figure 2.2> the major determinant distinguishing the cooperative mode of governance from the 
mode of coordination is the logic of action and the intensity of collective identity. In cooperation, 
the primary motivation of actions is a perception of self-interest and rational calculation of cost 
and benefits. But unlike the endless competition for resources assumed in the competition mode, 
actors in the cooperative mode start to feel the need for collective action to realize collective 
benefits.
9
 This description resembles the society that Lindblom calls „Pluralism.‟ Although self-
interests and individual identities are as diverse as in the mode of competition, this mode is much 
more developed in that the inherent problems of collective action are now recognized and its 
solutions are creatively addressed. The concept of transaction cost is introduced, and the function 
of collective actions is differently defined. The cooperative mode of governance is the process of 
transforming diverse volitions into a collective choice. The common strategy observed in this 
tradition would be mutual adjustment. It embraces all forms of highly multilateral exercises of 
influence and power, including, but by no means limited to, bargaining (Lindblom, 1993: 240). It 
is a give-and-take system, but the results do not have to be optimized. Individuals start to have 
dual identity –individual and collective. Interests are balanced by the aggregative mode, but its 
process now occurs outside economic realm. In short, in the mode of cooperation, self-interest 
maximization remains the first and foremost goal, while the strategy to achieve it is 
fundamentally changed. The process of cooperation does not maximize allocative efficiency, but 
it can achieve a high level of efficiency by minimizing transaction costs to a considerable extent.  
                                               
9 Multiple reasons such as transaction cost and „the shadow of the future‟ can explain the modal transition 
from competition to cooperation. 
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The final mode is called the coordinated mode of governance. As assumed in the mode of 
cooperation, achieving interest maximization is still a valid objective of independent actors. But 
unlike in the cooperative mode, interests are accommodated via an integrative social process. 
The vocabulary of coordination is selected to reflect the fact that in this mode of governance, 
individual interests could be influenced by a third party enforcer who is not a direct participant in 
interactions. This enforcer does not have to be a human or organizational agent. It would be more 
accurate to define it as social institutions such as social norms, rules or standard procedures, all 
of which provide criteria for appropriate social interactions.
10
 Accordingly, society as a whole is 
able to have its own interests, which are fundamentally different from the sum of the individual 
interests. Occasionally these two kinds of interests generate conflicts which necessitate an 
individual‟s sacrifice for others‟ benefit. The mode of coordination is thus a social mechanism 
through which two conflicting interests are accommodated and temporarily resolved. 
Undoubtedly, the four modes of governance have their own advantages and weaknesses. 
But looking at <Figure 2.2>, we are not able to explain why one society has developed one mode 
of governance while other society displays others. For instance, one may ask why one society 
can successfully launch privatization of public services while another cannot. The possible 
answer lies in <Figure 2.3>, the integrative framework of governance.  
2.4 THE INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNANCE 
Although the previous discussion about the modes of governance helps clarify the conceptual 
ambiguities inherent in governance studies, it only presents a partial picture. This section 
provides an integrative framework of modes of governance, in which a combination of the 
structural and procedural dimensions of governance provides a systemic categorization of 
governance systems. 
                                               
10
 According to March & Olsen, politics are organized by either logic of consequentiality or logic of 
appropriateness. In logic of consequentiality, behaviors are driven by preferences and expectations about 
consequences. In logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, actions stem from a conception of necessity 
rather than preference (March & Olsen, 1989: 160-161).  
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Figure 2-3. Modes of Governance: Integrative Framework 
 
<Figure 2.3> summarizes how governance systems have been figured in accordance with 
interaction of structures and political processes. Multiple modes of governance are defined and 
put into place in two-dimensional space.   
Unlike the uni-dimensional frameworks depicted in <Figure 2.1> and <Figure 2.2>, the 
framework in <Figure 2.3> makes it possible to read the dynamics that diverse social attributes 
jointly produce. Each of the four boxes indicates a particular mode of governance, which is 
institutionally circumscribed by structural and procedural attributes of social systems.  
It can easily be predicted from this framework that actors in a structurally centralized 
society are likely to follow the norms of command and control or coordination. Conversely, it is 
clear that where decision-making authorities are widely dispersed, autonomous actors will tend 
to maximize their self-interests using the strategies of competition or cooperation.  
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2.4.1 The Four Cs: Modes of Governance and Collaboration 
From <Figure 2.3> we can see that there is no articulated governance mode in either the 
Aggregation-Centralized (A-C) or Integration-Decentralized quadrants (I-D).
11
 This confines the 
scope of our focus to the remaining two quadrants: Aggregation-Decentralized (A-D) and 
Integration-Centralized (I-C).  
The contents of each mode of governance were briefly described in the last section. 
However, the earlier discussion was only a simple, single-dimensional, and deterministic 
conceptualization of how collective actions are achieved. It did not demonstrate how we can 
correctly distinguish between modes of governance. In order for the modal approach to 
governance to gain credence at least three questions need to be appropriately answered. 
First, what determines a particular mode of governance? Second, is there any relationship 
between modes of governance and level of collaboration? And last but not least, does each mode 
of governance lead to development of a particular pattern of collaboration? 
When studying governance, the importance of collaboration should be properly addressed 
as can distinguish modes of governance by careful observation of collaborative activities 
between individual actors. If we are interested only in policy decision-making in the closed 
system, a multiple-dimensional governance framework is not necessary. But in a situation where 
uncontrollable complexities emerge around policy problems and local actors are not capable of 
dealing with these kinds of problems any more, collective policy activities are called upon more 
frequently. Unfortunately these policy activities, in other words collaboration, can neither be 
described nor explained by the old framework of governance. This is why I have developed an 
integrative or more systematic framework of governance in which collaboration can be 
appropriately understood. This integrative framework can provide an accurate picture not only of 
governance mechanisms but also of plausible causal relationships between modes of governance 
and collaborative policy activities. 
                                               
11 We may put social capital and deliberate democracy theory in the dimension of A-D. Both theories base 
their theoretical background on communicative rationality (Habermas) philosophically, and put an 
emphasis on trust between social actors. However, their usefulness in practice seems to be quite limited 
because they do not yet provide an answer to „How.‟ Regarding the A-C dimension, the model of 
corporatism looks to fit, but its generalizability is highly questionable given the fact this model has 
developed only within a specific Scandinavian cultural context.  
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In the following subsections, the four modes of governance are reintroduced in a more 
systemic manner, and the relationships between each governance mode and collaboration will be 
illustrated as well. 
2.4.1.1  Competition 
While a pure form of competitive mode of governance does not exist in reality, this form has 
value it that it acts as a theoretical ideal to which the reality can be compared. As displayed in 
<Figure 2.4>, the mode of competition can exist only in the context of an absolutely 
decentralized governance structure. No asymmetry of power and resource distribution is allowed, 
and perfect decision-making authority should be secured at the hand of individuals. Competition 
is possible only in the context of egalitarian resource endowment.  
The procedural assumption of competition is as unreal as the structural one. As Olson 
(1965) shows, the collective result of competition is not social equilibrium, but a society full of 
collective action problems. Structural decentralization secures free expression of preferences and 
unilateral pursuit of self-interests. But ironically, a combination of the two dimensions drives us 
to be wary of future that would be created in an environment of pure competition.  
Collaboration in a competitive mode of governance is identical with exchange of goods 
and services. All exchanges are basically random, and participants in the exchanges do not need 
to be aware of whom they are interacting with. The relationship among actors terminates when 
the exchange is completed. Both anonymity of identity and randomness of interactions seem to 
be necessary on the one hand, but it does impede the establishment of long-term and reciprocal 
relationships. As societies are now recognizing the negative situations that unregulated 
competition can lead to, the value of enduring relationships is becoming more appreciated.  
2.4.1.2  Command and Control 
As in the case of competition, the mode of command and control is an idealized concept against 
which real governance systems are compared. It is located at the right end of the diagonal in 
<Figure 2.4>. The graphical description shows that the governance mode of command and 
control is highly expected when the two conditions of structural hierarchy and integrative interest 
accommodation are met. Structurally, this mode requires the a hierarchical design of authority 
structure and highly specified task of tightly coupled system (Comfort, 1999: 24). Procedurally, a 
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more culturally and politically integrated society is prone to the social interaction based on 
authoritative command and tight control. A combination of these two conditions would lead to 
an emergence of the mode of command and control. 
Issues of collaboration in this governance mode have rarely been addressed for a number 
of reasons. First, in a hierarchically organized society, following rules and standard procedures is 
coerced by legal instruments. There is no doubt that in this unified structure, any attempt to 
pursue self-interest would be harshly punished. 
The horizontal collaboration is not expected in different perspective. According to 
Simon, social systems are nearly decomposable, in which interactions among the subsystems are 
weak (Simon, 1996: 197). From his interest in dealing with complexity, hierarchy has a 
prominent value in the strength in controlling „inner environment‟ of the whole system. The 
design technique is to discover viable ways of decomposing it into semi-independent 
components corresponding to its many functional parts (Simon, 1996: 128). The effectiveness of 
a whole system, then, depends on how well the independent parts perform their pre-designated 
functions. In terms of initial design, there is little reason for each subunit to collaborate with 
others who specialize in unrelated functions. From this argument we may not expect to observe 
collaboration in a mode of command and control system. 
2.4.1.3  Cooperation 
In a neoclassical market system, individuals make welfare-maximizing choices. The aggregated 
outcome of numerous choices is Pareto-optimum, in which preferences of independent actors are 
perfectly balanced. But the four major assumptions of this system - no externalities, no scale 
economic, no decision costs, and fixed preferences - produce widespread recognition of the need 
for the alternative modes of governance (Alt, Levi, & Ostrom, 1999). 
One structural alternative, which can be defined as network has gained considerable 
attention from both academics and professionals. A network has been defined as “any collection 
of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same 
time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise 
during the exchange” (Podolny & Page, 1998: 59). This kind of structure is distinguished from a 
intra-organizational networks, which subsume relations between and among actors under a 
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governance structure that handles conflict resolution and channels behaviors (Fountain, 2001: 
65).  
A more serious concern with respect to networks comes from the procedural perspective. 
For example, while a network structure functions to provide a path for communication and 
resources exchange, there is no agreement on how to manage it or on who is responsible for the 
outcomes. Since there is no overarching rule to regulate network participants, the system as a 
whole is always exposed to the shirking behaviors of network participants. Individuals are likely 
to join a network when benefits from the network exceed the costs of participation. In other 
words, collaboration is an interest maximization strategy lacking the structurally enforced 
compliance of hierarchical structures. Collaborative outcomes through a network system are 
understood as an aggregation of exchanges. This aggregating process can be seen as “converting 
individual wants and resources into collective action by discovering and implementing policy 
coalitions that arrange Pareto-improving exchanges among citizens (March & Olsen, 1995: 12).” 
As this type of mode does exist in reality, empirical inquiry on collaboration under a 
mode of cooperation is as important as theoretical inquiry. Explaining variances in the intensity 
and pattern of collaboration across societies can have both empirical and prescriptive values in 
governance studies. 
The structural explanation of collaboration predicts that the more decentralized a system 
is, the less collaborative actors will be. This hypothesis will be tested in chapter four by 
comparing the two metropolitan regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. At the same time, the 
procedural mode of governance will be measured and the combined effects of structure and 
procedure will be examined as well. 
2.4.1.4  Coordination 
The final mode of governance is relatively not well-acknowledged in governance studies 
compared to the others, but it has recently gained increasing attention. Like the cooperative mode 
explained above, strict and unrealistic assumptions are somewhat loosened here as well. The 
coordination mode, however, is distinguished from the cooperative mode of governance in that 
the roles of institutional rules are differently interpreted. 
In an aggregated mode of interest accommodation as exists in the cooperative mode, 
institutional rules are one of the factors that influence rational calculation of actors. They are 
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intentionally designed to address a particular interest in a society so that their distributional 
effects are far from social justice (Knight, 1992). However, only if the distributional gaps are 
fully compensated can the society as a whole remain stable. In other words, where interests are 
accommodated in the aggregative mode, social stability cannot be assured. 
The issue of resolving conflicts of interest is also differently addressed here. In the 
integrative dimension in <Figure 2.3>, conflicts are possibly resolved because actors are 
concerned not only with their self-interest but also with the common good of the community. 
Governance in this mode of conflict resolution involves creating capable political actors who 
understand how political institutions work and are able to deal with them effectively. It is about 
building and supporting cultures of rights and rules that make agreement possible. It also 
involves building and supporting identities, preferences, and resources that make a polity 
possible (March & Olsen, 1995: 28). Proper citizens are assumed to act in ways consistent with 
common purposes that are not reducible to the aggregation of their separate self-interest 
(Spragens, 1990). 
Where this mode is different from the mode of cooperation is that the behaviors of actors 
are better depicted as rule-following. This does not necessarily mean that there is no self-interest. 
Actors are still eager to pursue their own interests whenever it is possible. But when an actor 
faces the moment of choosing between collective and individual identity, from the perspective of 
coordination, he is expected to pick the collective one. It is worth repeating that in the context 
where a decision-making authority is located above the individual level, actors tend to follow 
group identity and show a high level of compliance to collective objectives. 
This type of interest accommodation process has been defined as the integrative mode of 
governance. And we already argued that the emergence of this mode could be greatly facilitated 
when an appropriate form of governance structure supports it. The structural condition of the 
mode of coordination is a network arrangement where actors are unduly connected to one 
another without central authority. As stated in section 2.3.1, the main advantage of a network 
structure over a market structure is structural endurance, as its flexibility is evaluated as the 
strength over hierarchy. Whereas interactions in market systems are random and short-lived, 
interactions between network participants are often enduring as well as reciprocal. Whether 
intentional or not, repeated patterns of interactions occasionally become norms or standard 
procedures that regulate future interactions. Likewise, as a network is not as structurally 
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integrated as a hierarchy, the absence of a perfect control system in a network system enables 
interactions to become gradually embedded in institutional environments (Granovetter, 1985). 
While the mode of cooperative governance depends on a purely calculative explanation of 
network formation and collaborative activities by network participants, collaboration is 
accounted for as an embedded economic and political activity in the ongoing structure of social 
relationships (Fountain, 2001: 69).  
As can be seen, each mode of governance has its own strengths and weaknesses. But as 
concepts, these modes are rarely useful unless their applicability is assessed by empirical 
analyses. The next section will deal with the practical value of modal approaches to governance 
and how an integrative framework can help us understand the dynamics between real actors. 
2.5 GOVERNANCE AT WORK: REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Until now we have discussed about how differently arranged structures and culturally embedded 
collective decision-making processes result in variances in the modes of governance and how 
collaborative activities are distinctively characterized in each mode of governance.  
This section provides empirical cases to which the theoretical framework of governance 
is applied. The political arena of U.S. metropolitan regions serve well as empirical cases because, 
first, they consist of hundreds of self-interest oriented local governments, and second, each 
region differs in terms of governance structure and political process. This study aims to harness 
the inherent complexities of a metropolis and theoretically categorize them within the integrative 
framework of governance. 
2.5.1 Logics of Regional Governance 
The historical transformation of metropolitan or regional governance can best be described as a 
serious of attempts to deal with7 harmful collective action problems (Brenner, 2002: Feiock, 
2004, 2004: Frisken & Norris, 2001: Harrigan & Vogel, 2001: LeLand & Thurmaier, 2004, 
2005:  Miller, 2002: Miller et al., 1995: Mitchell-Weaver et al., 2000: Oakerson, 2004: Ostrom, 
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1972: Schester, 1996: Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000: Wallis, 1994b: 1994c). No matter how 
different each effort is regarding theoretical preferences and policy recommendations, 
organizational restructuring has always been a primary policy instrument for dealing with the 
problems at hand. But under what conditions these restructurings have taken place has not been 
not well accounted for. Urban scholars have not clearly acknowledged how the procedural 
perspective on governance brings clarity in understanding regional governance.  
Taking the procedural perspective into consideration, this study provides a creative 
framework within which each advocate of regional organizational reform is positioned. <Figure 
2.4> presents how modes of governance are applied to a regional level. 
The four schools of thoughts in regional governance are identified and put into the boxes 
each mode of governance represents. From the upper left, polycentricism, institutional collective 
action (ICA), new regionalism and consolidationism stand for the ideological background of 
each mode of governance. 
Although these schools of thought are all different in terms of theoretical assumptions 
and prescriptive recommendations with respect to regional policy problems, they share the 
primary policy goal of overcoming metropolitan collective action problems, particularly in the 
policy field of economic development.
12
  
                                               
12 Although this dissertation does not directly deal with cultural perspectives on regional governance, its 
influence on theory development is essential. For instance, the main arguments of Elazar (1970)‟s 
articulation of American political culture are surprisingly similar to the procedural aspect of the 
institutional perspective on regional governance in particular. According to Elazar, American political 
culture is rooted in two contrasting conceptions of the American political order, both of which can be 
traced back to the earliest settlement of the country. In the first, the political order is conceived as a 
marketplace in which the primary public relationships are products of bargaining among individuals and 
groups acting out of self-interest. In the second, the political order is conceived to be a commonwealth – a 
state in which the whole people have an undivided interest – in which the citizens cooperate in an effort to 
create and maintain the best government in order to implement certain shared moral principles (Elazar, 
2003: 258-259). There is no doubt Elazar conceptualizes the mode of aggregation as the individualistic 
political culture while the mode of integration is perceived as the moralistic political culture.  
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Figure 2-4. Theories of Regional Governance 
2.5.2 Regionalism: An Old Debate 
2.5.2.1  Progressive Reform: Toward Metropolitan Government 
In the late 19
th
 century, when the rapid modernization of cities caused unprecedented social 
problems, open-minded reformers realized that the fragmented local system was no longer 
responding effectively to social problems. They quickly turned to an allegedly structural 
centralization as an imminent solution. Miller (2002) explains this reform movement of this 
period by quoting Hooker (1917), saying “The enlarging of the city to match the real 
metropolitan community is the natural method of dealing advantageously with metropolitan city 
planning problems.” This centralists‟ proposal was to create region-wide governments by 
consolidating local governments or annexing unincorporated areas surrounding central cities.  
To Progressive reformers, the question of urban government reform was presented as a 
search for correspondence between the functional territory (the urban area) and the institutional 
territory (the existing local government structure) (Lefevre, 1998). They expected that a 
consolidated government with a centralized authority could resolve this mismatch between scope 
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of problems and jurisdictional boundaries. At the same time, the metropolitan level government 
was believed to have the ability to provide a more efficient solution in dealing with seemingly 
duplicated services, corruption, and increasing turf wars among local jurisdictions. In his 
chronological study of metropolitan government in American history, Brennan (2006) indicates, 
however, that although the Progressive Era reformers attracted political attention successfully, 
the adoption of reform programs was hardly universal because the issues of political 
representation were not properly considered. This, along with the Great Depression, caused the 
Progressive reform efforts for metropolitan government to gradually disappear. 
2.5.2.2  Public Choice and ‘Voting by Feet’ 
The most influential critique of Progressive reform toward structural consolidation was Tiebout‟s 
famous theoretical conceptualization of „voting by feet (1956).‟ His article is regarded as the first 
attempt to view metropolitan problems and solutions from the perspective of individual choice. 
His theory argues for a market-like system of local governance, which was believed to have the 
capacity to optimize allocative efficiency (Oates, 1972). The decentralized decision-making 
authority engenders various revenue-expenditure patterns, and according to Tiebout, given these 
patterns, the consumer-voter moves to the community whose service package satisfies his set of 
preferences best. In sum, the greater the number of communities and the greater the variance 
among them is, the closer the consumer will come to fully realize his preference position 
(Tiebout, 1956: 418). 
Equally important, his article effectively called into question the need for extensive use of 
region-wide metropolitan government structures in the United States (Brennan, 2006: 248). He 
explains the failure of Progressive reforms by commenting “The general disdain with which 
proposal to integrate municipalities are met seems to reflect, in part, the fear local revenue-
expenditure patterns will be lost as communities are merged into a metropolitan are (Tiebout, 
1956; 423)”  
Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren‟s (1961) concept of a „polycentric political system‟ reflects 
well how political conflicts could be managed in a decentralized system. Although recent 
proponents of polycentricity of local governance (McGinnis, 1999: Peterson, 1981: Parks & 
Oakerson, 1989, 1993, 2000: Schneider, 1989) have attempted to overcome the methodological 
naivety of Tiebout‟s model, the core idea is still influential without major modification. 
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The significance of Ostrom et al (1961)‟s article is receiving recognition from proponents 
of different perspectives, especially those of network analysis because they were the first ones to 
correctly acknowledge the importance of horizontal or inter-local relations. They argue that “to 
minimize the costs of conflict to their power positions, administrators of local government 
agencies in metropolitan areas have tended to develop an extensive system of communication 
about each other‟s experience and to negotiate standards of performance applicable to various 
types of public services (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961: 842).” The focus on communication 
and negotiation between local agencies explains the recent explosive interest in collaboration in 
public administration and management field of discipline. From the perspective of this research 
tradition, regional governance refers to the professional management of complex relations of 
local governments.  
2.5.3 Regionalism: New Debate 
Any hope for adoption of comprehensive metropolitan governments ended with the 1960s. 
Public administration scholars eventually understood the political impediments to metropolitan 
consolidation were real.  
This does not necessarily mean that the Tiebout‟s argument is in fact absolutely valid. 
Public choice tradition in the field of local and urban governance has also been criticized for its 
ignorance of political values such as equity, justice, and good governance. In a situation where 
neither a political consolidation nor a market-based exchange model is feasible, scholarly 
attention has been converged to build a structurally flexible and functionally effective 
governance model, particularly at the metropolitan level. Two main theoretical models are 
identified here.  
2.5.3.1  Regions that consist of collaboration: Institutional Collective Action 
Originating with Ostrom et al (1961), the importance of relations has been increasingly 
recognized by multiple schools of thought. One of them is a group of scholars who advocate a 
framework of Institutional Collective Action (ICA). Their major contribution comes from the 
recognition of the importance of voluntary cooperation and strategic behaviors of actors. 
According to the leading advocate (Feiock, 2004a: 6), ICA is the mechanism by which 
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cooperation is achieved among local governments, between levels of governments, and between 
local government units and other actors in the community. ICA provides the “glue” that holds an 
institutionally fragmented community together and is motivated by a desire to achieve a 
collective benefit that could not be realized by solitary action (Feiock, 2002).
13
 It emerges as the 
result of a dynamic political contracting process among local government units facing a 
collective action problem (North, 1990: Libecap, 1989 quoted in Feiock, 2004a: 7). It is also a 
remarkable theoretical progression from the polycentric perception of regional governance in 
that it takes the issue of redistribution into account. Since institutions always carry distributional 
bias, individual behavior constrained by institutions becomes evidently redistributional.
14
 So the 
strategies taken are inevitably „nested‟ in the existing institutional arrangement (Tsebelis, 1990). 
However, while it successfully addresses a core problem which American metropolitan 
regions are living with, the ICA framework does not provide a coherent mechanism in which 
policy objectives can be shared and regional civil societies can be created, even though 
proponents clearly recognize the significance of the issue (Feiock, 2004a: 6: Post, 2004: 76). 
From the ICA perspective, local governments are mobilized to pursue self-interests within the 
context of the institutional constraints placed upon them. Diverse interests are merely assumed to 
be accommodated by voluntary coalitions, and only in cases where the interests are compatible 
with one another. Most importantly, although ICA explains patterns of regional governance, it 
scarcely pays attention to the „region‟ itself. This does not mean ICA ignores the importance of 
the metropolitan regions in the academic inquiry of local governance. As Feiock points out, ICA 
                                               
13 Paradoxically, Feiock elucidates why collective benefit cannot be a motivation of strategic behaviors in 
another of his articles (Feiock, 2004b: 294).  
14
 In Tiebout‟s model, distributional inequality is plainly regarded as the result of aggregations of 
individual preferences. Peoples live in a poor community because they „choose‟ to live there. Since a 
market system is developed based on „one-time interaction‟ between anonymous individuals, anything 
deflecting the free choice of individuals is regarded as „bad,‟ because it deters efficient working of the 
price system. A market system operates based on the supply-and-demand function. If a person does not 
have resources with which she can join in the market interaction, she simply disappears from sight. In 
contrast, in the ICA model, distributional consequences of interaction are clearly seen for two reasons. 
First, unlike with a market-like system, ICA assumes that interactions are iterated (Steinacker, 2004). This 
means that the distributional consequences of the first interaction are naturally considered in following 
interactions among actors. Second, in a situation ICA imagines, actors come to perceive their gains in 
comparison to their neighbors‟ gains, because they are well aware that the present distributional 
consequences definitely affects expected gains in the future. In this respect, unlike with the absolute gain 
perception, capability of making an accurate estimation of distributional consequences is a major attribute 
of successful actors or organizations. 
  44 
is based on a belief that “local governments can act collectively to create a civil society that 
integrates a region across multiple jurisdictions through a web of voluntary agreements and 
associations and collective choices by citizens (Feiock, 2004a: 6).” However, the significance of 
the “region” as a research subject is not well addressed. Instead of being seen as an important 
factor in explaining variances in local governments across the country, regions, from the ICA 
perspective, seem to be perceived as the playing field of local actors, or the geographic boundary 
within which the results of cooperative behaviors of actors are realized.
15
 This passive definition 
of region is not able to embrace the emerging significance of a region as an economic and social 
community in which a collective identity is created as well as broadly shared. 
2.5.3.2  Regions that nuture collaborative actors: Emergence of New Regionalism 
Even though the polycentric model of regional governance has been reinforced for decades, 
arguments for consolidation and centralization of governments have been recurrently empowered 
as well. In accordance, a number of regions such as Miami, Portland, the Twin Cities, Louisville, 
Indianapolis, and Kansas City have successfully managed the complex process of structural 
consolidation.
16
 
According to Wallis (1994c), whereas past attempts at building a consolidated system of 
metropolitan governance aimed to maximize efficiency by internalizing transaction costs, new 
regionalists take the competitive advantage of the region as a primary policy goal (Brenner, 
2002: Foster, 1997: Dodge, 1996: Downs, 1994: Feiock, 2002, Hambleton, Savitch & Stewart, 
2003: Post, 2004: Savitch & Kantor, 2002: Scott, 2003: Swanstrom, 2001: Wallis, 1994c). They 
argue that with the national boundaries which once protected cities from external shocks having 
become blurred, cities or local municipalities are now exposed to a harsh zero-sum game for 
                                               
15
 As a result, most ICA empirical studies focus on identifying conditions that facilitate cooperation. It is 
hardly true to claim this shift in research interest is wrong. However, describing regional governance as 
an aggregated entity of local dynamics is somewhat pointless. In this respect, ICA follows the 
epistemological legacy of the polycentric model. 
16 Conceptual ambiguity of „region‟ or „regionalism‟ emerges from the fact that a „region‟ is not political 
entity. Because it only exists as a data collection purposes, defining region for an analytical purpose 
requires special attention. However, over time, these regions have come to take on more than a data 
collection role. More often than not, individuals, groups, and organizations in these regions are beginning 
to think of themselves as citizens of the regions. Federal policy has encouraged the formation of 
embryonic regional institutions around those boundaries. As a result, we can, on a limited basis, see these 
regions as political as well as data collection entities (Miller, 2002: 53). 
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survival at both the domestic and the international level. The fragmented local political system, 
which was developed to deliver public services to citizens at the lowest cost possible, is not able 
to manage new kinds of challenges.  
Quoting Barber (1995), Miller (2002) postulates that there is a fundamental paradox 
embedded in the simultaneous social processes of deconcentration and economic globalization. 
This observation raises the intriguing question of at which level societies are capable of 
maximizing their competitiveness. In particular, some American scholars feel obliged to assess 
whether cities in the fragmented American system are still as competitive as they were before. 
And if not, should another level of collectivity that would maximize economic competitiveness 
be addressed? This group of scholars, who call themselves „New Regionalists,‟ argue that future 
prosperity is dependent upon the effectiveness of governance at the regional level. It is clear that 
the locally based, the internally focused, and the place-oriented are all largely out of fashion, 
while the broadly based, the externally focused, and the people-oriented are now all the rage 
(Imbroscio, 2006: 226). 
Methodologically, new regionalists adopt an „organic whole (Miller, 2002)‟ approach, in 
which a metropolitan region is regarded as qualitatively different from a collection of local 
governments. A region should have its own interests and be capable enough to advance its 
interests against local dissent. In other words, the new regionalists‟ objective is to build an 
effective governance system at the regional level in which regional interests can be put forward 
while at the same time preserving local autonomy (Elazar, 1970; Frug, 1999).  
This idea is not reflected in the old regionalists‟ debate on effectiveness of governance 
structures. As Hamilton (2000: 74) nicely puts it, in the theoretical boundaries of new 
regionalism, the research interests are focused on the relationships among governments and 
governmental processes and functions. Unlike the polycentric approach, new regionalists are 
interested in how the collective identity is created and shared within a region, and how it is 
reinforced by which kinds of political process.  
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Table 2-1. Theories of Regional Governance 
 
Theories/ 
Schools 
Scholars Major Arguments Weaknesses 
Polycentrists Tiebout (1956) 
Ostrom et al (1965) 
Peterson (1981) 
Schneider (1989) 
Parks &  
Oakerson(1993) 
▪ Efficiency gains are maximized in the 
 context of market-like local  
 governance system: Voting by Feet 
▪ Provision vs Production 
▫ Little interests in social problems 
 such as racial segregation or poverty 
▫ Too simplified to reflect realities  
 accurately 
Old  
Debates 
Consolidationists Progressive 
Movement 
Rusk (1993) 
Lowery (1998) 
▪ A solution to negative externalities 
▪ As the scale of policy problems became 
 larger, jurisdictional boundaries should be 
 expanded correspondingly 
▫ Too simple answer to diverse  
 problems 
▫ Invited bureaucratic rigidities and  
 inefficiencies 
Institutional 
Collective 
Action/ 
Network 
Feiock (2004) 
O’Toole (1997) 
▪ Successful Collective Action could be 
 retained without structural reorganization 
 at the regional level 
▪ Network is replacing bureaucracy 
▪ Recognizing the importance of the  local 
 contexts 
▫ Pretty much attached to the ad hoc  
 solutions to policy problems  
 (dependent on decentralized  
 decision-making power) 
▫ Region is not considered as an  
 important economic and societal unit 
New 
Debates 
New Regionalists Downs (1994) 
Lewis (1996) 
Frug (1999) 
Brenner (2004) 
Wallis (1994) 
▪ Institutional reform at regional scale may 
 be necessary 
▪ Economic competitiveness can be better 
 achieved by scale of economy, and 
 strategically integrated plan 
▫ Little empirical evidences 
▫ No roadmap for successful reform 
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2.6 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
<Figure 2.5> affirms that the understanding of regionalism requires looking at multiple 
dimensions, as reviewed in section 2.5. The first wave of regionalism is well known, and has 
sometimes been successfully applied in multiple metropolitan regions. The arrow in (a) 
represents the direction of organizational reform, which aims to build a regional or metropolitan 
government capable of dealing with a variety of „wicked‟ problems and realizing high efficiency 
gains as well. 
Whereas the structural perspective presents the idea that organizational consolidation of 
local governments can solve collective action problems with a centralized command and control 
system, procedural regionalism, as shown in (b), presents the idea that good governance is 
achieved when members of a region begin to perceive their interests from a collective 
perspective. Regionalism is then defined as a regionalized political process (Lewis, 1996) in 
which actors voluntarily pursue collective interests. Relations are never perceived as static here, 
nor the political process of governing. 
a) Regionalism: Structural Perspective 
 
 
Decentralized Polycentricity 
 
Centralized Consolidation 
 
 
b) Regionalism: Procedural Perspective 
 
 
 
 
Aggregation Integration 
Polycentricity 
(Contractual) 
Organic Whole 
(Communal) 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Alternative Views on Regionalism 
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The benefits of multiple perspectives come to be fully realized when we combine them 
into one framework. We now see that two arrows converge at a particular form of regional 
governance, the coordinated mode of regional governance. 
Before proceeding to the empirical stage of research, it should be noted again that this 
dissertation does not give serious attention to the competition and command/control modes of 
regional governance. This is mainly because no metropolitan region can be put into these two 
conceptual categories. Thus, it would be better for us to delve into the remaining two modes, 
cooperative and coordinated governance. 
 
Coordination 
(New 
Regionalists) 
 
Cooperation 
(ICA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fragmented Centralized 
Integration 
 
Competition 
(Polycentric) 
 
 
Command/ 
Control 
(Consolidationist) 
Aggregation 
Figure 2-6. Modes of Regional Governance: Integrative Perspective 
  
 <Table 2-6> summarizes the proposed 4Cs modes of regional governance. It addresses 
the relationship between modes of governance and patterns of collaboration. Empirical 
evaluation of this relationship is lacking in the literature. Not only the likelihood and extent of 
collaboration but also the scope and pattern of collaboration are the focus of this study. The next 
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chapter investigates the relationship between modes of governance and patterns of collaboration 
by determining factors that increase collaborative policy activities. 
 
Table 2-2.  The Four Cs in a Regional Context 
Attributes 
 
Modes 
Structure Process Logic of action 
Regional 
Governance 
Collaboration 
Competition 
Perfect 
Fragmentation 
Market 
Exchange 
Logic of 
Consequentiality 
Polycentricism 
One-time 
Market Exchange 
Cooperation Network 
Mutual 
Adjustment 
by Bargaining 
Logic of 
Consequentiality 
Institutional 
Collective Action 
Theories 
Voluntary 
(Unstable) 
Coordination Network 
Goal 
Integration 
by Regulation 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
New Regionalism 
Institutionalized 
(Stable) 
Command/ 
Control 
Perfect 
Hierarchy 
Command and 
Control 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
Consolidationism 
Pre-determined 
(Non-Adjustable) 
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter started by pointing out the fundamental limitations in the governance studies in 
general which have impeded the theoretical and empirical progress of regional governance. This 
chapter introduced an integrative framework of governance in which the multi-dimensionality of 
governance is well described.  
The four modes of governance are then described in accordance with the rationales that 
this framework is providing. The modes of competition, cooperation, coordination, and 
command and control represent the dynamics multiple perspectives on governance are 
producing. Finally, theoretical hypotheses concerning collaborative policy activities were made 
based upon the ideas stemming from the integrative framework. The next chapter will 
empirically test these hypotheses in the field of local politics and economic development.  
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3.0  RESEARCH METHOD 
It was argued in the previous chapter that an integrative framework of regional governance is a 
significant marker of progress in the discipline of governance studies and regional governance in 
particular. But the framework in itself does not suggest which mode of governance is most 
effective in fostering inter-organizational collaboration. This is left to the task of empirical 
analysis. What the framework really adds to the research is the incorporation of procedural 
variables into a model of inter-organizational collaboration. Based on this idea, this chapter 
examines the question of how different modes of governance exert influences on the likelihood 
and extent of collaborative activities of local municipalities and deals with methodological issues 
such as measurement, data collection, and research methods. Finally, multiple hypotheses are 
proposed. 
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation explores two major issues. The first issue is under which structural and 
procedural conditions inter-organizational collaboration is facilitated. Several sub-questions 
follow to specify collaborative economic development as it applies in the local and regional 
context.  
 
1. What are the significant factors that increase the extent of collaborative policy 
activities between local municipalities? 
 
 1-1. What factors are significant in increasing the extent of collaborative policy  
   activities between local municipalities in the Pittsburgh region? 
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 1-2. What factors are significant in increasing the extent of collaborative policy  
   activities between local municipalities in Minneapolis region? 
 1-3. Does regional context have an impact on the extent of inter-organizational  
  collaboration? 
 
Assuming that the first set of questions is adequately answered, this study will then 
concern itself with the patterns of relationships that are differently structured in each region. 
While the first set of questions looks into the extent of collaboration, the second one delves into 
the content and scope of inter-organizational collaboration across regions. 
 
2. How are the patterns of relationships between policy actors in the two regions 
different? 
  
 2-1. Who are the major participants in collaborative policy activities? 
 2-2. Which policy activities most frequently involve inter-organizational  
  collaboration in each region? 
 
These two sets of questions are fundamentally interdependent on one another. But 
without determining the factors fostering inter-organizational collaboration, we cannot 
successfully address the question of how the relations between policy actors are differently 
arranged in two regions.  
 
3. Are there different patterns of collaboration that are undertaken by each region? 
 
Finally, this dissertation is also concerned with the patterns of regional governance from 
macro or collective perspective. Chapter 6 will investigates this question more thoroughly. 
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3.2 KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
As stated in the previous chapter, the main purpose of this dissertation is to fill the knowledge 
gaps in the existing literature, which fails to address a variety of issues related to inter-
organizational or inter-local collaboration in the area of economic development. The first gap is 
in regards to empirical study of collaborative policy activities.  The three most important issues 
with respect to empirical study are dealt with in the first part of this chapter. The second 
knowledge gap is related to the representativeness problem of metropolitan regions. As most 
scholars acknowledge, regions are neither political associations nor governing entities with 
sovereignties. Lacking any legitimate source of political authority, metropolitan regions are 
hardly considered as significant as local, state and federal governments. Then how we can 
conceptualize metropolitan regions for the purpose of this study? In other words, how do we 
define regional boundaries and how can we classify something as a regional institution with 
which local municipalities communicate, interact, and cooperate regarding economic 
development policies? 
3.2.1 Collaboration as a Variable 
Although interest in modes of governance at the regional or metropolitan level has been 
gradually increasing, the question of how they influence collaborative activities between local 
municipalities remains unanswered. This is because, first, in most recent studies, collaborative 
behaviors are seen as only one of various policy strategies. For the sake of research objectives, 
collaboration is rarely taken as something that needs to examination itself. Instead, it has been 
regarded as merely one of the variables that explain policy outcomes. Particularly in the field of 
policy studies, where the major interest is to determine the causal relationship between policy 
outcomes and a number of explanatory variables, inquiries about explanatory variables are 
always of secondary interest.  
Second, collaboration is a very elusive concept to operationalize. A few studies such as 
Rawlings (2003), Wood (2004), and LeRoux (2006) have developed indexes that measure the 
level of collaborative activities among local municipalities in the field of service delivery, 
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general administration, and economic development. Other studies have conceptualized 
collaboration as the number of self-organized regional economic development partnerships 
(Olberding, 2000: Park, 2005) or local governments‟ decision on whether they participate in 
policy networks such as joint ventures (Feiock et al, 2007). This clearly indicates an absence of a 
standardized instrument in measuring collaboration.  
3.2.2 Explaining Collaboration at Multiple Levels 
The second problem in doing empirical research on inter-organizational collaboration is related 
to the selection of level of analysis.  
Again, this question is directly related to the issue of how we perceive collaboration. If 
collaboration is defined as one of the interest-maximization strategies, explaining variances of 
collaboration may depend more on endogenous variables. This is based on the idea that, since 
environmental factors are not controllable, an organizational unit tends to consider its internal 
conditions more seriously when it is making a decision about whether or not it will collaborate. 
From this perspective, inner-boundary factors such as level of poverty, lack of resources, and 
jurisdictional locations become the major factors that influence a tendency towards collaboration 
on the part of local municipalities. But as an ignorance of historical and contextual factors 
appears to distort decision functions, the level of collaboration is decided away from the optimal 
level. 
Alternatively, collaboration can also be perceived as much more than a policy strategy. 
From a societal point of view, collaboration could be defined as a cultural legacy that 
circumscribes individual or organizational behaviors. Studies done by those supporting this 
perspective are used to explain variances in collaborative activities at a more collective level. For 
example, factors that influence local municipalities‟ tendency to collaborate are sought outside 
their jurisdiction. Putnam (1993)‟s idea of social capital represents this academic position well. 
However, since studies in this tradition often ignore organizational attributes, there always exists 
a possibility for them to commit the fallacy of structural determinism. 
In order to avoid the mistakes originating from each of these perspectives, this 
dissertation employs an eclectic and compromising approach. This is done by measuring the 
cultural factors stressed in the second view at a lower level, such as the organizational level, and 
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incorporating them into an analytic framework. More technically put, instead of assuming 
cultural influences are universal within a given region, this dissertation takes the stance that the 
impact of cultural factors varies across local municipalities even within the same metropolitan 
regions. Given this, the intensity of integration of local municipalities to a higher political level 
becomes the important variable in the empirical analysis. 
3.2.3 The Missing Link: Between Regional Governance and Economic Development 
The final problem in collaboration studies with respect to empirical analysis is more or less 
practical. The question is: How can knowledge on collaboration be used? In other words, for 
what purpose should collaborative activities encouraged? These questions focus on the practical 
use of collaborative strategies in a variety of policy areas. 
The first objective of inter-organizational collaboration is to increase efficiency in public 
services delivery. Studies dealing with service deliveries contend that local municipalities tend to 
cooperate with actors outside their jurisdictions only when they expect efficiency gains. 
Collaborative strategies such as joint purchase, contracting out, and inter-local agreement are 
most widely used. The main purpose for use of these policy tools is to take advantage of 
economy of scales by consolidating the production functions of local municipalities (McGinnis 
et al, 1998: Parks & Oakerson, 1989) or to decrease transaction costs by means of formal or 
informal agreement on service delivery (Chrisholm, 1992). Accordingly, the more collaborative 
municipalities are, the more efficiently public services can be delivered to citizens. However, 
much of the knowledge these studies supply is not informative in building an empirical model of 
collaboration in the policy field of economic development, which is the focus of this dissertation. 
Only a few studies probe the relationship between collaborative policy activities and the 
level of economic development. However, previous studies on regional economic development 
in particular rarely address collaboration as one of the probable strategies. Instead, structural 
differences among metropolitan regions seem to be preferred as the explanation for regional 
variances in economic development. For example, Hamilton et al (2004) puts forth a persuasive 
argument about the relationship between governance structure and economic competitiveness at 
the regional level. According to them, although a specific form of mode of governance is hardly 
significant in producing high economic performance in the short run, it clearly matters in the 
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long term because it determines the capacity of a region to adapt to a changing environment. 
However, no matter how well this argument is postulated, the authors provide no information on 
the mechanism of how each governance structure actually catalyzes economic growth. 
This dissertation aims to fill this knowledge gap with careful observations and empirical 
analyses of the political mechanism of collaboration. If I can find covariance between 
collaboration and economic development, it would be a good start for the future researches to 
inquire this relationship more deeply.  
3.2.4 Problem of Representing Metropolitan Regions: Metropolitan Planning Organizations 
As Miller (2002) succinctly puts it, a metropolitan region can be defined only by being attached 
to existing patterns of intergovernmental relationships between local, state, and federal 
governments. Since there are 50 different and very distinctive patterns of relationships-one for 
each state, it has been regarded that systematic understanding of metropolitan regions is hardly 
achievable. This ambiguity inherent in the concept of metropolitan region prevents us from 
seeing it as an independent level of governance. For example, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) establishes and maintains the definition of Metropolitan Areas solely for 
statistical purposes, and warns against using those definitions for any application but statistical 
applications.  
Conversely, with the passage of The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 
1991 (Public Law 102-240; ISTEA), the Department of Transportation has forced the flow of 
federal highway dollars through a metropolitan regional organization, generally utilizing the 
definitions supplied by the OMB (Millers, 2002: 6). 
What this legislation brought to the field of regional governance is the strengthening of 
the regional institution, the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). ISTEA reversed the 
trend of deterioration of urban problems with its renewed emphasis on the metropolitan 
transportation planning process. The legislation was designed to put in place a framework to 
guide the operations, management and investment in a surface transportation system that is 
largely in place. ISTEA strengthened the metropolitan planning process, enhanced the role of 
local elected officials, required stakeholder involvement, and encouraged movement away from 
modal parochialism toward integrated, modally mixed strategies for greater system efficiency, 
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mobility and access (http://www.ampo.org/content). In essence, the strengthening of the MPO 
represents the collective, integrated, and regional approach to inter-jurisdictional policy 
problems, especially in the field of transportation. 
I believe examination of the MPO serves the objective of this dissertation better than 
examination of the MSA for two reasons. First, it has both the content and structure of a regional 
institution. Despite its lack of formal authority, the MPO is at least supported by its 
administrative arms and by a certain degree of discretion in allocating transportation funds. Local 
municipalities seeking transportation funds have to interact with their regional MPO, and in 
doing so, inter-organizational relationships are created.  
Second, the issue of regional boundary is more clearly addressed by the definition of 
MPO. It provides the criterion by which we can distinguish metropolitan regions from those 
outside. The concept of boundary or jurisdiction is important in studying regional governance 
because without this concept, it is hardly possible to define actors and structures that compose 
the collective entity.  
This dissertation takes the MPO as the regional institution for study for these reasons. In 
order to study regional governance and collaboration, metropolitan regions need to be addressed 
as tangible entities; therefore, the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis and the Southwestern 
Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh serve each region as the MPO. 
3.3 A SUMMARY OF REGIONS 
In order for this dissertation to avoid false generalizations, an understanding of the social and 
political contexts of both metropolitan regions is plainly critical. Although it is impossible to 
describe details of regional characteristics in the limited space here, some are worth intensive 
attention.  
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3.3.1 Toward Metropolitan Government: Minneapolis 
3.3.1.1  The background of Metropolitan Reform in Twin Cities 
The year 1967 will be remembered as the year when one of the largest metropolitan regions in 
the US was finally able to build a regional governing institution - The Metropolitan Council. 
This choice has been called Minnesota‟s most successful achievement on the one hand, but on 
the other it has also been a target of political criticism for its inefficiency and 
unrepresentativeness. 
Typically it is a crisis that leads to this kind of comprehensive reform. Harrigan & 
Johnson (1978) suggest that at least four conditions facilitated metropolitan reform in the 
Minneapolis region. According to them, none of them by itself was the determinant, but without 
each one, the prospects for reform would have been much poorer (Harrigan & Johnson, 1978: 
22-23). 
First, the obvious distinction that the region enjoys -two central cities and thus two 
growth nuclei- has minimized the rise of an overpowering “anti-big city” feeling among 
suburbanites.  
A second important feature is that the Minneapolis region experienced little of the 
suburban distrust and antagonism toward the central city area that was detrimental to 
metropolitan reform in other cities such as Cleveland and St. Louis. 
Third, the moralistic political cultures, which were as coined by Daniel J. Elazars (1970), 
certainly played an important roles in its as support of high expenditure for public services, 
which in turn enabled this region to a build metro-level government. 
Closely associated with the political culture is a fourth distinctive feature of the Twin 
Cities region - the existence of some broadly based, unifying civic institutions that participate 
forcefully and effectively in political decisions. 
3.3.1.2  Metropolitan Council: A True Metropolitan Authority? 
In essence, Metropolitan Council is a metropolitan planning and policy-making authority. The 
Metropolitan Council is made up of 17 members appointed by the governor to represent 
geographic districts. It is also designated as the Twin Cities‟ regional Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (MPO). 
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According to Harrigan & Vogel (2001), the Council has four major powers. First, as the 
metropolitan planning agency, it is responsible for preparing the metropolitan development 
guide. It is a statement of policies on topics that range from the location of airports to solid waste 
disposal to the distribution of low-income housing throughout the suburbs to the channeling of 
future growth into predetermined locations in the regions. 
The Council‟s second responsibility is reviewing the comprehensive development plans 
of the local governments in the region. Third, the Council oversees and coordinates the 
metropolitan commissions responsible for transits, waste control, and regional parks and open 
space. The fourth power of the Metropolitan Council is to review applications from local 
governments and private organizations for many federal and state grant and loan guarantee 
programs (Harrigan &Vogel, 2001: 302).  
The Metropolitan Land Planning Act of 2004 reinforces the Council‟s authority on 
economic development. The Council prepares forecasts of regional growth based on such 
information as U.S. Census data, regional growth trends and demographics (Minn. Stat. 
473.146). With each community, the Council negotiates the share of growth which that 
community will plan for, taking into account Council policies, local land-use patterns, 
developable land supply and the community‟s current comprehensive plan. The outcomes of 
negotiation are reflected in a Development Framework, within which local governments take 
responsibility for meeting local needs. 
Once it revises its local plan, the community sends its plan to adjacent municipalities for 
them to consider the plan‟s impact and to the Council for its review based on requirements of the 
Land Planning Act and other state and federal guidelines.
17
 The Land Planning Act requires the 
Council to consider a plan‟s compatibility with the plans of other communities and its 
consistency with adopted Council policy plans, as well as its conformity with metropolitan 
system plans (Minn. Stat. 473.175). If the Council finds that a community‟s plan is more likely 
than not to have a substantial impact on or contain a substantial departure from metropolitan 
                                               
17
 Before a municipality submits its updated or amended comprehensive plan to the Metropolitan Council 
is must take the following steps: 1) Allow for adjacent governmental units and affected school districts to 
review and comment 2) obtain Planning Commission approval 3) obtain Local governing approval (but 
not final adoption). Local governmental units must not confer final approval of the plan or implement any 
part of it before the Metropolitan Council has reviewed and, if necessary, commented on it (Minn. Stat. 
473.585, Subd.2). 
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system plans, the Council can require the community to modify its local plan to assure 
conformance with the metropolitan system plans (Minn. Stat. 473.175). 
The short legal statements above verify the fact that the Metropolitan Council holds a 
strong authority on a variety of policy fields involving economic development within its seven-
county jurisdiction. Local municipalities are not only legally required to communicate on their 
comprehensive plans but also to hold all individual policy activity until Metropolitan Council 
approves their plans. In this process, local municipalities naturally come to share various 
perspectives on immediate policy issues, including their neighbors‟ and regional policy interests.  
The Metropolitan Council‟s review criteria confirm this observation. In its review of a 
local comprehensive plan, the Metropolitan Council views a jurisdiction‟s intended actions from 
the perspective of the Metropolitan Land Planning Act and the interests of both adjacent 
jurisdictions and the regional system plans. The review is designed to determine how the 
community‟s planned actions relate to the interests of the regions over the long term. Local 
comprehensive plan updates and amendments are evaluated relative to three criteria: 
Conformance, Consistency, and Compatibility (Metropolitan Council 2005: 1-13). Local plans 
should conform to all metropolitan systems policy plans for transportation, water resources, and 
parks. Plans should meet with requirements of the Metropolitan Land Planning Act and 
Metropolitan Council policies. Finally, local plans should be compatible with the plans of other 
local jurisdictions, including school districts. 
In sum, governance in the Minneapolis region cannot be imagined without Metropolitan 
Council‟s strong policy initiatives. Despite the political controversy about the overall 
effectiveness of Metropolitan Council, it still strongly influences peoples‟ lives directly and 
indirectly, and its responsibilities are continuously expanding. How these regional norms and 
rules influence the municipalities‟ horizontal relationships addressed in the empirical part of this 
dissertation. 
3.3.2 Partnerships in the Context of Hyper-Fragmentation: Pittsburgh 
3.3.2.1  History of Partnership 
According to Miller‟s MPDI index, the Pittsburgh region scored 5th highest in 1992. The 
Pittsburgh metropolis has 549 general purpose local governments within its 10-county boundary. 
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There is no area available for future incorporation, and Pennsylvania‟s tough legal code does not 
allow local annexation. This complete inelasticity defines the local and regional political context 
of Pittsburgh metropolis. 
But surprisingly, the Pittsburgh region has nurtured a cooperative culture for decades. 
When we compare Pittsburgh with other highly fragmented regions such as Philadelphia, Saint 
Louis, and Chicago, this fact becomes more outstanding. Particularly in the field of economic 
development, the Pittsburgh region has forged a “third way” of producing urban development 
(Sbragia, 1990). Pittsburgh‟s transition was constructed through the organizational capacity of a 
public-private partnership. A centralized network of business and government organizations has 
provided an effective tool for setting development goals and implementing them (Jezierski, 
1996: 161). The interdependency of the public and private sectors coincided with the decline of 
big bureaucracy. It also spurred and inter-sectoral network system to take over developmental 
decision-making authority to a considerable extent. 
In her comparative study of Pittsburgh and Chicago, Ferman describes that in Pittsburgh, 
the weight of precedent and the lure of the incentive structure pushed strongly toward 
nonconflictual, accommodative behaviors. Such behavior, in turn, reinforced the inclusionary 
orientation that permits the coexistence of numerous organizations (Ferman, 1996: 141).  
3.3.2.2  Advocacy without Authority: Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission 
The cooperative culture in the Pittsburgh region has been institutionalized in a variety of ways. 
One of the attempts to support cross-boundary communication resulted in the creation of 
regional level institutions. The Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission was created as one of 
these organizations, and it now serves the Pittsburgh region as a designated Metropolitan 
Planning Organization (MPO). 
The Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission (SPC) is the regional planning agency 
serving the Pittsburgh 10-county area and providing essential services to the region. The official 
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), the SPC directs the use of all state and federal 
transportation and economic development funds allocated to the region - approximately $33 
billion through 2030. For example, the SPC helps counties, cities, municipalities, and townships 
use federal transportation funds in a timely way. 
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 The SPC is also the region's designated Local Development District and 
Economic Development District by the US Appalachian Regional Commission and the US 
Department of Commerce. In this role, the SPC establishes regional economic development 
priorities and provides a wide range of services to the region 
(http://www.spcregion.org/about.html). 
The SPC‟s role in regional development should not be underestimated. As a designated 
MPO, the SPC‟s authority in allocation of transportation funding can significantly influence the 
location of development projects. Decisions on which projects will be funded determine where 
growth occurs and more importantly, where growth does not occur (Miller, 1999). With this 
capacity, it provides an important link between the federal government and local municipalities.  
Although it has diverse resources and authorities within its boundary, SPC cannot be 
overestimated as a true regional governing institution either. In contrast to the Metropolitan 
Council, the SPC‟s legal status is not based on State legislation. The SPC can only hold authority 
with local municipalities‟ voluntary cooperation. Even in the transportation funding allocation 
process, a local municipality cannot be coerced to follow the SPC‟s decision unless it is willing 
to give up its local sovereignty.  
In sum, we can safely argue that in the Pittsburgh region, the SPC works as a premier 
advocacy organization for regional economic development and planning. It provides 
opportunities for county representatives to discuss regional policy issues and create informal 
networks among local elites. However, its effectiveness in inducing municipalities‟ cooperation 
on regional issues has not been proved yet.  
3.3.3 Minneapolis vs Pittsburgh: A Comparison of Regions 
No metropolitan region can be identical to another. There are a considerable amount of 
similarities as well as differences across regions. This section addresses the fundamental 
attributes of each case in order to decide whether these two metropolitan regions are truly 
comparable. 
 <Table 3-1> presents the basic statistics that define each region. With respect to 
demographic attributes, the two regions are almost identical with populations around 2,650,000. 
Racial diversity seems to be lower in Pittsburgh, where the percentage of the white population is 
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above 90%. Considering the relatively high percent of African-Americans (7.4), the two races 
constitute almost 98% of the total population in Pittsburgh, which is also very high in 
comparison to Minneapolis region, where these two races only make up 91%. But when we 
compare this summary with other metropolitan regions, the two regions can be regarded as 
similar in terms of racial homogeneity. 
The two regions are also very similar in industrial composition. The industry of 
Educational, Health & Social Services makes up the largest part of both regional economies, 
followed by Manufacturing, Retail, and Professional management industries. This similarity is 
critically important because regional and local economic conditions tend to delimit local 
municipalities‟ development choices to a large extent. 
 
Table 3-1.  A Comparison of Regions 
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 Minneapolis Pittsburgh 
Population 2,642,056 2,656,007 
Race   
    White 84.7% 90.3% 
    African-American 5.9% 7.4% 
Ancestry   
    German 26.5% 26.1% 
    Irish 10.1% 16.8% 
    Italian 2.2% 15.0% 
    Norwegian 11.3% 0.2% 
    Swedish 8.0% 0.8% 
Industry   
    Educational, health & 
    Social Services 
19.2% 22.8% 
    Manufacturing 15.3% 12.6% 
    Retail Sale 11.7% 12.7& 
    Professional. Scientific, management, 
    Administrative, & waste management 
11.7% 8.9% 
Per Capita Income 26.219 (7
th
)* 20.935 (90
th
)** 
Poverty Status   
    Percent below poverty level 6.9% 11.2% 
Structural Fragmentation   
    Number of Local Municipalities 194 549 
    Miller’s MPDI (1992) 9.36 (7
th
) 11.57 (4
th
) 
Economic Competitiveness (1973-1997) 
    Paytas (2001) 
1.88 -9.06 
* Minneapolis MSA (includes 7 Metro region counties plus Chisago, Isanti, Sherburne and Wright County 
** Pittsburgh MSA (includes Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington, and Westmoreland County 
 
In respect to economic and fiscal capacity, the Minneapolis region is much more affluent 
than Pittsburgh. Among 331 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), Minneapolis ranks 4
th
 in the 
category of per capita income. The Pittsburgh region is struggling a bit compared to 
Minneapolis, with a per capita income. Likewise, the strong economic situation of the 
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Minneapolis region makes poverty problems relatively manageable, while the Pittsburgh region 
seems to suffer more from a more unequal distribution of resources and fiscal capabilities. 
The level of structural fragmentation is very high in both regions. While the absolute 
number of general purpose governments are significantly different (194 in Minneapolis, 549 in 
Pittsburgh), a systemic measure of „real‟ fragmentation indicates municipalities in both regions 
have to deal with fragmented local systems to a comparable extent. 
The final information provided by <Table 3-1> is that the Minneapolis region as an 
economic entity is more competitive than the Pittsburgh region. Although Paytas (2001)‟s 
conceptualization of competitiveness is far from perfect in measuring regional economic 
competitiveness, its methodological integrity provides a dependable criteria based on which we 
can evaluate the economic condition of the metropolitan regions. According to his index, 
Pittsburgh is far less competitive than national average, while Minneapolis maintains a fair level 
of competitive advantage in most of its industry. 
It is evident that the two regions are different. But the similarities between the two 
regions are significant enough to allow me to compare the two regions in more detail. Now the 
focus moves to the issue of a relevant research methodology to allow me to extract as much 
useful information from this comparison as possible. 
3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1 Small N Comparative Research Design 
This dissertation proposes that a particular mode of governance can be a major facilitator of 
collaborative activities among local governments. The theoretical speculations given in the 
previous chapter provide information as to why the „regional factors‟ are important in 
understanding local municipalities behaviors. In order to answer the question of how these 
factors work, a careful comparison of regions is required, with a particular focus on modes of 
governance and collective actions. 
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Comparison as a research strategy permits us to delve deeply into political and 
institutional dynamics, which variable-centered studies tend to overlook (Ragin, 1987). This can 
be done by delineating how critical contextual factors shape the direction of politics and policies 
(Ferman, 1996). However, while the comparative method allows for making use of contextual 
details, it presents difficulties with respect to gathering data, utilizing statistical methods, and 
most importantly, generalizing conclusions. Therefore, research objective, availability of the 
data, and scope of the study must be considered carefully when applying this method of study. 
This dissertation conducts an exploratory as well as an explanatory comparative case 
study on collaborative policy activities in two metropolitan regions in the field of economic 
development. It is exploratory since 1) it is searching for a new possible explanation of variances 
in the dependable variable, 2) it does not limit its academic endeavor to testing existing 
propositions about collaboration, and 3) it utilizes extensive materials from multiple sources of 
information to provide an in-depth picture of the cases (Creswell, 1998). One of the primary 
goals of this dissertation is to discover unknown or hidden relationships and, finally, generate 
hypotheses for future studies (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). At the same time, this research 
is concerned with methodological problems such as measurement of collaboration and 
appropriate level of analysis.  
It is also explanatory because it is strongly concerned with proving causal relationships 
between carefully selected independent variables and the extent of collaboration. Probing 
significant factors that would foster inter-organizational collaboration is undeniably important; 
however, this study goes one step further and conducts rigorous empirical tests using a variety of 
scientific method. However, inter-organizational collaboration, the major subject of this 
dissertation, has not been operationalized accurately, let alone systematically organized. 
Therefore, with the shortage of time and resources allowed, this study can only focus on a small 
number of cases and relies mostly on first-hand data obtained from structured surveys and 
interviews. 
While there is only a small number of regional institutions that possess the overarching 
authority over local governments in their boundaries, among them, the Minneapolis region is 
thought to be best for the purpose of the study because it is composed of densely populated 
independent municipalities which are fairly comparable to Pittsburgh region. This satisfies a 
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basic assumption of the design principle, which is defined as the most similar comparative 
design. 
3.4.2 Selection of Cases: The Most Similar System Design 
Explaining differences and similarities between political or social systems has been 
acknowledged as two major objectives of comparative social research. According to Przeworski 
& Teune (1970), the comparative method could be specified by an array of ways to select cases. 
Considering the cases at hand, the most similar system design, which attempts to control 
extraneous variances as much as possible, would be a logical selection for the purpose of the 
study. As argued above, although two regions would be shown as differently as they are similar 
enough to be compared, this study believes that the selection of cases within the national context 
of U.S already puts a number of alternative explanations away. Furthermore, census statistics and 
academically developed indexes such as MPDI (Miller, 2002) and PFI (Lewis, 1996) shows that 
institutional structures of two regions are similar enough to be analytically compared.  
This similarity makes it possible for us to determine significant factors that may explain 
divergence in collaborative activities. One possibility is found in the differently arranged 
governance structures. In some instances, the Metropolitan Council in the Minneapolis region is 
able to force local municipalities to comply with a regional blueprint for future development 
policies, while municipalities located in Southwestern Pennsylvania are more likely to pursue 
short-term individual gains regardless of their long-term effects on the region as a whole. For 
example, as mentioned above, Minnesota‟s State Statutes such as the Metropolitan Land 
Planning Act of 2004 require municipalities in the region to submit their local comprehensive 
plans to the Metropolitan Council for review and, as necessary, for appropriate corrective actions 
(Minn. Stat. 473. 175). This means the State of Minnesota bestows a powerful authority on the 
Metropolitan Council to force cooperation within its 7-County region. This particular 
institutional rule is the very factor that makes it possible to define Minneapolis‟ regional 
policymaking process as coordinated. 
In contrast, although the Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission strongly advocates 
regionalist ideas, the Pittsburgh region still remains one of the most fragmented areas in the U.S. 
Without legitimate authority as a last resort for resolving conflicts of interest, it is natural that for 
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local actors with vested interests, unilateral interest maximization is the best strategy. In the 
vocabulary of game theory, actors prefer defection to cooperation if it guarantees the highest 
payoff for them. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that there is no collaborative activity 
in Pittsburgh region. In contrast to the theoretical expectation, Pittsburgh has been recognized as 
a successful case of cooperative partnership (Ferman, 1996: Savitch & Vogel, 1996). But what 
this region still lacks, in comparison to the Minneapolis region, is a region-wide authoritative 
institution that could defend regional or collective interests. This difference is sufficient enough 
for this research to look at the effectiveness of policy coordination by regional institutions on 
economic development.  
3.4.3 Research Design: Nested Comparative Case Study 
The problem that previous research has not addressed well is how different levels of analysis can 
be integrated in one study. As discussed in 3.2.2, collaboration among local municipalities can be 
explained at two different levels of analysis: the micro and the macro level. From the micro 
perspective, collaboration is conceptualized as the outcome of municipalities‟ strategic 
calculation. In contrast, from the macro or aggregate point of view, it is just a politically 
appropriate behavior that has been inherited for a long period of time. 
The proper research design should take the impacts of both social and environmental 
contexts at the macro level and individual attributes at the micro level into consideration at the 
same time. In other words, the mode of explanation of this research should utilize endogenous as 
well as exogenous variables. 
But it is hard to take both levels‟ influences into consideration simultaneously. Moreover, 
even where possible, it is questionable whether this sort of research design is methodologically 
valid. The serious level incongruence or multilevel problems would incur irrelevance of research 
outcomes or make statistical inferences unreliable. 
The most widely used methodological solution for the multilevel problem would be an 
adoption of a specially developed statistical method such as a hierarchical linear model (HLM). 
HLM provides a conceptual framework and a flexible set of analytic tools to study a variety of 
social, political, and developmental processes. However, this study does not employ this analytic 
method, and instead attempts to resolve multilevel problems at the measurement level. 
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Municipalities are undoubtedly „nested‟ in regional, state, and federal level of governance. 
Visible or not, these political as well as administrative levels of governance influence local 
government in a variety of ways in the economic development policy process. This „nestedness‟ 
is inevitably reflected in municipalities‟ decisions on economic development policies. So, if we 
successfully capture the municipalities‟ perceptions of institutional influences on multiple levels 
of governance, we can argue that the „nestedness‟ of local decisions are well reflected in the 
measurements. At the same time, since this variable is measured and obtained at the local 
government level, it would not cause any multi-level problems. 
In sum, methodologically, this dissertation can successfully overcome the tradeoff 
between explanatory power and analytic robustness by incorporating macro-level influences into 
micro-level measurement. Regional, state and federal level influences on local decisions are 
successfully represented without a sophisticated analytic method such as the Hierarchy Linear 
Model. 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT 
3.5.1 Unit of Analysis 
The basic unit of analysis in this dissertation is the local municipality. While a number of recent 
studies on regionalism take metropolitan regions as units of analysis (Olberding, 2000; Paytas, 
2001; Park, 2005), their research can provide  local public officials with only very limited 
practical information on how to use collaborative policy strategies. 
In addition, reflecting the increasing attention paid to collaboration in governance studies, 
this study focuses on relations among governmental organizations as well. It presents a basic 
idea of the institutional framework, in which regional outcomes of economic development 
policies are regarded as the product of interactions between structural attributes of the region and 
the complex political process of „who gets what.‟ 
While organizational units have frequently been taken as units of analysis, relations have 
scarcely been examined in the field of social science, mainly because relations in themselves are 
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neither stable nor easily observable. However, with a serious interest in the relational dynamics 
of policy processes, this dissertation seeks to observe and measure diverse relationships between 
a wide variety of regional actors. This analytic endeavor will be greatly assisted by use of 
multiple research techniques. Inquiry on inter-organizational relationships will be exclusively 
conducted in chapter five taking the network perspective on regional governance. 
The units of observation are chief administrative officers of local governments in two 
regions. Assuming that they are most knowledgeable in local development policymaking, we can 
expect that their expertise can provide the most reliable and valid information. 
3.5.2 Sampling 
Both the Minneapolis and the Pittsburgh region are recognized as examples of highly fragmented 
areas. Miller‟s Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index (MPDI) estimates values of 9.36 and 11.57 
respectively, and they rank 7
th
 and 5
th
 among 331 U. S. metropolitan regions. There are 194 
general-purpose governments in the Minneapolis‟ region, and 549 in the Pittsburgh region. A 
total of 743 local municipalities, including cities, towns, townships, and boroughs constitute 
these two regions. This study does not include special purpose districts and school districts. This 
is because, first, only general purpose local governments exclusively contain authorities on 
comprehensive development plans, and equally importantly, they are considered to play a central 
role in the process of policy implementation far more effectively than any other kinds of 
organizations. 
With limited resources prohibiting population analysis, this study examines the 209 
biggest general purpose governments in the two regions in accordance with the population size 
(75 in the Minneapolis region and 134 in the Pittsburgh region). This is because the 
administrative and fiscal capacities that are necessary for economic development are better 
preserved in larger governments. Small cities often rely on substate or regional planning agencies 
to do their planning, zoning, and codification work (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 84).  
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3.5.3 Structured Survey 
The survey method produces both qualitative and quantitative data. The target recipients of the 
survey are chief administrative officers who are primarily responsible for local economic 
development policies. The survey consists of three parts, each of which is designed to produce 
data on organizational attributes, collaborative activities and intensity of policy integration of 
local governments, and pattern of communication with various governmental organizations.  
Previous surveys conducted by ICMA (International City/County Management 
Association), Agranoff & McGuire(1998: 2003), Olberding (2001), Park (2006), and Wood 
(2004) were quite resourceful for this survey. Specifically, the questionnaires in ICMA‟s 
periodic survey are used without major modification. 
3.6 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS, VARIABLES, AND  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.6.1 Dependent Variable: Collaborative Index 
Collaboration generally refers to any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to 
increase public value by their working together rather than separately (Bardach, 1998: 8). As few 
studies actually measure collaborative relations among organizations, social researchers are st ill 
debating the validity of measurements of collaboration. With a lack of agreed-upon collaboration 
data, the survey questionnaires are carefully articulated to capture the instances of collaboration. 
The major measurement instruments for collaborative activities, displayed in <Table 3-
2>, were originally developed by Agranoff & McGuire (2003). I changed the original survey 
questionnaires in order to reflect the role of contextual distinctiveness involved in economic 
development policy process. The questionnaire categorizes municipalities‟ collaborative 
activities into three sub-categories representing the functions of joint-policy effort, resource 
exchange, and project-based work. 
  71 
This measurement represents inter-organizational collaborative activities between local 
municipalities and organizations in public, private, and non-profit sectors. By inter-
organizational collaboration, I follow the definition of Agranoff and McGuire, meaning 
“working the highly interdependent local policy process, attempting to pool and use differential 
resource contributions, building bases of support, and determining feasible course of action 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 80).” The activities included in the table represent the most 
frequently used tactics when local governments are involved in inter-organizational interactions. 
While Agranoff and McGuire do not acknowledge the qualitative differences among the 
activities, this study gives some weight to the joint policy efforts, except for the activity of 
technical assistant. This is because those three activities are more likely to involve interest 
accommodation or policy integration than others. During the joint policy process, from the 
creation of policy coalition to joint implementation of such policies, localities must build a 
certain level of reciprocity and trust, without which any kind of policy coalition is fundamentally 
fragile. This kind of inter-local collaboration is not likely to be terminated, even after the joint 
objectives are fully accomplished. 
 
Table 3-2.  Measuring Instrument of Collaborative Activities 
 
Type of Activities Activities Used Weights 
Receive Technical Assistance  
Engage in Formal Partnership √ 
Engage in Joint Policymaking √ 
Joint Policy Effort 
Engage in Joint Policy Implementation √ 
Pool/Share Financial Resources  
Resource Exchange 
Pool/Share Personnel Resources  
Contracting-out Planning  
Project-based work 
Partnership for a particular project  
Source: Agranoff, Robert & Michael McGuire (2003), Collaborative Public Management: New 
Strategies for Local Government, Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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In contrast, other policy activities tend to be short-lived (Contracting-out, partnership for 
a particular project), technical (Receive technical assistance), or economical (Sharing/Pooling 
resources). While still significantly collaborative, these activities create neither reciprocal 
relationships nor collective identity as effectively as joint policy efforts would.  
3.6.2 Independent Variables and Hypotheses Development 
The independent variables for this study are divided into procedural and structural variables. 
Procedural variables measure the intensity of policy integration on three levels of governance - 
regional, state, and federal. Structural variables are further divided into three sub-categories 
which are Municipality Characteristics, Economic/Fiscal Factors, and Political/Governmental 
Institutions, respectively. 
3.6.2.1  Procedural Variable: Regional, State, and Federal Integration Index 
This measurement index was originally developed to record local governments‟ vertical 
collaborative activities with state and federal governments. Instead simply applying this index to 
the contexts of Minnesota and Pennsylvania, this dissertation reconfigures this measurement tool 
to reflect the propensity of local governments to collaborate with the regional, state, and federal 
institutions in each region. The Metropolitan Council in the Minneapolis region and the 
Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in the Pittsburgh region represent the regional 
institutions in each metropolis. 
With the lack of a standardized measure of vertical integration, recording the quantity and 
quality of vertical interactions at multiple levels act as a surrogate for the purposes of this study. 
For example, the operationalization of regionalism is built on the idea that the more local 
governments are involved with regional institutions, the more willing to adopt a regional 
perspective those local governments will be in local development policymaking process. The 
same rationale can apply to vertical integration at other governance levels.
18
 
 
                                               
18
 Although there are some policy fields that may require local compliance with regional rules, politically 
it is difficult to argue that the relationship between regional institutions and local governments is vertical.  
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Table 3-3.  Measurement Instrument of Regional, State, and Federal Integration Index 
 
Types of Activities Activities Used Weights 
Seek general program information  
Seek new funding of programs and projects  
Seek financial assistance through grants  
Seek interpretation of standards and rules  
Seek policy guidance  
Information Seeking 
Seek technical assistance  
Request Statutory/Regulatory relief, flexibility, or waiver √ 
Request change of official policy √ Adjustment Seeking 
Request resolution of conflicts with other local governments √ 
Source: Agranoff, Robert & Michael McGuire (2003), Collaborative Public Management: New 
Strategies for Local Government, Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Vertical policy activities are divided into two types: information seeking activities and 
adjustment seeking activities. In the first, local governments are expected to seek tactical 
assistance from higher level institutions, while in the latter the governments tend to adjust 
programs of their own to collective rules or regulations or seek some slack in hierarchical 
regulations. The adjustment seeking activities are particularly important because local 
governments are more likely to adopt a collective perspective in these kinds of policy 
interactions. Furthermore, while information seeking activities are likely to be short-lived, 
adjustment seeking activities promote long-term relationships between local officials and 
officials in other levels of government. Regionalism is easy to address in this context because 
city officials must jointly establish a course of action with regional officials, who bring the 
regional perspective into the interaction. Thus this type of activities should be weighted more 
because of its significance in the development of collective identity. The propensity of local 
municipalities to collaborate with State and Federal government can be easily captured in the 
same way. 
Methodologically, these variables measure the procedural aspect of governance 
illustrated in the last chapter. A high value for these variables represents a high level of political 
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and cultural integration in the given governmental level. Municipalities with a low level of 
integration are likely to be more independent in the developmental policy process and are also 
more likely to favor formal negotiations or contracts over consolidation of policy activities. In 
general, metropolitan regions with high average values for the procedural indexes can be defined 
as culturally integrated, while regions with low values can be seen to operate under an 
aggregated mode of governance. 
 
H1a: The Regional Integration Index (RI) is positively related to the extent of 
collaborative policy activities, indicating that cultural and political integration advances 
regionalism more effectively than aggregation of individual municipalities‟ interests. 
 
H1b: The Regional Integration Index (RI) is negatively related to the extent of 
collaborative policy activities, indicating that inter-local competition for resources impedes the 
development of regionalism. 
 
The governing procedure of integration does not occur only at the regional level. Another 
variable can be utilized to measure the intensity of cultural and political integration at the state 
level. 
 
H2a: The State Integration Index (SI) is positively related to the extent of collaborative 
policy activities.  
 
H2b: The State Integration Index (SI) is negatively related to the extent of collaborative 
policy activities. 
 
The same reasoning can apply at the federal level. This variable measures to what extent 
local municipalities are politically integrated with the policy preferences of federal governments.  
 
H3a: The Federal Integration Index (FI) is positively related to the extent of 
collaborative policy activities. 
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H3b: The Federal Integration Index (FI) is negatively related to the extent of 
collaborative policy activities. 
3.6.2.2  Structural Variables 
1. Municipality Characteristics 
There are six variables that measure municipalities‟ endogenous structural attributes. 
Population and Land area represent the physical size of local municipalities, while Density 
provides information on the location of a given municipality within each of two regions. 
The size of population variable has been employed in most local governance studies 
because it is believed that it has significant effects on governmental behaviors. Regarding the 
variances in collaboration in economic development, size of population can be thought to be both 
positively and negatively related to the extent of collaborative policy activities. According to the 
hypothesis expecting a positive relationship, when a municipality‟s population surpasses the 
optimum level, a strategy that makes use of resources located outside its jurisdiction becomes 
crucial. A collaborative policy is one of the probable strategies by which municipality in this 
situation can achieve its objectives. On the other hand, a larger population can have the effect of 
making a local political economy self-sustainable so that political autonomy of the jurisdiction is 
more valued than cooperation. In this context, the size of population is expected to be negatively 
related to the extent of collaborative activities. We cannot determine the direction of influence 
without understanding the local contexts. 
 
H4a: The size of population may have a positive impact on the extent of collaborative 
policy activities of local municipalities.  
 
H4b: The size of population may have a negative impact on the extent of collaborative 
policy activities of local municipalities.  
The second structural variable examined is the land area of local municipalities. As 
shown with size of population, the land area can be both positively and negatively associated 
with the extent of collaboration. The hypothesis expecting the positive relationship is based on 
the idea that a municipality with broader territory tends to have more neighboring municipalities, 
which naturally generates more dyadic connections. The opposite argument is equally plausible, 
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in that the large jurisdiction can provide enough resources to the local community that it does not 
need additional resources from its neighbors.  
 
H5a: The territorial land size is positively related to the extent of collaborative policy 
activities of local municipalities. 
 
H5b: The territorial land size is negatively related to the extent of collaborative policy 
activities of local municipalities. 
 
The variable of density requires a more complex explanation. This is because density is 
the functional expression of the interaction of population and land area. Since theoretical 
expectations with regards to population size and land area cannot be specified a priori, the 
direction of influence of density is not predicted either.  
The variable of density is important because it carries basic geographical information. 
Where a municipality is located within a region is one piece of critical information when it 
comes to policy-related decisions, because location tends to be highly related to the 
socioeconomic characteristics of a community and its industrial interests. This is why I leave 
density in the model despite the high possibility of multicollinearity with the population and land 
area variables. 
 
H6a: The density of a local municipality has a positive impact on the extent of 
collaborative policy activities. 
 
H6b: The density of a local municipality has a negative impact on the extent of 
collaborative policy activities. 
 
The number of neighboring municipalities represents the degree of structural 
fragmentation. Theories of regional governance used to expect a higher level of structural 
fragmentation to impede cross-boundary collaboration between local municipalities. For 
example, while Miller‟s MPDI index, Lewis‟s Fragmentation index and Rusk‟s measure of 
inelasticity are distinctive in terms of ideas and techniques in measurement, they converge on the 
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hypothesis expecting a negative impact of structural fragmentation on regional policy effort in 
the policy field of economic development.
19
 It is therefore reasonable for this study to expect that 
the number of neighboring municipalities is negatively related to the extent of collaboration. 
 
H7: The more neighboring municipalities there are, the less a local municipality is 
willing to collaborate. 
 
Community heterogeneity measures impacts of racial diversity on the pattern of 
developmental policy-making. It also partly represents cultural differences between 
communities. Generally it is expected that as racial diversity increases, the extent of 
collaborative activities decreases.  
 
H8: As racial diversity increases, the extent of collaborative activities of local 
municipalities decreases. 
 
Finally, the regional dummy variable informs us in which region selected municipalities 
are located. Municipalities located in Minneapolis are coded as 1 while municipalities in 
Pittsburgh are coded as 0. According to theoretical expectations, the hierarchically arranged 
institutional structures in Minneapolis should function against collaborative policy activities.
20
 
                                               
19
 Since the structural decentralization of decision-making authority is believed to facilitate 
competition between local governments, jurisdictional fragmentation is recognized as an important 
prerequisite for efficient local governance. But no matter how pervasive this theoretical belief has been 
over the decades, empirical evidence supporting this polycentric model is more or less ambiguous 
(Prud'homme, 1995). 
In addition, as societies become more and more interlinked, keeping policy independence as 
strictly as in the past is no longer possible, let alone recommendable. Efficiency gains from local 
governance seem to come more from low transaction cost rather than market-like competition (Miller, 
1992: Putnam, 1993). It is now believed that a key factor producing efficiency gains is successful 
collective action among actors and organizations, including local governments. Thus, an effective mode 
of governance is expected to encourage collaborative activities between local governments. Collaboration 
is defined as a purposive relationship designed to solve a problem by creating or discovering a solution 
within a given set of constraints (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 4). 
20
 According to Simon (1996), as an organizational unit is divided into functionally near-
decomposable sub-units, a unit as a whole would be advantaged with efficiency gains. This theory 
predicts that a local government of hierarchical structure tends to invest more resources in a relationship 
with a higher level government than with its adjacent neighbors.  
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H9: The extent of collaboration of local municipalities in the Minneapolis region is 
significantly lower than that of local municipalities in the Pittsburgh region. 
 
2. Economic/Fiscal Factors 
The variables of community wealth, community fiscal health, and community social 
inequity are used to measure the diversity of economic and fiscal stresses across local 
governments. 
The first variable in this group is related to a municipality‟s economic wealth. Among 
various measures that represent the concept of economic wealth of a given local municipality, 
per capita income has been selected for this study because it is the most widely used in 
development studies. These studies generally agree that wealthy communities are less 
collaborative in most policy areas, mainly because they may believe that by collaborating they 
are more likely to contribute than gain the necessary resources. 
 
H10: The wealthier a local municipality is, the less likely it is to cooperate with its 
neighbors in the economic development policy process. 
 
The second variable, community fiscal health, is closely related to the community wealth 
but is regarded as having an independent influence on collaboration. Per capita property tax 
would best represent the fiscal capacity or fiscal independence that is needed to satisfy residents‟ 
preferences as expressed by the per capita income variable. It can be postulated that local 
municipalities with low fiscal capacity are eager to cooperate with their neighbors. 
 
H11: The less fiscally capable the local municipality is, the more it is willing to cooperate 
with its neighbors in the economic development policy process. 
 
While per capita income and per capita property tax represent economic and fiscal 
attributes of local governments, the ratio of population under poverty level measures the 
economic and social inequity within each region. Like the hypothesis positing a negative 
relationship between community economic and fiscal capacity and inter-local collaboration, we 
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can easily hypothesize that affluent communities will be less likely to cooperate because they 
have enough resources to satisfy their own needs, while municipalities with a high percentage of 
poverty will be eager to find outside funds to cope with the poverty problems at hand.
21
 
 
H12: A local municipality with a higher ratio of population under the poverty level is like 
to be more cooperative than others. 
 
3. Political/Governmental Institutional Factors 
At least three forms of institutional infrastructures are worth being considered in inter-
organizational collaboration. 
First, the council-manager form of government may play a positive role in facilitating 
collaboration. A long-term incumbency chief administration officer in this form of government 
gives city managers enough time to build inter-local networks with its probable policy partners. 
In addition, the existence of professional managers tends to result in high managerial 
effectiveness and low political transition costs.  
However, there exist studies positing a negative impact of this governmental form on 
collaboration. For example, Feiock et al (2007) argues that collaborative policy activities are 
more frequently adopted in local governments with a mayor-council system. According to this 
study, a mayor‟s personal interest in reelection tends to increase the propensity of collaborative 
policy activities because mayors tend to prefer short-term policy outcomes that are easily visible 
to local voters. 
 
H13a: The Council-Manager form of government is likely to increase the extent of inter-
organizational collaborative activities. 
                                               
21
 This question is rephrased whether a mode of governance influences the distributional patterns 
in each region. Since the benefits of economic development are always selective (Knight, 1992), conflicts 
with respect to the decision of „who gets what‟ are inevitably embedded in political interaction between 
autonomous governmental units. This statement is well reflected in the proposition that the more different 
the planning capacities of neighboring governments are, the more difficult it is for these governments to 
agree on developmental objectives (Kelleher & Lowery, 2004).  
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H13b: The Mayor-Council form of government is likely to increase the extent of inter-
organizational collaborative activities. 
 
The membership of any kind of economic partnership may have significantinfluence on 
the dependent variable. It is natural to believe that the more memberships a local municipality 
holds, the more it is willing to collaborate inter-organizationally. 
 
H14: Municipalities currently participating in economic partnerships are more likely to 
cooperate with other policy-related organizations. 
 
Finally, the introduction of a performance measurement system is also believed to be 
related to the extent of collaboration. Although I have found no theoretical background about the 
influence of this system, I believe this variable partly stands for managerial professionalism and I 
expect it to be positively associated with the extent of collaborative activities. 
 
H15: Municipalities with a formal performance measurement system are more likely to 
cooperate with their neighboring organizations. 
 
<Table 3-3> summarizes the hypothesized directions of the independent variables in 
relation to the extent of collaborative activities among local municipalities. A +/– direction 
denotes that the hypothesized direction of these factors cannot be specified a priori, and also that 
there are multiple theories stating contradictory directions of influence. In the next chapter 
empirical analyses on these hypotheses will be conducted in addition to the basic descriptive 
analyses of each of the variables included in the explanatory model. 
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Table 3-4. Summary of Hypotheses 
Factors that may influence 
 Inter-Organizational collaboration 
Hypothesized Direction 
     Procedural Variables  
  Regional Integration Index +/- 
  State Integration Index +/- 
  Federal Integration Index +/- 
     Structural Variables  
Municipality Characteristics  
  Population +/- 
  Land Area +/- 
  Density +/- 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities - 
  Community Heterogeneity - 
  Regional Dummy +/- 
Economic/Fiscal Factors  
  Community Wealth - 
  Community Fiscal Health - 
  Community Social inequity + 
Political/Governmental Institution  
  Form of Government +/- 
  Economic Partnership + 
  Performance Measurement System  + 
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4.0  ANALYSES: DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION 
This chapter examines the causal relationship between governance structure and extent of 
collaboration in the two regions based on the hypotheses developed in the chapter 3. In this 
chapter, descriptions of the dependent and independent variables are provided first, and their 
meaning with respect to regionalism studies will be sought. Based on the hypothetical statements 
developed above, multiple tests involving models of inter-organizational collaboration will be 
conducted. 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1.1 Conducting a Survey 
One of the fundamental objectives of social science research is to find variances in a variable and 
to explain these variances using one or multiple causes. In the study of collaborative policy 
activities, the first task is to detect significant variances in the extent of collaboration across the 
two regions. 
In a nutshell, this dissertation expects significant regional differences in the level of 
collaboration, which will be demonstrated by statitistically different overall values for the two 
regions in the collaboration index.  The survey conducted in the two regions will provide 
necessary information on the variances of the variables. 
<Table 4-1> summarizes the administrative information of the survey conducted from 
June to August in 2007. Two rounds of conducting the survey were conducted following 
Dillman‟s Total Design Method (1978). After the first round was completed with almost a 45% 
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response rate the second round immediately followed. As <Table 4-1> shows, the second round 
brought the total response rate up to 58%.
22
 
 
Table 4-1. Summary of Survey 
Municipalities in Minneapolis and Pittsburgh Regions  
with 5,000 Population or more 
 Minneapolis  Pittsburgh  Total 
Total(Collected) 75 (45) 134 (76) 209 (121) 
Response Rate (%) 60 57 58 
 
 
4.1.2 Finding Variances in Collaboration 
The first goal of empirical analysis is to assess whether the variance in the dependent variable is 
significant enough to be worth studying. In this dissertation, the average values of the 
collaboration index in the Minneapolis and Pittsburgh regions are expected to be considerably 
different. To prove that the impacts from regional cultural and political institutions are the 
factors that influence the tendency of collaboration of local municipalities, the overall values of 
the collaboration index in each region should be observed first. 
<Table 4-2> displays the average values of  the collaboration index in the two regions. 
When the activities in Joint Policy Efforts (except „receive technical assistance‟) shown in 
<Table 3-2> are  double weighted in calculating the collaboration index, the Minneapolis and the 
Pittsburgh regions give average values of 19.73 and 11.95, respectively. Even without the double 
weighting, the values of 14.47 and 8.60 can be regarded as considerably different. These simple 
statistics confirm that municipalities in the Minneapolis region are more collaborative than 
municipalities in the Pittsburgh region.  
 
 
 
                                               
22
 One response was detected as outlier and dropped from empirical analysis. 
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Table 4-2. Variances of Collaboration Index 
Collaboration Index 
 
Unweighted Weighted 
Minneapolis 14.47 19.73 
Pittsburgh 8.60 11.95 
 
 
4.1.3 Procedural Variables: A Summary 
When there is a significant variance found in the dependent variable, the next step needed is to 
detect a meaningful covariance between the dependent variable and independent variables. 
Among multiple explanatory variables, I give put more emphasis on finding a significant 
relationship between the collaboration index and a series of procedural variables here. 
Three procedural variables were defined in accordance with the levels of government. 
These variables, which are labeled Regional Integration Index, State Integration Index, and 
Federal Integration Index, measure the intensity of interaction between regional institutions and 
local municipalities, the state government, and the federal government, respectively.  
<Table 4-3> indicates that only the Regional Integration Index (RI) would have a 
meaningful covariance with the Collaboration Index (CI), and demonstrates that RI is more 
likely to be an important cause of variances in CI. In contrast, SI and FI remain quite stable, 
regardless of regions. 
The same weighting process could be applied to RI, SI, and FI as in the case of 
Collaboration index. Policy activities in the category „adjustment seeking‟ in <Table 3-3> were 
weighted twice in comparison to activities in the „information seeking‟ category. This is because 
as municipalities are adjusting their economic, political, and cultural interests to other levels of 
governance, their perception of self-interest becomes defined more collective. This mechanism 
eventually leads to generation of a concept of collective benefit that could satisfy even the most 
autonomous local political unit. This is why voluntary adjustment seeking activities should be 
treated differently from information-seeking policy activities. 
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Table 4-3.  Variances in Regional, State, and Federal Integration Indexes 
 
a) Unweighted  
 
Mean Max Min SD  
MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA 
  Independent Variables  
Regional Integration Index 4.11 0.77 8.0 6.0 0 0 2.46 1.31 
State Integration Index 4.09 4.32 9.0 9.0 0 0 2.17 2.20 
Federal Integration Index 2.22 2.28 8.0 9.0 0 0 2.33 2.17 
  Dependent Variable  
Collaboration Index 14.47 8.60 46.0 32.0 1 0 9.60 8.26 
 
 
b) Weighted  
 
Mean Max Min SD  
MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA 
  Independent Variables  
Regional Integration Index 5.16 0.88 11.0 7.0 0 0 3.48 1.61 
State Integration Index 5.24 5.21 13.0 13.0 0 0 3.18 3.10 
Federal Integration Index 2.56 2.63 11.0 12.0 0 0 3.08 2.75 
  Dependent Variable  
Collaboration Index 19.73 11.95 62.0 50.0 1 0 13.34 11.59 
 
 
When these indexes are weighed, the differences between Minneapolis and Pittsburgh 
become more conspicuous. While the average value of RI in Pittsburgh goes up only 0.11 point 
(14%), RI in Minneapolis rises 1.1 point, indicating 26% increase. Even considering RI is 
originally significantly higher in the Minneapolis region, this phenomenon supports the 
observation that municipalities in Minneapolis are more strongly integrated at the regional level.
 The summary of SI and FI in <Table 4-3> supports the idea that modes of governance at 
the regional level are important. In contrast to the fluctuations in CI and RI across regions, 
neither SI nor FI shows a considerable variance and both remain absolutely stable regardless of 
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region. This fact is reaffirmed when weights are now applied as in the case of RI.  In <Table 4-
3> (a), the average value for SI in Minneapolis and Pittsburgh is 4.1 and 4.3, respectively. It can 
be hardly said this amount of difference is significant enough to distinguish the two regions. 
Even after weighting, the difference between two regions remains negligible, compared to the 
changes in the variables of RI and CI. 
The final observation from <Table 4-3> is that the frequency and intensity of interaction 
with Federal agencies shows the least average values and least amount of variation across 
regions.  In fact, after weighting, the average values of FI in two regions are almost identical. 
This story as a whole shows that there is no covariance between two variables, which may 
indicate that variances in the dependent variable are not significantly related to FI,. 
In sum, a descriptive analysis of CI and procedural variables tells us that the tendency of 
inter-organizational collaboration of local governments is significantly influenced by regional 
factors, no matter what the region. Moreover, it proves that only the regional level procedural 
variable covaries with the dependent variable. We do not know yet whether this phenomenon is 
in fact true, but it provides enough reason to conduct further investigation. A systemic analysis 
of this topic will follow including the statistical description of the structural variables in the two 
regions. 
4.1.4 Structural Variables: A Summary 
As the discussion of the theoretical background for this dissertation has already shown, any study 
that exclusively examines only the procedural or only the structural perspective of governance 
hardly grasps the sophisticated nuisances hidden in the collaborative policy processes. Even 
though the descriptive summary of procedural variables might seem enough to explain variances 
in the extent of collaboration, structural attributes of local municipalities should not be neglected 
in the model of inter-organizational collaboration. 
<Table 4-4> summarizes the basic statistics related to the structural variables, arranged 
by region to make regional differences more obvious. 
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Table 4-4. Summary of Statistics of Structural Variables in the Two Regions 
 MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM SD 
 MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA 
Municipality Characteristics         
  Population 31559.4 16396.63 382618 334563 5070 5145 56263.56 37215.25 
  Land Area 16.40 15.77 54.89 91.80 2.24 0.60 13.72 17.23 
  Density 2181.65 2547.19 6970.63 13292.86 187.20 75.96 1331.90 2610.30 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities 5.93 7.12 13 34 2 1 2.34 4.24 
  Community Heterogeneity 7.37 7.53 32.00 49.40 1.50 0.40 6.78 9.67 
  Regional Dummy         
Economic/Fiscal Factors         
  Community Wealth 26692.76 22730.95 44425.0 80610.00 15513.0 12067.00 5919.92 9502.90 
  Community Fiscal Health 290.08 151.85 519.02 376.99 147.81 6.70 87.24 83.48 
  Community Social inequity 4.29 9.83 16.90 44.10 0.60 1.70 2.78 8.03 
Political/Governmental Institution         
Form of Government 
Min: N= 45 (0=14, 1=31) Pit: N=76 (0=30, 1=46) 
0.69 0.61 1 1 0 0 0.47 0.49 
Economic Partnership 
Min: N= 45 (0=22, 1=23) Pit: N=76 (0=22, 1=54) 
0.51 0.71 1 1 0 0 0.51 0.46 
Performance Measurement System 
Min: N= 45 (0=27, 1=18) Pit: N=76 (0=54, 1=22) 
0.40 0.29 1 1 0 0 0.50 0.46 
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4.1.4.1 Municipal Characteristics 
It was noted that the strategic decision on collaboration is influenced by multiple factors - it is 
hardly imaginable that decisions could be made regardless of each jurisdiction‟s economic, 
social, and institutional characteristics.  
In terms of size of population, the municipalities in Minneapolis are about twice as big as 
those in Pittsburgh in general. But the populations of the central city in both regions are quite 
comparable. The city of Minneapolis has about 50,000 more people than the city of Pittsburgh, 
although the direction of population change in the two cities is opposite.
23
 The standard deviation 
for each case shows that variance in population is bigger in the Minneapolis region. 
The variable of land size is also quite comparable, except that diversity is more 
conspicuous in Pittsburgh region. This indicates that while municipalities in urban areas in the 
Pittsburgh region are very small in size, cities in the suburbs have wide jurisdictions.  
The variable of density tells a similar story. Given the fact that the average values of 
density lie between 2,000 and 2,500 per square mile, a two times larger standard deviation in the 
Pittsburgh region is unusual. This means that in the Pittsburgh region, the structural and 
functional differences between urban municipalities and suburbs are clearer than in Minneapolis 
region. This can also be interpreted to mean that the central cities and suburbs in the Minneapolis 
region are more functionally integrated than the Pittsburgh region. 
The number of neighboring municipalities is the central measurement for structural 
aspect of governance. The summary shows that the Pittsburgh region is more structurally 
decentralized by more than one point on average. Concerning the fact that the Pittsburgh region 
has three times more local municipalities, this result seems logical even though the difference in 
average is not as wide as expected. 
The most unexpected result obtained is regarding the racial composition. The mean 
values of non-white population in the two regions are almost the same, 7.37 for Minneapolis and 
                                               
23
 The total populations in the two regions were almost the same two decades ago. The 1990 census 
reported that the Minneapolis region had 2,464,124 persons and Pittsburgh had a population of 2,242,798. 
In 2006, one and half decade later, the population in the Minneapolis region was estimated to be 
3,175,041, while the size of the population in Pittsburgh had hardly changed at 2,370,776. Among the 20 
biggest MSAs in the U.S., Pittsburgh is one of the two metropolitan regions which had lost some 
population during the last decade. 
  89 
7.50 for Pittsburgh. This is surprising because the Minneapolis region is usually regarded as a 
racially as well as culturally homogeneous region, where the Scandinavian and Deutsche 
heritage is particularly strong. In contrast, the value of 7.50 in Pittsburgh is comparatively low 
considering the huge African American labor immigration to steel industry during the 20
th
 
century. 
4.1.4.2  Economic/Fiscal Factors 
Economic and fiscal attributes are as important as municipal characteristics. Three variables 
were selected for study, each of which measures different aspects of the economic and fiscal 
conditions of local governments. 
In the Minneapolis region, the economic wealth measured by per capita income is about 
$4,000 higher on average than that in the Pittsburgh region. This partly represents the current 
economic downturns of the Pittsburgh metropolis as compared to the steady economic growth of 
the Minneapolis region. One report states that among more than 331 metropolitan statistical 
areas, Minneapolis is ranked 102nd with a 5.8% average growth rate while Pittsburgh is 250
th
 
with a 4.2% rate of economic growth (Beacon Hill Institute, 2004). This observation corresponds 
with recent reports that describe Pittsburgh as one of the two regions that have lost their 
population during the last decade. In sum, it is safe to say that say that municipalities in the 
Minneapolis region are wealthier in general than municipalities in the Pittsburgh region. 
More important information is provided by the standard deviation of per capita income. 
According to statistics, the standard deviation in the Pittsburgh region is more than 60% larger 
than in the Minneapolis region, which demonstrates that economic inequity is substantially more 
severe in Pittsburgh. With a relatively low level of per capita income, we can easily guess that 
economic wealth in the Pittsburgh region will continue to be unequally distributed if there is no 
correctional counter-measures taken or comprehensive intervention of higher level of 
governments. 
Observations of community fiscal health represented by per capita property tax revenue 
reinforce this argument from a different perspective. This variable is intended to capture the 
fiscal capacity of local governments, and at the same time it measures the citizens‟ preferences 
on governmental roles in local governance. According to the descriptive statistics on fiscal 
capacity, municipalities in Minneapolis spend two times that of Pittsburgh municipalities. This 
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illustrates that the role of the local governments is more proactive in the Twin Cities region. It 
may be understandable with the moralistic cultural legacy in Minnesota, the local governments 
might be expected to protect the values of social justice and civic virtues. 
What distinguishes the two regions most in the sub-category of Economic/Fiscal Factors 
is the poverty ratio or the number of persons under the poverty line. The average percentages of 
4.29 in Minneapolis and 9.88 in Pittsburgh look significantly different, which shows social and 
economic equity is relatively well preserved in Minneapolis region. Not only the overall 
economic situation but also the distribution of poverty among municipalities display that the 
Pittsburgh region suffers from unequal resource distribution within the region. This phenomenon 
could be explained by the economic hardships that Pittsburgh has experienced during several 
decades, but we cannot rule out other possible explanations such as the strong political and 
economic parochialism in Pittsburgh region leads to social inequality.  
4.1.4.3  Political/Governmental Institutions 
The last set of variables consists of municipalities‟ internal institutional structures. All variables 
in this category are represented by the categorical and dichotomous measurement level. 
In terms of forms of government, 68.9% (31/45) of sample municipalities in Minneapolis 
have the Council/Manager form of government, while 60.5% (46/76) of respondents in the 
Pittsburgh region report their governmental form as the Council/Manager system. In total, 63.6% 
(77/121) of the sample municipalities in both are operating under the managerial form of 
governing system.  
The second variable, Economic Partnership, clearly distinguishes the two regions. Half 
(51.1%, 23/45) of Minneapolis municipalities have voluntarily participated in various kinds of 
inter-organizational partnerships. In the Pittsburgh region, more than 71% (54/76) of 
municipalities are engaged in economic partnership with private and non-profit organizations 
voluntarily. This reflects again that the historical legacy of inter-sectoral cooperation in 
Pittsburgh illustrated in previous studies (Ferman, 1996: Jacob, 2001: Savitch & Vogel, 1996). 
The final variable measures whether municipalities have a performance measurement 
system. While 40% (18/45) of municipalities in the Minneapolis region report that they are 
equipped with any kind of performance measurement system, only 29% (22/76) of Pittsburgh 
municipalities measure and record their governmental performances. 
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4.1.5 A Summary of Variables: Integrative Model 
This simple statistical description demonstrates that the two regions are significantly different 
both in structural as well as procedural aspects. The summary highlights that the Pittsburgh 
region is more structurally decentralized than the Minneapolis region, fiscally unequal, and 
culturally individualistic.  
Even with these differences, it is still possible to put the municipalities in the two regions 
into a single data set as all the variables measure the micro and internal attributes of each 
municipality; environmental or macro level influences are not likely to taint the information 
embedded in the measurements. Circumstantial or geographical information will be carried by 
regional dummy or procedural variables. Whether both dummy and procedural variables can be 
included in the explanatory model at the same time will be determined by the regression analysis 
and model specification process. 
<Table 4-5> summarizes the results for the descriptive statistics of variables regardless of 
the regional location of the municipality. The dependent variable (CI) and procedural variables 
reflect the weights which are given to reciprocal and adjusting policy activities. 
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Table 4-5. A Summary of Statistics of Variables: Integrated Data 
 Mean Max Min SD 
Dependent Variable     
Collaboration Index 14.87 62.0 0 12.79 
Independent Variables     
Procedural Variables     
  Regional Integration Index 2.48 11.0 0 3.23 
  State Integration Index 5.23 13.0 0 3.12 
  Federal Integration Index 2.60 12.0 0 2.87 
Structural Variables     
Municipality Characteristics     
  Population 22082.67 382618 5070 46183.96 
  Land Area 16.01 91.80 0.60 15.94 
  Density 2410.11 13292.86 75.96 2219.14 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities 6.71 38 1 3.94 
  Community Heterogeneity 7.47 49.40 0.40 8.67 
  Regional Dummy 0.37 1 0 0.48 
Economic/Fiscal Factors     
  Community Wealth 24216.63 80610.00 12067.00 8533.68 
  Community Fiscal Health 204.31 519.02 6.70 106.52 
  Community Social Inequity 7.75 44.10 0.60 7.09 
Political/Governmental Institution     
  Form of Government (0=44, 1=77) 0.64 1 0 0.48 
  Economic Partnership (0=81, 1=40) 0.63 1 0 0.48 
  Performance Measurement (0=44, 1=77) 0.33 1 0 0.47 
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4.2 EXPLAINING COLLABORATION:  
DETERMINANTS OF COLLABORATION 
The next step of the analysis is estimating the influence of structural and procedural variables on 
the extent of collaborative orientation of local municipalities in the two regions. The analysis 
starts with building appropriate explanatory models for each region, and in the end introduces an 
integrative model generalizable to other metropolitan regions in the U.S. 
In specifying the integrative model, regional differences needed to be appropriately 
addressed. The three models were carefully tested. They are different only in respect to how 
regional differences are addressed. Model one has a regional dummy variable (0 = Minneapolis, 
1 = Pittsburgh) while model 2 includes an RI variable instead of regional dummy. Model 3 
includes both variables. 
4.2.1 Method of Analysis 
The extent of collaboration of local municipalities, the dependent variable for this analysis is 
carefully measured and recorded in this chapter as it reflects the significance of reciprocal and 
long-term relationships.  
For the purpose of causal explanation, the most appropriate statistical method is multiple 
regression analysis. The possible indicators to show statistical validity such as multicollinearity 
and heteroscedasticity are comprehensively checked in this chapter, and the final model is 
determined through a model specification process. 
4.2.2 Data Manipulation: Satisfying the Normality Assumption 
The other important topic that is worth serious attention is how well the dependent variable 
satisfies the fundamental assumptions of multivariate regression analysis. One of the 
requirements is normal distribution of the dependent variable. While there is confusion on 
whether this is a „must‟ in regression analysis, there is no doubt normal distribution of the 
dependent variable substantially increases both the validity and reliability of the results. 
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The original data of the Collaboration Index (CI) is not normally distributed. In order to 
correct this problem, several attempts at data transformation were made until the dataset passed 
the normality test.
24
 Graphical expressions were also scrutinized. This series of descriptive 
analyses was reiterated using various methods of transformation. After tens of rounds, I found 
that taking the square root of each measurement of CI makes the dependent variable normally 
distributed. 
 
Table 4-6. Normality Test: Pittsburgh Region 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) 
 Statistic Df Sig. 
CI2 .074 75 .200(*) 
CIW5 .076 75 .200(*) 
   * This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
   (a) Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
CI2 and CIW5 stand for unweighted and weighted Collaboration Index, respectively. 
Both are interval variables, in which differences between the values of the intervals are equally 
spaced. 
SPSS provides two kinds of normality tests - the Kolmogotov-Smirnov test and the 
Shapiro-Wilk test. Due to the inherent limitations in each test, it is necessary to get results that 
pass both tests at the same time. Fortunately the results for these tests, displayed in <Table 4-6>, 
show that both variables are normally distributed. 
The same procedure was applied to the case of the Minneapolis region and the integrated 
dataset consisting of all the observations in both regions. The normality tests for each case are 
summarized below. 
 
                                               
24
 Transformations are a remedy for outliers, failures of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. 
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Table 4-7. Normality Test: Minneapolis Region 
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. 
CI2 .976 45 .465 
CIW5 .981 45 .642 
      * This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
      (a) Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Table 4-8.  Normality Test: Integrated Data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a) 
 Statistic Df Sig. 
CI2 .049 120 .200(*) 
CIW5 .047 120 .200(*) 
      * This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
      (a) Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Now with the transformed data in hand, we can finally move forward to the step of 
explanatory analyses. It starts with a question of „what determines inter-organizational 
collaboration in Pittsburgh region. 
4.2.3 Findings: Collaboration in the Pittsburgh Region 
Although notorious for its hyper-structural fragmentation, the Pittsburgh region has been 
acknowledged as a cooperative metropolitan area. This section raises the question of how 
cooperation is possible in this context of severe structural fragmentation. Also, it attempts to find 
the factors that encourage the collaborative activities of local municipalities in this region. 
<Table 4-9> summarizes the statistical significances of the regression models and 
regression coefficients of each variable in the context of the Pittsburgh region. Overall, the 
significance is slightly higher when weighted data was used.  
Among the procedural variables, only the state integration index (SI) appears to be highly 
significant, while the extent of interactions with federal agents (FI) does not seem to explain the 
tendency of municipal decision-making towards collaborative activities. It demonstrates that 
municipalities with a close relationship with state government agencies are more active in 
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horizontal cooperation as well. It challenges the theory of near-decomposibility, which claims a 
negative relationship between vertical cooperation and inter-organizational cooperation. 
In the variables for structural factors, all variables of political/governmental institutions 
are highly significant. The dummy variable for the form of government seems to be most 
significant. In both models, the council-manager form of government increases the level of inter-
organizational collaboration to a great extent.  
Another significant structural variable is Economic Partnership. In this analysis, if a 
municipality holds a membership in existing economic partnership organizations, its tendency 
towards inter-organizational collaboration increases considerably. In other words, municipalities 
with economic partnerships tend to be more cooperative cross-jurisdictionally by .934 
(Unwieghted) or 0.942 (Weighted) points
25
 than municipalities without any economic 
partnership. 
The variable of performance measurement system is positively associated with 
collaboration as well. Information on governmental performances encourages managers to 
evaluate their past experiences. If they are not satisfied with the current situation, they are likely 
to adopt innovative policy alternatives. If we correctly acknowledge that the collaborative 
approach to economic development has emerged as a likely policy option for municipal 
managers, we can see the relationship between two variables easily. 
When it comes to the analysis of each variable‟s significance, the two differences 
between the models are the variables of regional integration index and community social 
inequity. Given that the interactions between local governments and regional institutions (SPC) 
are not strong, we would not expect policy integration at the regional level to play as central a 
role in inter-organizational collaboration as state level policy integration. However, although not 
significant in both models, it is still an important finding that policy preferences shared at the 
regional level are in fact influential in explaining the extent of collaboration of local 
municipalities. 
                                               
25 This values results from the function of square root of original values. 
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Table 4-9.  Factors Explaining the Extent of Collaboration in the Pittsburgh Region 
 Unweighted (1) Weighted (2) 
Procedural Variables   
  Regional Integration Index  .061 (.138)* .065 (.122) 
  State Integration Index .292 (.100)** .295 (.075)*** 
  Federal Integration Index -.020 (.098) -.051 (.078) 
Structural Variables   
Municipality Characteristics   
  Population (1/1000) .010 (.007) .011 (.008) 
  Land Area .003 (.012) .004 (.013) 
  Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities -.048 (.067) -.075 (.078) 
  Community Heterogeneity -.016(.020) -.031 (.023) 
  Regional Dummy N/A N/A 
Economic/Fiscal Factors   
  Community Wealth .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Community Fiscal Health -.003 (.002) .000 (.003) 
  Community Social Inequity .029 (.028) .057 (.033)* 
Political/Governmental Institution   
  Form of Government .881 (.299)*** 1.029 (.343)*** 
  Economic Partnership .934 (.338)*** .942 (.390)** 
  Performance Measurement .595 (.341)* .791 (.376)** 
Constant -.281 (.842) -.294 (.941) 
R-Square .578 .598 
Adjusted R-Square .479 .504 
F 5.865*** 6.365*** 
Note: Standard Error in parenthesis.  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10; two-tailed test. 
 
 
In sum, we can safely say that in the context of hyper-fragmentation as in Pittsburgh, 
municipalities with active relationships with the state government tend to collaborate more with 
their neighbors. In addition, the council-manager form of government and the membership of 
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economic partnership exert positive influences and the performance measurement system plays a 
moderate role in fostering inter-organizational collaboration. 
4.2.4 Collaboration in the Minneapolis Region 
This section investigates how the same variables are differently associated in the Minneapolis 
region. The same statistical analysis as above was conducted using the method of multivariate 
regression analysis. The results are reported in <Table 4-10>. 
While still statistically significant, the overall significance of models of collaboration in 
the Minneapolis region do not hold as strong as in the case of the Pittsburgh region. Only 
membership in an economic partnership and RI and membership in an economic partnership 
(Weighted model) appear to be statically significant. Here it should be clarified that this result 
does not mean overall level of collaboration is lower in the Minneapolis region. As summarized 
<Table 4-3>, municipalities in the Minneapolis region are much more cooperative on average 
than municipalities in the Pittsburgh region. We can infer from <Table 4-10> that inter-
organizational or cross-boundary collaboration in Minneapolis is less influenced by either 
structural attributes or the frequencies of relations with higher level governments. It could be 
better interpreted that, in comparison to the Pittsburgh case, since the relationships among 
municipalities in the Minneapolis region are more formally regulated, the variables included in 
these models are less likely to determine the extent of collaborative activities. 
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Table 4-10.  Factors Explaining the Extent of Collaboration in the Minneapolis Region 
 Unweighted (1) Weighted (2) 
Procedural Variables   
  Regional Integration Index  .129 (.080) .119 (.068)* 
  State Integration Index .164 (.100) .115 (.082) 
  Federal Integration Index -.038 (.094) .018 (.086) 
Structural Variables   
Municipality Characteristics   
  Population (1/1000) .013 (.009) .015 (.011) 
  Land Area -.029 (.028) -.038 (.034) 
  Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities -.070 (.098) -.079 (.120) 
  Community Heterogeneity .030 (.038) .037 (.047) 
  Regional Dummy N/A N/A 
Economic/Fiscal Factors   
  Community Wealth .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Community Fiscal Health -.001 (.002) -.001 (.003) 
  Community Social Inequity -.020 (0.131) -.043 (.162) 
Political/Governmental Institution   
  Form of Government .371 (.382) .395 (.468) 
  Economic Partnership .911 (.371)** .956 (.457)** 
  Performance Measurement -.021 (.372) .012 (.458) 
Constant .374 (.680) 2.819 (2.202) 
R-Square .579 .560 
Adjusted R-Square .383 .355 
F 2.948*** 2.726*** 
Note: Standard Error in parenthesis.  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10; two-tailed test. 
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4.2.5 Findings: A Model of Collaboration – Unweighted 
The next empirical question is whether the effectiveness of the proposed model could hold 
regardless of the metropolitan region it is applied to. The data on each region is now combined 
and the same statistical method is applied.  
Three models of collaboration are summarized in <Table 4-11>. The first model is 
introduced to capture the differences that the regional factor makes on the results for extent of 
collaboration. The variable of regional dummy is significant at the 0.01 level, and based on this 
information we can predict that, other things being equal, municipalities in the Minneapolis 
region tend to collaborate more than municipalities in the Pittsburgh region. The size of 
population, State integration index (SI), the form of government, and membership in an 
economic partnership are also positively related to the collaboration index (CI).  
The second model substitutes a regional dummy for the Regional Integration Index (RI). 
Whereas the regional dummy captures all the unspecified factors hidden in a regional context, RI 
measures the intensity of cultural and political integration of municipalities to regional level of 
governance. In other words, while a regional dummy measures the uncontrollable, external, and 
macro level influences on local decisions, RI represents the way these exogenous factors interact 
with endogenous characteristics of local governments. We may expect to distinguish strategically 
active local municipalities from inactive ones by scrutinizing the patterns of distribution of these 
indexes. According to Agranoff & McGuire (2003), some municipalities are more able to get 
what they want by making use of various local connections and being actively involved with 
regional and state level policy problems. They call this type of governance jurisdictional-based 
management, as each local jurisdiction is able to maximize individual benefits. 
The second model also clearly shows interactions with regional and state agencies are 
positively associated with level of collaboration. Unlike the theoretical expectation, this indicates 
that political and cultural integration at regional and state levels facilitates local governments 
development of the concept of shared interest.  
Size of population, form of government, and membership in economic partnerships are 
positively related to the collaboration index (CI) as well. The big change from the first model is 
the variable of number of neighboring municipalities becomes significant, with a negative impact 
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on collaboration. This means that structural fragmentation impedes inter-local cooperation on 
economic development. 
 
Table 4-11. Factors Explaining the Extent of Collaboration – Unwieghted case 
 
With Regional 
Dummy 
With Regional 
Integration Index 
With Both 
Procedural Variables    
  Regional N/A .209 (.052)*** .106 (.066) 
  State .258 (.063)*** .195 (.065)*** .227 (.065*** 
  Federal .015 (.064) .000 (.065) .008 (.063) 
Structural Variables    
Municipality Characteristics    
  Population .007 (.004)* .007 (.004)* .006 (.004)* 
  Land Area .001 (.009) .003 (.009) .001 (.009) 
  Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities -.024 (.039) -.065 (.037)* -.033 (.039) 
  Community Heterogeneity -.013 (.016) .000 (.017) -.008 (.017) 
  Regional Dummy 1.306 (.292)*** N/A .912 (.379)** 
Economic/Fiscal Factors    
  Community Wealth .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Community Fiscal Health -.001 (.001) .000 (.001) -.001 (.001) 
  Community Social Inequity .029 (.024) .009 (.023) .024 (.024) 
Political/Governmental Institution    
  Form of Government .712 (.225)*** .705 (.229)*** .689 (.224)*** 
  Economic Partnership .787 (.241)*** .751 (.244)*** .772 (.239)*** 
  Performance Measurement .370 (.232) .294 (.236) .325 (.232) 
Constant -.157 (.643) -.523 (.638) .062 (.652) 
R-Square .534 .548 .572 
Adjusted R-Square .503 .488 .511 
F 9.610*** 9.111*** 9.276*** 
Note: Standard Error in parenthesis.  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10; two-tailed test. 
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In the final model, in which both variables are included, the regression coefficient of the 
regional dummy variable dramatically changes, as does its significance. RI becomes insignificant 
while the regional dummy maintains its explanatory power. This may indicate that the two 
variables are closely related, even though multicollinearity does not exist. Other than that, the 
third model is similar to the first, with the exception that the overall goodness of fit is slightly 
decreased. 
Overall, the three models of inter-organizational collaboration determine the factors that 
are effective in explaining variances in the dependent variable. We can enhance the validity of 
the conclusion by conducting another set of analyses using a weighted dataset.  
4.2.6 Findings: A Model of Collaboration – Weighted 
As mentioned above, some of the policy activities deserve more weight by virtues of their 
longevity and reciprocity. This idea was reflected in the data manipulation procedure, which 
generated completely new datasets.  
The methodological advantages of „Multiplism‟ support this data manipulation. The 
results from this analysis of the weighted dataset can be compared to the results in the previous 
section, and conclusions drawn from comparison of the two may be more solid and 
comprehensive than a one-shot analysis. 
<Table 4-12> reports estimates of regression coefficients from multivariate regression 
analysis. The first model does not include RI and measures regional differences using a regional 
dummy variable. This dummy variable predicts that municipalities in the Minneapolis region 
tend to collaborate inter-organizationally substantially more than municipalities in the Pittsburgh 
region. It also predicts that the more interactive with state agencies local governments are, the 
more horizontally collaborative they are. 
Regarding the structural variables, like the analysis built upon the unwieghted data, the 
variables of social inequity, form of government, membership in economic partnerships, and 
performance measurement system are statistically significant in explaining collaboration. In the 
weighted model being examined here, other things being equal, municipalities with a 
council/manager form of government tend to collaborate more, which in turn legitimizes the idea 
of professional managerialism again. Likewise, we can claim that municipalities that already 
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have joined in any kind of inter-organizational economic development network are considerably 
more collaborative than others. 
 
Table 4-12.   Factors Explaining the Extent of Collaboration – Weighted Case 
 
With Regional 
Dummy 
With Regional 
Integration Index 
With Both 
Procedural Variables    
  Regional N/A .152 (.045)*** .085 (.056) 
  State .240 (.050)*** .206 (.052)*** .219 (.052)*** 
  Federal .013 (.057) -.001 (.057) .006 (.057) 
Structural Variables    
Municipality Characteristics    
  Population .008 (.005) .008 (.005)* .007 (.005) 
  Land Area -.001 (.011) .000 (.011) -001 (.011) 
  Density .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities -.042 (.045) -.085 (.043)* -.052 (.045) 
  Community Heterogeneity -.026 (.019) -.015 (.019) -.022 (.019) 
  Regional Dummy 1.236 (.342)*** N/A .851 (.423)** 
Economic/Fiscal Factors    
  Community Wealth .000 (.000) .000 (.001) .000 (.000) 
  Community Fiscal Health .000 (.002) .002 (.108) .000 (.002) 
  Community Social Inequity .051 (.028)* .033 (.027) .047 (.028)* 
Political/Governmental Institution    
  Form of Government .866 (.264)*** .867 (.267)*** .846 (.263)*** 
  Economic Partnership .816 (.285)*** .783 (.287)*** .800 (.283)*** 
  Performance Measurement .482 (.271)* .361 (.276) .409 (.273) 
Constant .051 (.737) .654 (.728) .253 (.744) 
R-Square .565 .558 .575 
Adjusted R-Square .507 .499 .514 
F 9.754*** 9.482*** 9.376*** 
Note: Standard Error in parenthesis.  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10; two-tailed test. 
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What is new in the first model of <Table 4-12> is that one variable becomes statistically 
significant which was not in any of previous analyses. The variable of community social inequity 
turns becomes significant, which verifies the „need‟ hypothesis.  
The second model, which substituted a dummy variable for RI, also reports very similar 
results. Municipalities with more active interactions with regional and state agencies are likely to 
be more horizontally collaborative, as with the municipalities with the variables of economic 
partnership, the forms of government, and the size of population. The variable of social inequity 
becomes insignificant again here, while the number of neighboring municipalities begins to 
display its significance as an explanatory variable. In particular, the negative direction of the 
variable of number of neighbors confirms the theoretical expectation of the negative relationship 
between structural fragmentation and propensity towards collaboration. 
The final model confirms the statement again that a regional dummy and RI cannot be 
included simultaneously in one model. When both are included, the overall significance goes 
slightly down compared to both the first and the second model, while R square remains stable at 
a significant level. 
Along with the three models that used unweighted data, the results reported in <Table 4-
12> demonstrate that some variables show consistent significance, regardless of model. In 
procedural variables, the state integration index (SI) is the most dependable explanatory variable. 
The regional integration index (RI) seems to be fairly significant only when we combine regional 
data into one integrated dataset. This means that the intensity of policy integration at the regional 
level becomes significant when the comparison of metropolitan regions is at issue. While a 
regional dummy variable is able to present the undetermined differences in regional contexts, RI 
specifies the factor that actually causes the level of collaborative activities. 
With respect to structural variables, the significance of political and governmental factors 
is conspicuous. This may indicate that local governments decide whether to collaborate or not 
based on the existence of institutional infrastructures that permit collaboration, rather than based 
on strategic calculation of future benefits from collaboration. I could say that this result confirms 
the logic of appropriateness as the rationale of action in local context. 
Structural fragmentation does not seem to have a strong influence in any cases, but its 
value as an explanatory variable is still appreciable. The social need hypothesis is also fairly 
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relevant in some cases. But economic and fiscal abilities are not associated with level of 
collaboration. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
In <Table 3-3> I summarized the hypothesized directions of each variable. Some of them were 
relatively easy to predict given the theoretical clarity or wealth of previous research, while others 
remained undecided until empirical analyses could determine the direction. 
<Table 4-13> compares the hypothesized directions and the estimates of directions 
provided by the series of empirical analyses completer for this study. Some of the variables 
prove that the proposed hypotheses were in fact empirically correct, and others specified the 
direction of influences which could not be hypothesized a priori. Variables in the gray cells are 
proven to be significant, and variables in the denser gray cells indicate those variables are 
consistently significant regardless of models. 
The most clear-cut conclusion we can draw is that the intensity of policy integration of 
local municipalities at the regional and state level are in fact the most effective in explaining 
variance in collaborative activities. This result is quite contrary to the near-decomposability 
theorem and the polycentric perspective on regional governance. First, this result shows that the 
effectiveness of a near-decomposable system would be quite exaggerated in a metropolitan 
context. The proposition of vertical integration of hierarchy still seems meaningful in some 
aspects because it actually supports horizontal interactions among subunits of governance 
system.  
The polycentric perspective also predicts a negative relationship between collective 
political and cultural integration and the extent of collaboration. In an aggregated mode of 
governance, local municipalities are apt to interact with higher level governmental organizations 
in order to win in the game of resource allocation. Theoretically there is no need for them to 
cooperate with their neighbors in this competition. But again, this theorem does not hold true. 
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Table 4-13. A Summary of Hypotheses and Results of Empirical Analyses 
Factors that influence 
 Inter-organizational collaboration 
Hypothesized 
Direction 
Direction  
at Work 
     Procedural Variables   
  Regional Integration Index +/- + 
  State Integration Index +/- + 
  Federal Integration Index +/- N/A 
     Structural Variables   
Municipality Characteristics   
  Population +/- + 
  Land Area +/- N/A 
  Density +/- N/A 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities - - 
  Community Heterogeneity - N/A 
  Regional Dummy +/- + 
Economic/Fiscal Factors   
  Community Wealth - N/A 
  Community Fiscal Health - N/A 
  Community Social inequity + + 
Political/Governmental Institution   
  Form of Government +/- + 
  Economic Partnership + + 
  Performance Measurement System + + 
 
 
When the issue of regional comparison comes forward, the regional dummy variable 
becomes especially important. As mentioned, this variable does not specify the factors that create 
differences in the level of collaboration. At this point, it is enough to say that local municipalities 
in the Minneapolis region are more collaborative in their economic development policy process. 
If this study includes more cases in the future, the importance of the dummy will be more 
obvious. 
Two other structural variables look significant. Size of population is positively associated 
with the collaborative index, which means local governments with a larger population, which 
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need more resources from outside their jurisdiction, are more likely to work inter-
organizationally to make use of neighbors‟ resources. 
The variable of number of neighboring municipalities represents the structural 
perspective on local and regional governance. Although it is not always statistically significant in 
all cases, its influence on collaboration is undeniable as the number of neighboring local 
governments increases the transaction costs of dealing with relational complexity increase 
substantially.  
Economic and fiscal factors were shown to be generally insignificant. This does not 
necessarily mean economic factors are not considered in local decision-making. But in my 
analysis, only the variable of social inequity shows a moderate influence in some cases. The 
argument that expects a negative relationship between local wealth and collaboration seems 
irrelevant, as does the case of between local fiscal capacity and collaboration. Municipalities 
may not pursue cooperation unless they have to deal with „real‟ poverty problems.  
Political and governmental institutions are critically important except for the variable of 
performance measurement system. The influence of governmental form could not be pre-
specified in chapter 3, as each of the different theories had solid reasoning for opposing 
positions. But empirical analysis clearly determines the direction of the influence. According to 
the results, the council-manager form of government definitely increases the extent of 
collaboration. It also supports the necessity for professional managerialism. 
Membership in economic partnerships is proven significant as well. Local governments 
do not exclusively interact among themselves. There are countless strong and weak ties between 
public, non-profit, and private organizations. Although local municipalities play an important 
role in every economic development policy effort, they cannot accomplish a high rate of growth 
without sufficient input from other sectors. Voluntary participation in economic development 
consortia is a good strategy to build a smooth relationship with various organizations. Thus, it is 
natural to assume that the more participatory a local municipality is, the more collaborative it is 
with its neighbors. 
As expected, this variable is strongly associated with the extent of collaboration and plays 
a positive role in increasing cross-boundary collaboration. We can therefore argue that if a 
municipality has a legacy of cooperation, it definitely impacts decisions on economic 
development strategies. 
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Finally, the performance measurement system is sometimes a significant factor in 
fostering inter-organizational collaboration, most likely because this kind of system can provide 
credible information about governmental performances which municipal managers can use to 
improve strategies. The decision whether or not to pursue collaboration cannot determined by a 
single or a couple of factors. Collaborative policy activities are the outcomes of complex 
interaction between a number of factors, including structural and procedural variables. It can be 
understood neither as a transaction cost saving strategy nor as simple compliance with 
institutional rules. I would argue it is a little bit of both. The next analysis addresses how these 
factors are interrelated to one another and how regional contexts structure these relations in 
different ways. 
  109 
5.0  LINKAGES, CLUSTERS, AND NETWORKS IN THE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROCESS 
Previous chapters have answered the fundamental question of this dissertation: What factors 
determine the extent of inter-organizational collaboration? Based on the answers provided in the 
last chapter, I will conduct another set of analyses on the economic development policy process, 
compare the mechanism of policy dynamics, and present how policy actors in the two regions of 
Minneapolis and Pittsburgh actually communicate, interact, and cooperate. The two regions seem 
to be different not only in extent of collaboration but with respect to patterns of interactions as 
well. 
The last chapter ends with a conclusion that suggests political and cultural integration at 
regional and state levels facilitates inter-organizational collaboration in the economic 
development policy process. Among the multiple significant explanatory variables, I singled out 
two variables that reflect regional variances in the extent of collaboration. Those were the 
Regional Integration Index (RI) and the regional dummy variable. Although these two variables 
could not be included in the model at the same time, there is still significant variance in the level 
of collaboration between the two metropolitan regions. 
Now the question is „how‟ they are different. More specifically, this chapter focuses on 
how the relationships among various organizations are differently structured for a wide range of 
collaborative policy activities. This analysis can fill the knowledge gap that the main conclusion 
of the last chapter leaves open.  
First, this chapter aims to identify the main actors in the economic development policy 
process. Although the previous analyses generated important knowledge on determinants of 
collaboration, we are still unaware of the roles performed by participants in economic 
development other than local municipalities. The concepts of actor and activity centrality make it 
easier to define most active actors in each region. 
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Second, this study asks which network actors play an active role in providing connections 
to other participants. Actors involved in economic development policies can increase their 
benefits not only by independently pursuing their interests, but also by providing other 
participants with relevant information such as locations of resources. We can define this type of 
participant as a network entrepreneur and will identify who occupies this position in the 
metropolitan regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. 
Finally, understanding the patterns of relationships is also important. This study employs 
the clustering method, where the three most active players are grouped in each of ten particular 
policy activities, to find out who participates in which policy activities and how the collaboration 
is organized.  
This chapter does not offer a formal network analysis per se but will provide important 
information on how economic development policies are differently shaped in each region. 
5.1 THE RESEARCH METHOD FOR NETWORK ANALYSIS 
5.1.1 Collaboration in the Network 
A network as a structural form of governance was briefly discussed in chapter two. Its 
emergence in public and urban administration coincides with the transformation of the paradigm 
of public administration from government to governance. A simultaneous change in power 
relations and increasing complexity of social problems necessitates the more flexible 
organizational form of governance, which is defined as a networked society. In a network 
society, hierarchical control is replaced by continuing processes of bargaining among interested 
parties within most fields of public administration (Bogason & Toonen, 1998: 205). 
The theme of collaboration is closely related to network structures conceptually as well 
as practically. First, collaboration is often addressed as a key managerial strategy in a networked 
society. Given a lack of rules and standard procedures, actors in network organizations have to 
figure out how to pursue collective benefits that cannot be achieved by individual efforts. 
Paritcipatin in any form of joint activity can be defined as a collaborative strategy. 
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Collaboration as a policy strategy is valued more in the context of inter-sectoral relations. 
Governments‟ weakened ability to control social actors has well been observed and documented. 
A metaphor such as „hollow state (Milward & Provan, 2000a: 2000b)‟26 describes the fact that 
policy decisions can no longer be made exclusively by governmental organizations. As resources 
are more widely distributed across the social sector, so is the authority to control their use. 
Without formal authority to monitor, command, and control, hierarchical relations have no 
means to sustain structural integrity. As a result, network structures are especially conspicuous in 
cross-sector relationships, and collaboration through the form of a network is expected to benefit 
all participants, regardless of where they are from. 
But despite the increased interest in network structures, its usefulness in policy-related 
researches has still not been adequately explored. This is partly because there is no systemized 
model explaining how a network may be structured or who is involved in which kinds of 
network arrangements. This lack of clarity in articulation perhaps reflects an uneasiness with a 
system of coordination that does not allow for clear management either by a hierarchy or by the 
market (Kickert, Kliijn, and Loppenjan, 1997). This dissertation does not claim that it can 
provide a complete set of theories of network or that its conclusions can be generalized into other 
contexts without modification. What this dissertation delivers might be a small part of the whole 
picture, but it can empirically describe the relationship between modes of governance and the 
patterns of collaboration in the field of economic development. 
5.1.2 Modal Approach Revisited 
The modal approach to regional governance is creatively reinterpreted in this chapter. While the 
empirical analysis on extent of collaborative activities provides information about factors 
determining inter-organizational collaboration, the empirical endeavor of this chapter centers on 
the structural arrangement of inter-organizational networks which have emerged from local and 
regional economic development in the regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. 
                                               
26 It originally refers to the current fashion of contracting out government services to networks of largely 
nonprofit organizations (with some private firms included) (Milward & Provan, 2000b: 362). 
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In a mode of cooperation, we may expect inter-sectoral collaboration is the dominant 
form of development policy activity. In a context lacking any authoritative regional institution, 
actors in this mode are not expected to voluntarily give up their interests in order to pursue 
relatively ambiguous and uncertain collective objectives. As Feiock et al (2007) succinctly puts 
it, local governments are likely to seek collaboration only when the transaction cost from 
interactions with other actors does not exceed the perceived benefits of the collaboration. For 
example, since interaction with private sector organizations may bring competition into service 
provision, a local government would benefit from the cost-saving mechanism of market 
competition. This is why we can expect to observe more inter-sectoral collaboration in the 
cooperative mode of governance. 
In contrast, organizations in the mode of coordination are more likely to be influenced by 
formal and informal regulations. Collaboration is explained as a standardized course of action 
regardless of whether it will benefit participants in collaboration in the future. In this sense, 
collaboration would be more intra-sectoral. Of course it does not necessarily mean inter-sectoral 
collaboration is absent in a coordinative mode of governance. This argument is only valid only in 
comparison with the case of mode of cooperation.  
5.1.3 Basic Concepts of Network Analysis 
5.1.3.1  Linkage 
The basic unit of analysis in this chapter is the collaborative „linkages‟ through which local 
municipalities collaborate on economic development policy activities with other organizations. 
Methodologically, the basic building block of any network study is the linkage among the 
organizations that make up the network (Provan & Milward, 1995). Linkage is defined as any 
type of tie between two individual organizations regardless of its strength, stability, and 
durability. There are a variety of units of analyses in a formal network analysis. This dissertation 
employs two units of analyses, each of which consist of dyadic (one) and triad (two) linkages as 
elementary structural features. Additionally, although diversity in the characteristics of a linkage 
can cause methodological complexities in the measurement process, for this study, it is not an 
issue because the relational data obtained from municipal managers is not comprehensive enough 
to support rigorous network analysis.  
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5.1.3.2  Density 
Density in network analysis usually refers to the ratio of the number of observed relations to the 
potential number (Knoke, 1990: 237). Density in this study measures the degree to which the 
municipality links with each of the players. It is thus a type of multiplexity measure for each 
player, representing the mean number of linkages per player for each municipality reporting 
collaboration with that player (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 115). 
5.1.3.3  Centrality 
Network centrality refers to the importance or prominence of actors. Wasserman & Faust (1994) 
specifies centrality as being based on degree, closeness, betweenness, and information. It is also 
measured by the differential status or rank of the actors. 
The theoretical background of centrality is nicely put by Hanneman & Riddle (2005): 
  
“Actors who have more ties to other actors may be advantaged positions. 
Because they have many ties, they may have alternative ways to satisfy needs, 
and hence are less dependent on other individuals. Because they have many ties, 
they may have access to, and be able to call on more of the resources of the 
network as a whole. Because they have many ties, they are often third-parties and 
deal makers in exchanges among others, and are able to benefit from this 
brokerage. So, a very simple, but often very effective measure of an actor's 
centrality and power potential is their degree.”  
 
From the structural point of view, the meaning of network centrality is often regarded as 
related to the concept of „structural hole.‟ According to this conceptualization, actors can build 
relationships with multiple disconnected clusters and use these connections to obtain information 
and gain advantages over others (Burt, 1992). Thus positioning in the network comes to have 
strategic value in advancing local interests. 
However, this dissertation does not adopt the structural perspective in its network 
analysis. Instead it employs the two measures of actor centrality and activity centrality, which 
capture the relative importance of particular actors and each collaborative policy activities in 
economic development policy process.  
  114 
5.2 PATTERNS OF COLLABORATION IN THE TWO REGIONS 
This section identifies the most active actors in collaborative policy activities and examines the 
extent to which each actor is involved in each policy activity. Here we can take advantage of 
theoretical expectations on the pattern of collaboration that the modal approach to governance 
provides. 
5.2.1 Participants in a Comprehensive Economic Development Plan 
5.2.1.1  Definition of Participants 
Participants or Actors in collaborative networks are broadly defined in this study, and refers to 
the „types‟ of organizations. For example, there are numerous local governments with whom one 
municipality is interacting. Although network ties can be drawn between a sample municipality 
and its partner cities, these are counted as one in my relational data. Since the main purpose of 
this study is to delineate patterns of relationships across social sectors, measuring the strength of 
networks or identifying a particular network entrepreneur is only of secondary interest. 
The types of organizations and their definitions are given as below: 
 
City (CT): Any type of local government you are in contact with, regardless of its 
  distance from your jurisdiction. 
County government (CO): All organizations belonging to State governments,  
  e.g. County‟s Department of Economic Development, State Legislatures,  
  Governor‟s Office, etc. 
Special District (SD): A governmental organization which provides specialized  
  services only to those persons who live within specified boundaries. 
Public/Private Partnership (PPP): A formal or informal relationship between local  
  governments and Private organizations for joint pursuit of local economic  
  growth. 
Chamber of Commerce (CC): A private voluntary business network which aims to  
  improve the business climate in a locality, typically through business  
  networking, lobbying, common projects and a selection of business  
  services. 
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Planning Consortia (PC): An association consisting of organizations from the 
public,  
  private, and non-profit sectors which primarily collaborates to develop  
  local comprehensive development plans. 
Economic Development Corporation (EDC): A non-profit organization whose  
  mission is to promote economic development within a specific  
  geographical area. 
Neighborhood Association (NA): A voluntary, non-profit organization which  
  represents civic values or a certain type of development interests. 
Councils of Governments (CG): A voluntary, multi-service entity with state and  
  locally-defined  boundaries that delivers a variety of federal, state and  
  local programs while continuing its function as a planning organization,  
  technical assistance provider and “visionary” to its member local  
  governments. 
Regional Institution (RI): A metropolitan planning organization (MPO).   
  A transportation policy-making organization made up of representatives  
  from a local government and transportation authorities.  
State government (ST): All organizations belonging to State governments, e.g.  
  State‟s Department of Economic Development, State Legislatures, and  
  Governor‟s Office, etc. 
Federal Government (FD): All organizations belonging to Federal governments.  
  e.g. Department of Economic Development, Department of Housing and  
  Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Congressmen or  
  Senators‟ Offices, etc. 
5.2.1.2  Frequency Analysis: Who Participates Most? 
Preparing an economic development plan is one of the most important policy activities of local 
municipalities. A comprehensive development plan is often required by state law, and it should 
contain each municipality‟s fundamental concepts, objectives, and specific strategies for 
economic development. Municipalities seldom develop their plans in isolation. Various 
stakeholders are involved in the planning process and undoubtedly do everything they can to 
ensure that these plans are written in their favor. Likewise, municipalities are more likely to 
cooperate with actors whose resources are crucial for their development objectives.  
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Table 5-1.  Frequency Distribution of Participants in 
Comprehensive Plan Development: Minneapolis 
R1 R2 R3 R4  
Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr % 
Total 
(%) 
CT 39 88.6 3 7.1 1 2.6 1 3.3 44 (100) 
CO - - 8 19.0 3 7.9 3 10.0 14 (31.8) 
ST 1 2.3 4 9.5 8 21.1 8 26.7 21 (47.7) 
FD - - - - - - - - 0 (0.0) 
SD - - - - - - - - 0 (0.0) 
PC - - 4 9.5 - - - - 4 (9.1) 
EDC 3 6.8 5 11.9 1 2.6 1 3.3 10 (22.7) 
CC - - 4 9.5 4 10.5 4 13.3 12 (27.3) 
PPP - - 2 4.8 4 10.5 4 13.3 10 (22.7) 
NA - - - - 2 5.3 2 6.7 4 (9.1) 
CG - - - - - - - - 0 (0.0) 
RI 1 2.3 11 26.2 7 18.4 7 23.3 26 (59.1) 
Total 44 100 42 100 38 100 30 100  
  Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh) 
 
But interactions between organizations do not always occur based on a rational 
calculation of benefits. Interactions involved in development of a comprehensive plan are also 
guided by diverse norms, rules, and standard procedures, and are expected to be differently 
arranged in the two regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. If we can identify active 
organizations participating in the planning process in these two regions and measure the relative 
significance of them, we may able to argue how the differently arranged modes of governance 
influence the patterns of interaction regarding development of these plans. 
Although complicated at first look, <Table 5-1> presents the core information with 
respect to the patterns of collaboration in preparation of economic development plans in the 
Minneapolis region. Twelve major organizations were identified as key participants in the 
planning process. Surveys were distributed to municipal chief administrative officers, who were 
then asked to rank those organizations according to importance. R1 in the first row means ranked 
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#1, R2 ranked #2, and so on. Since not all recipients made use of all the organizations in their 
ranking, the number of observations decreases as the ranking gets lower. For instance, while 44 
municipalities identify the most important participants in the planning process, only 30 out of 44 
municipal managers could think of a 4
th 
 most-important organization.  
The percentage measure reported in the table also shows the relative importance of the 
selected organizations holding the same rank. For example, the 88.6% for city in R1 means that 
88.6% of 44 municipal managers think „other cities‟ are the most significant participants in 
preparing development plans. Likewise, among the 42 respondents that identified a second most 
important organization, 26.2% of them see Metropolitan Council as only second to other cities in 
terms of its significance. 
The last column provides a systematic evaluation of the interactions between local 
municipalities and each of these 12 organizations in the collaborative development of an 
economic development plan. When I include ranks from 1st to 4
th
 according to importance, 
100% of 44 survey respondents reported „other cities‟ as one of the most important participants. 
Specifically, 39 out of 44 municipal CAOs (Chief Administrative Officer) select other cities as 
the most important participants, followed by economic development corporations, which 
received 3 votes overall. 
As mentioned above, the other actor whose importance is second only to other cities is 
Metropolitan Council. A total of 59.1% of answers include this organization in their answer, 
where 12 out of 26 ranked it either first or second. This result was expected a priori, given the 
active involvement of Metropolitan Council in the local incidences.  
<Table 5-2> illustrates that the patterns of inter-organizational interactions in the 
Pittsburgh region are fundamentally different from those in the Minneapolis region. First, in 
Pittsburgh more organizations are involved and the relative importance of each organization is 
widely distributed. For example, even though other cities is ranked as the most active participant 
in the Pittsburgh region as well, other organizations‟ involvement such as county government, 
state agencies, and economic development corporations cannot be treated as secondary as in the 
Minneapolis region.  
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Table 5-2. Frequency Distribution of Participants in 
Comprehensive Plan Development: Pittsburgh 
R1 R2 R3 R4  
Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr % 
Total 
(%) 
CT 25 39.7 3 5.1 5 10.2 4 10.3 37 (58.7) 
CO 12 19.0 19 32.2 9 18.4 7 17.9 47 (74.6) 
ST 9 14.3 8 13.6 7 14.3 8 20.5 32 50.8) 
FD 1 1.6 2 3.4 3 6.1 3 7.7 9 (14.3) 
SD - - 3 5.1 1 2.0 - - 4 (6.3) 
PC 3 4.8 1 1.7 - - - - 4 (6.3) 
EDC 7 11.1 4 6.8 5 10.2 5 12.8 21 (33.3) 
CC 1 1.6 6 10.2 - - 2 5.1 9 (14.3) 
PPP 2 3.2 1 1.7 5 10.2 2 5.1 10 (15.9) 
NA 1 1.6 1 1.7 4 8.2 1 2.6 7 (11.1) 
CG 2 3.2 7 11.9 6 12.2 3 7.7 18 (28.6) 
RI - - 4 6.8 4 8.2 4 10.3 12 (19.0) 
Total 63 100 59 100 49 100 39 100  
  Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh) 
 
County governments in the Pittsburgh region are more deeply involved in municipal 
development plans than in Minneapolis. Almost 75% of respondents responded that county 
governments are major participants, and more than half put county government as the first or 
second most important actor. It seems that in the context of no regional authority, county 
governments in part take the responsibility of regional issues, including economic development.  
The Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission as a regional institution did not receive 
meaningful votes. This can be interpreted to mean that the SPC‟s authority as a regional MPO is 
not successful either in inducing voluntary compliances of municipalities or in effectively 
regulating local decisions on development plans. Municipalities in the Pittsburgh region seem to 
maintain a more active relationship with a council of governments instead, which supports the 
idea of picket-fence regionalism promoted by (Wood, 2004). Collective actions on sub-regional 
issues with neighboring municipalities or county government are always the priority for local 
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governments in this region. 32 sub-regionally organized councils of governments are the primary 
institution by which each municipality can communicate and coordinate issues emerging from 
comprehensive economic development plans. 
Although it is exciting to find some regional differences here, information from this 
survey does not reveal how the interactions determined were formed and are managed. The 
following section deals with the issues of communicative networks and tries to find other 
regional differences regarding inter-organizational collaboration. 
5.2.2 Network Providers: Who Bridges the Complexity Gap 
Survey question number 11 asked „Which of the following organizations help your local 
government connect to other organizations?‟ The answers to this revealed that some 
organizations not only interact with one another but also perform various functions such as 
acting as a network brokerage in the policy process. There are five ideal-typical brokerage 
relations - liaison, representative, gatekeeper, itinerant broker, and coordinator (Knoke, 1990: 
145). Whichever brokerage roles the organizations perform, if other organizations are connected 
through them, they are likely to possess network power or occupy the social position of a 
structural hole (Burt, 1992). My data hardly specify the brokerage roles in detail, but it is 
possible to identify the actors which could successfully position themselves as the network 
brokers.  
Without sufficient ties to other network players, local governments either suffer from a 
lack of crucial information and resources or pay higher opportunity costs that could have been 
saved if the relevant actors had been involved in local matters in a timely manner. 
In the Minneapolis region, three organizations are identified as the most prominent 
network brokers. Despite notable differences from <Table 5-1>, in <Table 5-3> other cities and 
Metropolitan Council remain active players in inter-organizational communication. Other cities 
are still the most important collaborative partner for municipalities, but its dominance is clearly 
weakened with respect to network brokering in comparison with its role in the case of 
comprehensive plan development. Likewise, even though it is not considered as „the‟ most 
important network player, Metropolitan Council links municipalities to other organizational 
players, which proves its formal as well as informal influences on municipalities‟ behaviors. 
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Table 5-3. Frequency Distribution of Network Providers: Minneapolis 
R1 R2 R3 R4  
Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr % 
Total 
(%) 
CT 26 63.4 1 2.5 1 2.6 - - 28(68.3) 
CO 4 9.8 21 52.5 8 21.1 2 5.9 35 (85.4) 
ST 3 7.3 3 7.5 8 21.1 9 26.5 23 (56.1) 
FD - - - - - - 3 8.8 3 (7.3) 
SD - - - - - - 3 8.8 3 (7.3) 
PC - - 1 2.5 - - 1 2.9 1 (2.4) 
EDC 2 4.9 3 7.5 1 2.6 - - 6 (14.6) 
CC - - 4 10.0 5 13.2 7 20.6 16 (39.0) 
PPP 1 2.4 - - - - 1 2.9 2 (4.9) 
NA - - 1 2.5 - - 1 2.9 2 (4.9) 
CG - - 1 2.5 3 7.9 - - 4 (9.8) 
RI 3 7.3 5 12.5 12 31.6 6 17.6 26 (63.4) 
OTH 1 2.4 - - - - - - 1 (2.4) 
Total 41 100 40 100 38 100 34 100  
  Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
The most visible difference is the emergence of county government as a network broker. 
The role of the county government in development planning is quite limited in Minneapolis due 
to the heavy involvement of Metropolitan Council in the planning process. However, county 
governments remain network entrepreneurs that provide local municipalities with bridges to 
other organizational units.  
In the Pittsburgh region, like in the Minneapolis region, the roles of other cities in the 
inter-organizational communication become less significant as compared to their roles in 
development planning. While cities directly participate in their neighbors‟ economic plans, they 
seem to be less active in providing informal connections to other organizations. In contrast, state 
and county governments remain as strong network providers to local municipalities.  
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Table 5-4.  Frequency Distribution of Network Providers: Pittsburgh 
R1 R2 R3 R4  
Nr % Nr % Nr % Nr % 
Total 
(%) 
CT 18 25.0 1 1.4 1 1.6 1 1.9 21 (29.2) 
CO 13 18.1 22 31.0 14 21.9 6 11.5 55 (76.4) 
ST 8 11.1 11 15.5 20 31.3 6 11.5 45 (62.5) 
FD - - 2 2.8 4 6.3 8 15.4 14 (19.4) 
SD - - 2 2.8 1 1.6 2 3.8 5 (6.9) 
PC 1 1.4 2 2.8 1 1.6 2 3.8 6 (8.3) 
EDC 3 4.2 9 12.7 3 4.7 3 5.8 18 (25.0) 
CC - - 6 8.5 4 6.3 8 15.4 18 (25.0) 
PPP 2 2.8 1 1.4 3 4.7 2 3.8 8 (11.1) 
NA 1 1.4 2 2.8 - - 2 3.8 5 (6.9) 
CG 23 31.9 9 12.7 7 10.9 6 11.5 45 (62.5) 
RI 2 2.8 3 4.2 5 7.8 6 11.5 16 (22.2) 
OTH 1 1.4 1 1.4 1 1.6 - - 3 (4.2) 
Total 72 100 71 100 64 100 52 100  
  Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
Perhaps the most significant finding in this table is the importance of councils of 
governments in inter-organizational communications. Out of 72 respondents, 31.9% replied that 
they are most heavily dependent on councils of governments in networking and communicating 
with previously unrelated organizational actors. Thirty two councils of governments exist within 
the boundaries of the Pittsburgh region (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2007). Given the 
absence of a formal authority in councils of governments, municipal managers can freely interact 
with other managers in regular meetings, and can develop long-term informal relationships. In 
this sense, councils of governments are truly a network-specified organizational form, whose 
major objective is to build sub-regional professional networks or epidemic communities 
(Frederickson, 1999) within the pre-defined regional boundaries.  
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The only region-wide player is the SPC. But as in the case of comprehensive plan 
development, the SPC is not perceived to be as active as councils of governments. Most likely 
this is because the membership the SPC is held only by county governments and the city of 
Pittsburgh so that the municipalities‟ relationships with the SPC are likely to be indirect. 
5.3 NETWORKS AND COLLABORATIVE POLICY ACTIVITIES 
In the previous chapter, the collaboration index (CI) was employed as the dependent variable in 
the multivariate analysis. However, its value is not limited to being a variable only. It also serves 
as a valuable resource for information on the inter-organizational relationship itself.  
We can easily see whom municipalities are more interactive with for each policy activity. 
Ten kinds of organizations are identified along with eight collaborative policy activities. If a 
local municipality is interacting with all of the organizations, the total number possible number 
of linkages is 88. Again it should be noted that organizations and policy activities could not be 
pre-specified. For example, the category of „other city‟ does not indicate there is only one 
neighboring city. We do not know how many cities our sample municipalities are interacting 
with until we comprehensively scrutinize the dynamics of collaboration. We cannot name the 
partner cities a priori. Likewise, with a lack of time and resources, it is extremely difficult to 
identify all the organizations in the category of neighborhood association, public/private 
partnership, planning consortia, and so on. Rigorous network analysis may require such a 
comprehensive approach, but it is not an objective of this dissertation. 
In order to accurately describe the patterns of collaboration in the two regions examined, 
two relational units of analyses are introduced. The first one is the dyadic relation between local 
municipality and another organizational unit. Despite its simplicity, this network measure 
provides the most straightforward information on collaborative activities. The second relational 
unit of analysis is the triad relationship, of „cluster,‟ which is defined as local municipality 
contact with two different players. The major reason for examining clusters of three players is to 
emphasize how the addition of one player to an existing network or group increases the level of 
complexity (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 110-111). The triad relationships are expected to be 
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distinctively structured for each policy activity. For example, as our focus moves from one 
policy activity to another, we may expect to see that local municipalities start to partner with 
different organizations in order to adapt to increasing complexity. Identifying important network 
partners of the local governments will also allow us to build practical knowledge of these types 
of situations in general upon which policy strategies can be developed. 
5.3.1 Overview of Linkage: Dyadic Relations 
The first type of collaborative network examined is the dyadic relationship between 
municipalities and other organizations. The primary goal of this analysis is to identify the most 
important organizational partner of the local municipalities in economic development, and 
second, to understand the relative significance of these actors across different policy activities. 
For example, even if the chamber of commerce is one of the most important partners in a joint 
policy-making activity, it does not necessarily mean that they are also active in other policy 
activities such as „sharing financial resources.‟   
<Table 5-5> shows the number of linkages local municipalities in the Minneapolis region 
have with other organizations. A total of 654 linkages were identified, and these were classified 
along two prominent dimensions. The first dimension is player-oriented. Ten pre-defined 
organizations are provided in the player dimension. The last two rows in the table summarize 
which actors are most active, regardless of policy activity. In Minneapolis, other cities, mostly 
the neighboring municipalities, make active partners regardless of policy activity with the 
exception of technical assistantship. It is closely followed by municipality-county partnership, 
which occupies 22.6% of all dyadic relations. Connection with Metropolitan Council is also 
crucial, particularly when cities are searching for policy guidance or technical assistance. 
The second dimension categorizes dyadic relations with policy activities. From this 
dimension, linkages are fairly well distributed, except the categories of Pool/Share Personnel 
Resources and Contracting-out Planning. Engaging in a formal partnership is most common 
collaborative activity in Minneapolis. These results indicate that municipalities in Minneapolis 
pursue more formal and sustainable relationships rather than short-lived and ad hoc ones. 
Here is must be noted that the overall level of collaboration is much higher in 
Minneapolis, as can be seen by the numbers for „linkage per municipality.‟ Linkages for a 
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municipality average a score of 14.53 in Minneapolis, while municipalities in Pittsburgh have 
only 8.88 ties with other organizations in average.  
Table 5-5.  Frequency Distribution of Dyadic Relations between Players: Minneapolis 
Actors 
 
Activities 
CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH 
Total 
(%) 
Receive Technical 
Assistance 
20 20 5 3 5 5 9 1 1 27 1 
97 
(14.8) 
Engage in Formal 
Partnership 
25 26 7 2 8 6 10 2 2 20 2 
110 
(16.8) 
Engage in Joint 
Policy-making 
25 19 9 5 4 3 5 0 1 16 1 
88 
(13.5) 
Engage in Joint 
Policy-Implementation 
24 23 6 1 4 2 5 0 0 15 1 
81 
(12.4) 
Pool/Share 
Financial Resources 
22 21 9 1 6 6 7 2 3 11 2 
90 
(13.8) 
Pool/Share 
Personnel Resources 
18 9 4 1 5 2 2 0 2 2 0 
45 
(6.9) 
Contracting-out  
Planning 
18 3 1 3 2 0 4 1 0 3 1 
36 
(5.5) 
Partnership for a  
Particular Project 
29 27 6 1 5 9 11 3 2 13 2 
107 
(16.4) 
Total (%) 
181 
(27.7) 
148 
(22.6) 
47 
(7.2) 
17 
(2.6) 
39 
(6.0) 
33 
(5.0) 
53 
(8.1) 
9 
(1.4) 
11 
(1.7) 
107 
(16.4) 
9 
(1.4) 
654 
(100) 
Linkage  
per municipality 
4.02 3.29 1.04 0.38 0.87 0.73 1.18 0.20 0.24 2.38 0.20 14.53 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; SD = Special District; PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic 
Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood 
Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, 
Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = Others 
 
In comparison, as can be seen in <Table 5-6>, municipalities in Pittsburgh have 
developed patterns of inter-organizational relationships different from those in Minneapolis. 
From the actor-oriented dimension, councils of governments emerge as the second most 
important partners for local government. This fact in part represents the limited role of regional 
institutions in this region. Partnership with the SPC is not often sought by local governments in 
the Pittsburgh region - only special districts rank lower. The active involvement of councils of 
governments and county government in local economic development allows at least two 
explanations.  
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Table 5-6.  Frequency Distribution of Dyadic Relations between Players: Pittsburgh 
Actors 
 
Activities 
CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH 
Total 
(%) 
Receive Technical 
Assistance 
17 36 0 6 12 7 11 5 28 11 7 
140 
(21.0) 
Engage in Formal 
Partnership 
18 26 5 5 11 5 12 5 24 2 3 
116 
(17.4) 
Engage in Joint 
Policy-making 
15 13 2 2 4 2 1 5 17 2 1 
64 
(9.6) 
Engage in Joint 
Policy-Implementation 
11 14 2 2 2 3 1 5 15 0 1 
56 
(8.4) 
Pool/Share 
Financial Resources 
15 14 3 2 5 3 5 2 21 0 1 
71 
(10.7) 
Pool/Share 
Personnel Resources 
16 10 2 3 2 2 1 2 11 0 0 
49 
(7.4) 
Contracting-out  
Planning 
12 13 0 1 2 1 2 0 10 2 2 
45 
(6.8) 
Partnership for a  
Particular Project 
21 27 5 5 8 8 14 4 18 3 1 
114 
(17.1) 
Others 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 
11 
(1.7) 
Total (%) 
125 
(18.8) 
154 
(23.1) 
20 
(3.0) 
27 
(4.1) 
46 
(6.9) 
32 
(4.8) 
49 
(7.4) 
29 
(4.4) 
146 
(21.9) 
21 
(3.2) 
17 
(2.6) 
666 
Linkage  
per municipality 
1.66 2.05 0.27 0.36 0.61 0.43 0.65 0.39 1.95 0.28 0.23 8.88 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; SD = Special District; PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic 
Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood 
Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, 
Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = Others 
 
First, as briefly argued in the previous section, municipalities in Pittsburgh are seeking 
community-based and sub-regional cooperation at most. The strong individualistic culture in 
Pennsylvania local governance makes interventions in local decision-making difficult. Regional 
cooperation is the individual and independent strategic choice of local government, not a coerced 
course of action. Second, without formal authority to induce compliance from municipal 
governments, the SPC is not able to function as a regional institution as well as the Metropolitan 
Council does in the Minneapolis region. The lack of much communication between the SPC and 
municipalities indicates a low level of regional cultural and political integration. Even the SPC‟s 
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authority on federal transportation fund allocation does not significantly attract local attention. 
Local governments seem to seek the funding indirectly, using established connections with 
county governments.  
From the activity dimension, Pittsburgh seems similar to Minneapolis, except for the fact 
that the relationships in Pittsburgh are more technically oriented and short-lived. The ratio of 
„Receive Technical Assistance‟ is significantly higher in Pittsburgh, while the formal 
engagement in joint policy activities is not as popular as in the Minneapolis region. The 
combined ratio for the three activities in joint policy activities - „Engage in Formal Partnership, 
Engage in Joint Policy-making, and Engage in Joint Policy-Implementation‟ - is 42.7% in 
Minneapolis, while it is 35.4% in the Pittsburgh region.  
This descriptive analysis of dyadic relationships in the two regions characterizes inter-
organizational collaboration in the Pittsburgh region as genuinely voluntary, sub-regional, and 
strategic, while it depicts the Minneapolis case as coherent, regional, and regulated. However, 
first, this characterization captures tendencies only; it does not claim the two regions are 
completely heterogeneous in every aspect. The measurement of dyadic relations helps us to see 
the patterns of relationships from the network perspective, but this measure also suffers from 
over-simplicity. Analyzing clusters will ameliorate this shortcoming, and provide us with a tool 
to systemize the complexities inherent in local and regional collaborative policy interactions.   
5.3.2 Understanding Inter-Organizational Networks: Cluster Analysis 
Collaborative networks involving only two players are extremely rare. All networks are different 
in terms of their participants, durability, number of ties, and stability. In particular, because of its 
structural flexibility, no network form of organization can perfectly regulate the ins and outs of 
participants. In other words, relations within a network structure are regarded as structurally 
unstable, and network durability is always questionable because any players can leave the 
relationship anytime they realize expected benefits.  
Also, in network relations one relationship is always vulnerable to other relationships, 
and a small change in any network attribute such as players, frequency of interactions, or number 
of ties tends to generate both intended and unintended transformations in the network system as a 
whole.  
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It is almost impossible to prepare for every unexpected outcome which could result from 
network dynamics. Neither can every interaction between network participants be controlled. 
How can we improve our understanding of collaborative networks? And how can we decipher 
the complexities that countless interactions have produced over a long period of time? 
This dissertation emphasizes that an addition of a third player to a dyadic relation can 
increase the capacity of describing the level of complexity to a great extent. The analytic 
endeavor of this section is not to control this complexity but to describe the patterns of the 
collaborative relationships in the two regions as close to reality as possible. This can help 
decision-makers see similarities and differences between the regions more clearly so that they 
can in turn select more sophisticated and informed development strategies. 
The study was modeled after Agranoff & McGuire (2003). Their methodology of 
network analysis is applied here without major modifications. Building upon their work, our 
study provides more specified information on network clusters for each policy activities.  
5.3.2.1  Overview of Network Clusters: Actor Centrality 
„Cluster‟ or „triad cluster‟ is defined here as a municipal government in contact with two 
different organizations. The study measures collaboration as the relationship between three 
organizations or players (always including the municipality as one of the three) interacting 
within the context of a specific policy activity (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 110-111). The total 
number of linkages for each organization is converted into a percentage measuring the relative 
involvement of each organization, and used as an Actor Centrality index. 
A total of 1,571 clusters were identified in two regions, has 856 in Minneapolis and 715 
in Pittsburgh. In terms of per capita clusters, municipalities in the Minneapolis region have more 
than twice the number of triad clusters of those in the Pittsburgh region (19.02 and 9.53, 
respectively).  
In considering the difference in the number of clusters in the two regions, we should 
remember that the measurement of triads does not count network ties that do not involve local 
governments. Though networks between state agencies, special districts, and economic 
development corporations are to local economic development, they are methodologically 
meaningless for this study. It could be a major flaw of this descriptive analysis on the one hand, 
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but by focusing on networks involving local governments, the hope is to significantly increase 
the level of knowledge on local municipalities‟ policy behaviors.  
<Table 5-7> and <Table 5-8> provide an overview of the triad clusters in the two 
regions. As stated in the analysis of dyadic network relations, we expect the different modes of 
regional governance to have structured network clusters in distinctive ways to a considerable 
extent. 
 
Table 5-7.  Frequency of Distribution of Clusters and Actor Centrality: Minneapolis 
 CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH 
CT   112 41 16 29 27 50 8 9 70 8 
CO 112  38 5 17 21 39 8 7 80 7 
SD 41 38  5 8 9 19 5 4 28 5 
PC 16 5 5  7 3 8 - 4 7 - 
EDC 29 17 8 7  9 14 - 6 11 - 
CC 27 21 9 3 9  15 5 3 19 4 
PPP 50 39 19 8 14 15  6 4 28 6 
NA 8 8 5 - - 5 6  1 6 3 
CG 9 7 4 4 6 3 4 1  6 - 
RI 70 80 28 7 11 19 28 6 6  5 
OTH 8 7 5 - - 4 6 3 - 5  
Total 370 334 162 55 101 115 189 42 44 260 38 
Centrality 21.6 19.5 9.5 3.2 5.9 6.7 11.1 2.5 2.6 15.2 2.2 
Rank 1 2 5 8 7 6 4 10 9 3 11 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
Every observation in these tables represents a triad relationship between a local 
municipality and two other organizations. For example, The SD-CT match is in fact a 
municipality - special district - other city triad cluster in the economic development policy 
process, and a total 41 clusters of this type are reported, regardless of the collaborative policy 
activity. The most frequent collaborative linkage involves the county governments and other 
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cities. A total of 112 triads were reported in this category, meaning that municipalities are most 
interactive with neighboring cities and county government for the purpose of economic 
development. CO-RI and CT-RI clusters are next highest.   
The last row informs us of the number of triads including each of the 10 organizations. 
The percentage expression for the total number of linkages represents the Actor Centrality of 
collaborative cluster networks. According to the table, „other cities‟ are the most frequent 
collaborator with local municipalities. A total of 370 triad clusters involving „other cities‟ were 
reported, followed by clusters including county governments with 334 clusters total. Clusters 
including Metropolitan Council occur 260 times, which indicates the active involvement of this 
regional institution in the Minneapolis region. Those numbers are converted into a centrality 
measure of 21.6, 19.5, and 15.2, respectively. 
In comparison, the most frequent cluster in the Pittsburgh region includes county 
governments and councils of government. The active involvement of councils of government is 
particularly notable, compared to the active role of Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis region. 
The relative importance of other cities as a network partner is lower than in the Minneapolis 
case, while county governments are involved in the inter-organizational collaboration with 
municipalities most frequently. 
When considering the inter or intra-sectoral network relationships, the two metropolitan 
regions become more distinctive. Cities, counties, and special districts are pure public 
organizations regardless of location. Joint activities by these players can only be categorized as 
intra-sectoral collaboration, whereas any other network relationships are defined as inter-
sectoral. In Minneapolis, more than 50% (50.6%) of all clusters occur only between public 
organizations. This ratio significantly goes up when we include Metropolitan Council, which 
makes the ratio 65.8%. 
In contrast, only 40.7% of clusters are formed within the boundary of the public sector in 
Pittsburgh. Concerning the fact that there is no corresponding regional authority in Pittsburgh 
region, the difference in the ratio between the two regions becomes more than 25%. 
We can infer from this description that municipalities in Minneapolis have a tendency to 
pursue economic development by collaboration with other public sector organizations, whereas 
municipalities in Pittsburgh region are more dependent on inter-sectoral collaboration with 
private and non-profit organizations. If we recall the fact that the average number of 
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collaborative clusters per municipality is two times larger in Minneapolis than in Pittsburgh, we 
can conclude that the intra-public sector collaboration in effect covaries with the sheer volume of 
overall inter-organizational collaboration, and it is possibly increasing the extent of collaborative 
policy activities of local municipalities.  
 
Table 5-8.  Frequency of Distribution of Clusters and Actor Centrality: Pittsburgh 
 CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH 
CT  64 12 7 30 9 25 20 48 12 10 
CO 64  11 15 27 16 37 18 80 16 13 
SD 12 11   4  9 4 6 2  
PC 7 15   1 7 7 3 11 6 1 
EDC 30 27 4 1  7 14 10 25 3 1 
CC 9 16  7 7  7 6 23 4 1 
PPP 25 37 9 7 14 7  9 23 7 2 
NA 20 18 4 3 10 6 9  12 3 6 
CG 48 80 6 11 25 23 23 12  10 9 
RI 12 16 2 6 3 4 7 3 10  2 
OTH 10 13  1 1 1 2 6 9 2  
Total 237 297 48 58 122 80 140 91 247 65 45 
Centrality 16.6 20.8 3.3 4.1 8.5 5.6 9.8 6.4 17.3 4.5 3.1 
Rank 3 1 10 9 5 7 4 6 2 8 11 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
<Table 5-9> and <5-10> have converted the frequencies from <Table 5-7> and <5-8> 
into percentages, which can show the distribution of clusters among organizations.  
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Table 5-9.  Percentage Distribution of Clusters among Players: Minneapolis 
 CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH 
CT  33.5 25.3 30.0 28.7 23.5 26.5 19.0 20.5 26.9 21.1 
CO 30.3  23.5 9.3 16.8 18.3 20.6 19.0 15.9 30.8 18.4 
SD 11.1 11.4  9.3 7.9 7.8 10.1 11.9 9.1 10.8 13.2 
PC 4.3 1.5 3.1  6.9 2.6 4.2 - 9.1 2.7 - 
EDC 7.8 5.1 4.9 13.2  7.8 7.4 - 13.6 4.2 - 
CC 7.3 6.3 5.6 3.7 8.9  7.9 11.9 6.8 7.3 10.5 
PPP 13.5 11.7 11.7 14.8 13.9 13.0  14.3 9.1 10.8 15.8 
NA 2.2 2.4 3.1 - - 4.3 3.2  2.3 2.3 7.9 
CG 2.4 2.1 2.5 7.4 5.9 2.6 2.1 2.4  2.3 - 
RI 18.9 24.0 17.3 13.2 10.9 16.5 14.8 14.3 13.6  13.2 
OTH 2.2 2.1 3.1 - - 3.5 3.2 7.1 - 1.9 - 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
The cluster distribution can be discerned by reading the table in a columnar direction, 
with each number representing the percentage of all linkages involving the player listed in the 
column heading that also involve each player listed in the left-hand column (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003: 112). For example, 30.3 percent of CT clusters (a municipality and other cities) 
also involve a county government. Likewise, 33.5 percent of CO clusters (a municipality and 
county government) also have connection with other city governments. The number in bold 
indicates the most frequent collaborator. 
It is evident from <Table 5-9> that other cities are the most important collaborative 
partners in any configuration of triad clusters except for the cluster involving municipality and 
regional institution. „County government‟ is second only to other cities with respect to 
significance and is closely followed by Metropolitan Council. The organizational form of 
public/private partnerships is also notable here since its significance is fairly consistent 
throughout the columns. 
Compared to the Minneapolis case, distribution of clusters among players in Pittsburgh 
region looks more diverse in terms of the relative significance of each player. Other cities remain 
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important network partners in every type of cluster. However, the most actively involved 
organization is county government, which tops 6 of the 11 columns.  
 
Table 5-10. Percentage Distribution of Clusters among Players: Pittsburgh 
 CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH 
CT  21.5 25.0 12.1 24.6 11.3 17.9 22.0 19.4 18.5 22.2 
CO 27.0  22.9 25.9 22.1 20.0 26.4 19.8 32.4 24.6 28.9 
SD 5.1 3.7   3.3 - 6.4 4.4 2.4 3.1 - 
PC 3.0 5.1   0.8 8.8 5.0 3.3 4.5 9.2 2.2 
EDC 12.7 9.1 8.3 1.7  8.8 10.0 11.0 10.1 4.6 2.2 
CC 3.8 5.4 - 12.1 5.7  5.0 6.6 9.3 6.2 2.2 
PPP 10.5 12.5 18.8 12.1 11.5 8.8  9.9 9.3 10.8 4.4 
NA 8.4 6.1 8.3 5.2 8.2 7.5 6.4  4.9 4.6 13.3 
CG 20.3 26.9 12.5 19.0 20.5 28.8 16.4 13.2  15.4 20.0 
RI 5.1 5.4 4.2 10.3 2.5 8.8 5.0 3.3 4.0  4.4 
OTH 4.2 4.4 - 1.7 0.8 2.5 1.4 6.6 3.6 3.1  
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others
 
The active role of councils of governments in the Pittsburgh region is confirmed again in 
the <Table 5-10>. A considerable amount of clusters are linked to councils of governments, and 
in particular, 26.9% of clusters configured by municipality and county government are also 
connected to councils of governments in some way. 
Overall, the frequency distribution of the clusters confirms the results from the analysis 
of dyadic relationships. Neighboring cities and county governments are always the most 
important partners, regardless of regions. The real difference between the two regions is the 
municipalities‟ pattern of interactions with regional institutions and the way they perceive policy 
issues beyond local jurisdictions. The next section examines these differences in detail and 
systematizes the patterns of collaboration in accordance with type of policy activity. 
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5.3.2.2  Actor Centrality in Collaborative Linkages by Type of Activity 
Although the findings from actor centrality successfully identify regional differences to be of 
relative importance to organizations, it did not address how the relationships between 
organizations are differently structured in each collaborative policy activity. This section 
reconfigures and rearranges the network clusters so that we can comprehend how local 
governments have constructed different economic development networks for each collaborative 
policy activity. 
<Table 5-11> and <Table 5-12> demonstrate that each policy activity possesses its own 
unique operating dynamic, which can only be executed with a particular organization or 
combinations of network players. All organizations are not equally involved in all policy 
activities. The level of importance as a network partner varies with the policy objectives of local 
governments, as is well portrayed by the changes in rank for each organization. 
In the case of the Minneapolis region, <Table 5-11> confirms the primary role of 
neighboring cities as network partners. Its relative importance is quite stable in all categories of 
policy activities except for the case of „Partnership for a Particular Project.‟ Even in this activity, 
other cities are only second to county government in terms of significance as a network partner. 
Its consistent role in collaboration with our sample municipalities would be the first 
characterization of the Minneapolis region.  
The Metropolitan Council‟s participation can be systemically comprehended as well. Its 
importance as a network partner is particularly strong in the activities of „Receive Technical 
Assistance‟ and „Engage in Joint Policy-Making.‟ Concerning its formal authority with respect to 
regional policy issues, heavy involvement of the Metropolitan Council in local matters was 
expected, but the level of significance could not be anticipated. 
Including county government as the other active network participant, we can possibly 
label the Minneapolis region as a public-oriented, regionally integrated, and collaboratively 
active metropolitan region. 
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Table 5-11.  Actor Centrality in Collaborative Linkages by Type of Activity: Minneapolis 
   CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH  
Actor Centrality 20.5  18.9  7.0  4.1  6.6  6.6  12.3  1.6  1.2  19.3  2.0  100.0  Receive Technical Assistance 
Rank 1 3 5 8 6 6 4 10 11 2 9  
Actor Centrality 19.9  19.1  9.0  2.3  6.6  6.9  11.0  3.2  3.2  16.8  2.0  100.0  
Engage in Formal Partnership 
Rank 1 2 5 10 7 6 4 8 8 3 11  
Actor Centrality 24.4  18.9  10.4  6.5  4.0  4.0  8.5  0.0  1.0  19.9  2.5  100.0  
Engage in Joint Policy-making 
Rank 1 3 4 6 7 7 5 11 10 2 9  
Actor Centrality 25.3  20.9  10.4  3.3  5.5  3.8  10.4  0.0  0.0  19.2  1.1  100.0  
Engage in Joint Policy-Implementation 
Rank 1 2 4 8 6 7 4 10 10 3 9  
Actor Centrality 22.0  19.3  9.0  3.8  5.9  5.7  10.7  1.5  1.6  18.5  2.0  100.0  
Joint Policy 
Effort 
Sub-Total 
Rank 1 2 5 8 6 7 4 11 10 3 9  
Actor Centrality 20.1  17.5  12.7  2.2  6.7  8.2  10.1  3.4  4.1  12.3  2.6  100.0  
Pool/Share Financial Resources 
Rank 1 2 4 11 7 6 5 9 8 3 10  
Actor Centrality 28.6  15.5  13.1  6.0  10.7  2.4  9.5  0.0  9.5  4.8  0.0  100.0  
Pool/Share Personnel Resources 
Rank 1 2 3 7 4 9 5 10 5 8 10  
Actor Centrality 22.2  17.0  12.8  3.1  7.7  6.8  9.9  2.6  5.4  10.5  2.0  100.0  
Resource 
Exchange 
Sub-Total 
Rank 1 2 3 9 6 7 5 10 8 4 11  
Actor Centrality 34.2  13.2  7.9  7.9  2.6  0.0  15.8  10.5  0.0  5.3  2.6  100.0  
Contracting-out Planning 
Rank 1 3 5 5 8 10 2 4 10 7 8  
Actor Centrality 19.5  20.7  7.9  1.2  4.7  10.5  12.8  4.4  2.6  11.7  4.1  100.0  
Partnership for a Particular Project 
Rank 2 1 6 11 7 5 3 8 10 4 9  
Actor Centrality 21.0  19.9  7.9  1.8  4.5  9.4  13.1  5.0  2.4  11.0  3.9  100.0  
Project- 
Based Work 
Sub-Total 
Rank 1 2 6 11 8 5 3 7 10 4 9  
Actor Centrality 21.6 19.5 9.5 3.2 5.9 6.7 11.1 2.5 2.6 15.2 2.2   
Total 
Rank 1 2 5 8 7 6 4 10 9 3 11  
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Table 5-12.  Actor Centrality in Collaborative Linkages by Type of Activity: Pittsburgh 
   CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH  
Actor Centrality 13.6  20.3  0.0  4.6  9.5  7.4  9.2  5.6  16.2  9.2  4.4  100.0  Receive Technical Assistance 
Rank 3 1 11 9 4 7 5 8 2 5 10  
Actor Centrality 16.6  19.9  4.6  5.0  9.6  2.6  12.9  7.0  16.2  2.6  3.0  100.0  
Engage in Formal Partnership 
Rank 2 1 8 7 5 10 4 6 3 10 9  
Actor Centrality 18.6  19.5  2.5  2.5  6.8  5.9  4.2  9.3  21.2  5.9  3.4  100.0  
Engage in Joint Policy-making 
Rank 3 2 10 10 5 6 8 4 1 6 9  
Actor Centrality 18.1  22.9  3.6  2.4  3.6  4.8  3.6  13.3  22.9  0.0  4.8  100.0  
Engage in Joint Policy-Implementation 
Rank 3 1 7 10 7 5 7 4 1 11 5  
Actor Centrality 15.7  20.3  2.2  4.3  8.6  5.4  9.3  7.3  17.5  5.7  3.8  100.0  
Joint Policy 
Effort 
Sub-Total 
Rank 3 1 11 9 5 8 4 6 2 7 10  
Actor Centrality 17.2  20.9  6.0  3.0  11.2  3.7  9.7  6.7  18.7  0.0  3.0  100.0 
Pool/Share Financial Resources 
Rank 3 1 7 9 4 8 5 6 2 11 9  
Actor Centrality 26.3  19.7  5.3  3.9  7.9  5.3  3.9  2.6  25.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  
Pool/Share Personnel Resources 
Rank 1 3 5 7 4 5 7 9 2 10 10  
Actor Centrality 20.5  20.5  5.7  3.3  10.0  4.3  7.6  5.2  21.0  0.0  1.9  100.0  
Resource 
Exchange 
Sub-Total 
Rank 2 2 6 9 4 8 5 7 1 11 10  
Actor Centrality 25.0  28.6  0.0  3.6  8.9  3.6  0.0  0.0  17.9  5.4  7.1  100.0  
Contracting-out Planning 
Rank 2 1 9 7 4 7 9 9 3 6 5  
Actor Centrality 14.8  21.1  4.8  4.4  7.0  7.8  15.2  5.2  14.1  4.1  1.5  100.0  
Partnership for a Particular Project 
Rank 3 1 8 9 6 5 2 7 4 10 11  
Actor Centrality 16.6  22.4  4.0  4.3  7.4  7.1  12.6  4.3  14.7  4.3  2.5  100.0  
Project- 
Based Work 
Sub-Total 
Rank 2 1 10 7 5 6 4 7 3 7 11  
Actor Centrality 16.6 20.8 3.3 4.1 8.5 5.6 9.8 6.4 17.3 4.5 3.1   
Total 
Rank 3 1 11 9 5 7 4 6 2 8 10  
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The summary of actor centrality in the Pittsburgh metropolitan region is provided by 
<Table 5-12>. Even at a glance we can observe several fundamental features of inter-
organizational collaboration, among which the emergence of county government as the most 
active network participant is the foremost.  
As briefly argued before, county governments partly play the roles performed by the 
Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis. Without a resourceful regional policy partner, 
municipalities in Pittsburgh are likely to be dependent on county governments in dealing with 
inter-jurisdictional policy problems. The other regional hallmark of the Pittsburgh metropolis 
would be the municipalities‟ voluntary participation in councils of governments. Councils of 
governments are especially active in the activities of joint policy making and implementation and 
resource exchanges. These results are demonstrating the possibility of voluntary collaboration on 
inter-organizational policy issues in a context of no central authority. However, it is hard to 
believe that councils of governments are as equally involved in local incidences as the 
Metropolitan Council, at least in any substantive way. However, they are appreciated more as 
network entrepreneurs or providers in that transaction costs that would have been excessive can 
be controlled to a manageable extent (Feiock et al, 2007: Andrew, 2006). Moreover, several 
empirical analyses have demonstrated that the membership of councils of governments 
substantially increases the likelihood of inter-organizational collaboration (LeRoux, 2007). The 
multiplicity of such organizations in the Pittsburgh region has to be noted as valuable regional 
asset which may play a key role in future economic development. 
The comparatively rare inclusion of special districts in collaboration is another point of 
surprise. It is often said that the lack of region-wide decision-making authority encourages an 
adoption of a special district form of government to deal with inter-jurisdictional policy 
problems. This theoretical expectation is in fact evidenced by the 333 special districts in the 
Pittsburgh MSA.
27
 
Given the nature of special districts, they are expected to be connected to local 
governments in any way possible. But the results say that they are lively only in the activity of 
resource exchanges. The absence of special districts in collaborative networks in Pittsburgh 
                                               
27
 This number does not include special districts in Armstrong, Greene, Indiana, and Lawrence county. 
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becomes more clearly observed when it is compared to the Minneapolis region, in which their 
participations in collaborative networks are well documented and appreciated.
28
  
In sum, we can safely say that actor centrality in various features gives us fairly 
consistent results. Regional differences are well captured as well. In Minneapolis, neighboring 
cities are participating in almost every policy network, along with county governments and 
Metropolitan Council. Public sector based, region-wide, and rule-following collaboration may be 
the best characterization of inter-organizational collaboration in the Minneapolis region. 
Despite some similarities to Minneapolis, the Pittsburgh region is described somewhat 
different by the measure of actor centrality. County governments are most frequently connected 
to local municipalities, but their importance as network players is less dominating. Councils of 
governments have almost as many ties as county governments with local municipalities. The 
relative importance of cities bordering our sample municipalities is significantly lower compared 
to in the Minneapolis region. Along with the fact that the per capita clusters of local 
municipalities in Pittsburgh number less than half of those in the Minneapolis region we can 
conclude that inter-organizational collaboration in the Pittsburgh region can be characterized as 
inter-sectoral, sub-regional, and voluntary collective actions of local governments 
This conclusion is supported further if we look at the phenomena of collaboration from 
the perspective of policy activity. The next section introduces the concept of Activity Centrality 
and analyzes the inter-organizational networks in the two regions from this aspect. 
5.3.2.3  Overview of Linkages: Activity Centrality 
The previous section centered on measuring the extent to which each actor collaborates with 
others in an inter-organizational context. Despite its useful information on collaborative 
networks in the two regions, it does not address how these networks are differently arranged for 
particular policy activities. For example, we cannot expect the pattern of clustering in the policy 
activity of technical assistance to be identical to the one in resource exchanges. Knowing which 
actors are most active would not be sufficient. In this regard, I adopt the measure of Activity 
Centrality, which is the percentage expression of total number of linkages for each of 8 policy 
                                               
28
 As of 2007, 22 special districts exist in the territory of the Minneapolis region. 
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activities, measuring the degree of relative involvement of each activity for a specific 
organization.  
The first measure involves only number of clusters in each activity type (Joint Policy 
Effort, Resource Exchange, and Project-based Partnership). We can infer from this measure the 
objectives of network clustering and the relative significance of each policy activity in the two 
regions. 
 
Table 5-13.  Activity Centrality: Minneapolis 
  
CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH TOT 
A/C 
(%) 
Receive Technical  
Assistance 
50 46 17 10 16 16 30 4 3 47 5 244 14.3 
Engage in Formal 
Partnership 
69 66 31 8 23 24 38 11 11 58 7 346 20.3 
Engage in Joint 
Policy-making 
49 38 21 13 8 8 17  2 40 5 201 11.8 
Engage in Joint Policy 
Implementation 
46 38 19 6 10 7 19   35 2 182 10.7 
Joint Policy 
Efforts 
 214 188 88 37 57 55 104 15 16 180 19 973 57.0 
Pool/Share Financial 
Resources 
54 47 34 6 18 22 27 9 11 33 7 268 15.7 
Pool/Share Personnel 
Resources 
24 13 11 5 9 2 8  8 4  84 4.9 
Resource 
Exchange 
 78 60 45 11 27 24 35 9 19 37 7 352 20.6 
Contracting-out 
Planning 
13 5 3 3 1  6 4  2 1 38 2.2 
Partnership for a  
Particular Project 
67 71 27 4 16 36 44 15 9 40 14 343 20.1 
Project- 
Based 
Work 
 80 76 30 7 17 36 50 19 9 42 15 381 22.3 
  370 334 162 55 101 115 189 42 44 260 38 1712 100 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
The numbers in each box represent the number of triad clusters involving organizations 
listed in the first row. In <Table 5-13>, the number of 50 in the third column means that in the 
policy activity of „Receive Technical Assistance,‟ 50 clusters including other cities are reported. 
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Likewise, the number 66 in the box in the fourth column and third row denotes 66 out of 346 
„Engage in Formal Partnership‟ activities include county government as network participants in 
clusters. 
 
Table 5-14. Activity Centrality: Minneapolis 
  
CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH TOT 
A/C 
(%) 
Receive Technical  
Assistance 
50 46 17 10 16 16 30 4 3 47 5 244 14.3 
Engage in Formal 
Partnership 
69 66 31 8 23 24 38 11 11 58 7 346 20.3 
Engage in Joint 
Policy-making 
49 38 21 13 8 8 17  2 40 5 201 11.8 
Engage in Joint Policy 
Implementation 
46 38 19 6 10 7 19   35 2 182 10.7 
Joint Policy 
Efforts 
 214 188 88 37 57 55 104 15 16 180 19 973 57.0 
Pool/Share Financial 
Resources 
54 47 34 6 18 22 27 9 11 33 7 268 15.7 
Pool/Share Personnel 
Resources 
24 13 11 5 9 2 8  8 4  84 4.9 
Resource 
Exchange 
 78 60 45 11 27 24 35 9 19 37 7 352 20.6 
Contracting-out 
Planning 
13 5 3 3 1  6 4  2 1 38 2.2 
Partnership for a  
Particular Project 
67 71 27 4 16 36 44 15 9 40 14 343 20.1 
Project- 
Based 
Work 
 80 76 30 7 17 36 50 19 9 42 15 381 22.3 
  370 334 162 55 101 115 189 42 44 260 38 1712 100 
Note: CT = Other City; CO = County; ST = State Government; FD = Federal Government; SD = Special District; 
PC = Planning Consortia; EDC = Economic Development Corporation; CC = Chamber of Commerce; PPP = 
Public/Private Partnership; NA = Neighborhood Association; CG = Council of Governments; RI = Regional 
Institution (Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis, Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh); OTH = 
Others 
 
The measure of Activity Centrality in the last columns of <Table 5-13> and <Table 5-
14> demonstrate the relative importance of each policy activity in the two regions. For example, 
while 14.3% of all triad clusters in the Minneapolis region are arranged in the policy activity of 
Technical Assistance, almost twice as many clusters are reported in the Pittsburgh region in this 
activity category. Likewise, the activity centralities of Pool/Share Financial Resources illustrate a 
considerable difference in the relative significance of this policy activity for each region. 
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If we categorize those activities into three types of collaborative policy activities, the 
differences between the two regions become more conspicuous. While municipalities in 
Minneapolis are more apt to share their own resources (20.6% vs 14.6%), local governments in 
the Pittsburgh region cooperate more with other organizations in joint policy processes (57.0% 
vs 62.5%). However, this type of comparison might be misleading as to the true differences 
embedded in the regional contexts. If we consider the fact that the activity of „Receive Technical 
Assistance‟ is qualitatively different from the other three activities in the category of „Joint 
Policy Efforts‟, municipalities in the Pittsburgh region seem less cooperative in policy efforts 
than Minneapolis. I believe the latter interpretation would be more appropriate in the sense that 
first, collaboration on technical assistance is less formal, shorter-lived and less reciprocal, and 
second, it does not have the integrative attributes that the other activities possess.  
According to this interpretation, the percentage of policy efforts activities in Minneapolis 
is 7.6% higher than that of Pittsburgh‟s (42.8% vs 35.2%). In particular, the activities for 
„Formal Policy Partnership‟ are most frequently carried out by inter-organizational networks in 
Minneapolis (20.3%), while network clusters around technical assistance are reported most in the 
Pittsburgh region (27.3%). Engaging in formal partnership is also a significant policy strategy for 
local governments in the Pittsburgh region (21.1%). But joint policy-making and implementation 
are much more common in Minneapolis (22.5%) than Pittsburgh (14.1%). 
Municipalities in Pittsburgh seem to be more independent in resource utilization. Less 
than 15% of clusters have devoted to resource exchange activities in Pittsburgh, whereas the 
percentage in Minneapolis is more than 20% (20.3%). And finally, short-term clusters for 
particular projects are similar in number in the two regions (22.3% vs 22.8%).  
5.3.2.4  Activity Centrality in Collaborative Linkages by Type of Actor 
The second activity-oriented measure is concerned with the extent of organizations‟ devotion to 
a particular policy activity. For example, if a municipality reports that county government is 
involved in a total of eight clusters and six of these clusters involve joint policy efforts, then 
centralization for the county government within that activity would be 75%. That is, 75% of all 
county government collaboration would be devoted to joint policy effort activities. Such activity 
would thus be viewed as most central to the county government‟s involvement with the 
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municipality‟s economic development effort (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003:118). The question is 
then as follows: To what extent is the involvement of player A devoted to activity B? 
The comparative advantage of this measure over the first stems from its 
comprehensiveness in data analyses. While the first one provides the number of clusters 
involving organizations in each policy activity, <Table 5-15> and <Table 5-16> convert them 
into percentage distribution of activity centrality and rank each in accordance with its relative 
significance.  
Unlike the case of actor centrality displayed in <Table 5-13> and <Table 5-14>, the ranks 
given to each box should be read in a columnar manner. For instance, 18.5 in the fourth column 
and third row denotes that out of 8 policy activities that involve other cities, 18.5% of all clusters 
are structured for the „Receive Technical Assistance‟ activity. The number of clusters including 
other cities are least found in the activity of „Contracting-Out Planning,‟ which was given rank 
number 8.  
The overall results in <Table 5-15> and <Table 5-16> reconfirm the patterns of activity 
centrality reported in the last section. In the Minneapolis region, two collaborative activities of 
„Engage in Formal Partnership,‟ and „Partnership for a Particular Project‟ are similarly central to 
most organizations on the list. It is notable that in the activity of formal partnership, public 
organizations (other cities, county, Metropolitan Council) participation is more active, while 
organizations from private and non-profit sectors (CC, PPP, NA) are most participatory in short-
term partnerships for particular projects. In other words, long-term and formal collaboration is 
better sustained by public sector organizations, whereas ad hoc types of cooperation are more 
favored by network participants from other social sectors. 
Sharing financial resources is the third most common activity jointly pursued by 
multiples actors. Special districts in particular are most frequently clustered with local 
governments in financial exchange networks more than in other collaborative policy activities. 
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Table 5-15.  Activity Centrality in Collaborative Linkages by Type of Actor: Minneapolis 
   CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH  
Activity Centrality 13.4  14.2  10.4  18.2  15.8  13.9  15.9  9.3  6.8  18.1  12.2  14.3  Receive Technical Assistance 
Rank 4 4 6 2 3 4 3 4 5 2 4 4 
Activity Centrality 18.5  20.4  19.0  14.5  22.8  20.9  20.1  25.6  25.0  22.4  17.1  20.3  
Engage in Formal Partnership 
Rank 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 
Activity Centrality 13.2  11.7  12.9  23.6  7.9  7.0  9.0  0.0  4.5  15.4  12.2  11.8  
Engage in Joint Policy-making 
Rank 5 5 4 1 7 5 6 6 6 3 4 5 
Activity Centrality 12.4  11.7  11.7  10.9  9.9  6.1  10.1  0.0  0.0  13.5  4.9  10.7  
Engage in Joint Policy-Implementation 
Rank 6 5 5 4 5 6 5 6 8 5 6 6 
Activity Centrality 57.5  58.0  54.0  67.3  56.4  47.8  55.0  34.9  36.4  69.5  46.3  57.0  
Joint Policy 
Effort 
Total 
Rank             
Activity Centrality 14.5  14.5  20.9  10.9  17.8  19.1  14.3  20.9  25.0  12.7  17.1  15.7  
Pool/Share Financial Resources 
Rank 3 3 1 4 2 3 4 3 1 6 2 3 
Activity Centrality 6.5  4.0  6.7  9.1  8.9  1.7  4.2  0.0  18.2  1.5  0.0  4.9  
Pool/Share Personnel Resources 
Rank 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 4 7 8 7 
Activity Centrality 21.0  18.5  27.6  20.0  26.7  20.9  18.5  20.9  43.2  14.3  17.1  20.6  
Resource 
Exchange 
Total 
Rank             
Activity Centrality 3.5  1.5  1.8  5.5  1.0  0.0  3.2  9.3  0.0  0.8  2.4  2.2  
Contracting-out Planning 
Rank 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 8 8 7 8 
Activity Centrality 18.0  21.9  16.6  7.3  15.8  31.3  23.3  34.9  20.5  15.4  34.1  20.1  
Partnership for a Particular Project 
Rank 2 1 3 7 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 
Activity Centrality 21.5  23.5  18.4  12.7  16.8  31.3  26.5  44.2  20.5  16.2  36.6  22.3  
Project- 
Based Work 
Total 
Rank             
 Total Activity Centrality 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 5-16.  Activity Centrality in Collaborative Linkages by Type of Actor: Pittsburgh 
   CT CO SD PC EDC CC PPP NA CG RI OTH  
Activity Centrality 22.4  26.6  0.0  30.5  30.3  36.3  25.7  24.4  25.4  55.4  37.0  27.3  Receive Technical Assistance 
Rank 1 1 7 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Activity Centrality 21.1  20.2  31.1  25.4  23.8  10.0  27.9  23.3  19.8  12.3  19.6  21.1  
Engage in Formal Partnership 
Rank 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 
Activity Centrality 9.3  7.7  6.7  5.1  6.6  8.8  3.6  12.2  10.1  10.8  8.7  8.3  
Engage in Joint Policy-making 
Rank 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 
Activity Centrality 6.3  6.4  6.7  3.4  2.5  5.0  2.1  12.2  7.7  0.0  8.7  5.8  
Engage in Joint Policy-Implementation 
Rank 7 6 5 7 8 6 6 4 6 6 3 6 
Activity Centrality 59.1  60.9  44.4  64.4  63.1  60.0  59.3  72.2  62.9  78.5  73.9  62.5  
Joint Policy 
Effort 
Total 
Rank             
Activity Centrality 9.7  9.4  17.8  6.8  12.3  6.3  9.3  10.0  10.1  0.0  8.7  9.4  
Pool/Share Financial Resources 
Rank 4 4 3 4 4 5 4 6 4 6 3 4 
Activity Centrality 8.4  5.1  8.9  5.1  4.9  5.0  2.1  2.2  7.7  0.0  0.0  5.3  
Pool/Share Personnel Resources 
Rank 6 8 4 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 8 7 
Activity Centrality 18.1  14.5  26.7  11.9  17.2  11.3  11.4  12.2  17.7  0.0  8.7  14.7  
Resource 
Exchange 
Total 
Rank             
Activity Centrality 5.9  5.4  0.0  3.4  4.1  2.5  0.0  0.0  4.0  4.6  8.7  3.9  
Contracting-out Planning 
Rank 8 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 5 3 8 
Activity Centrality 16.9  19.2  28.9  20.3  15.6  26.3  29.3  15.6  15.3  16.9  8.7  18.9  
Partnership for a Particular Project 
Rank 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 3 3 
Activity Centrality 22.8  24.6  28.9  23.7  19.7  28.8  29.3  15.6  19.4  21.5  17.4  22.8  
Project-Based 
Work 
Total 
Rank             
 Total Activity Centrality 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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The measure of activity centrality displays somewhat different results in the Pittsburgh 
region. As already shown in <Table 5-14>, the most common policy activity pursued by local 
governments is to receive technical assistance from other organizations in contact. Overall, 
27.3% of all collaborative activities are put into this category, and all actors except special 
districts and public/private partnerships are most frequently called upon by local governments 
that expect technical solutions for existing policy problems from those organizations. Sectoral 
differences are also clear in a sense that the relative significance of public organizations (Other 
cities, county, special districts) are comparatively lower (22.4, 26.6, 0.0, respectively) than 
organizations from other sectors such as planning consortia, economic development corporation, 
and chamber of commerce (30.5, 30.3, 36.3, respectively). 
While an engagement in a formal partnership is as common in Pittsburgh as in 
Minneapolis, activities related to integration of the policy process (Joint Policy Making and Joint 
Policy Implementation) were substantially less reported there (22.5% in Minneapolis vs 14.1% in 
Pittsburgh).  
These results prove the usefulness of the modal approach in explaining collaboration. 
Recall the graphical expression of regional governance in the theoretical part of this dissertation. 
I argued that mode of collaboration is the outcome of the interactive effects of structural and 
procedural attributes of regional governance. The Minneapolis and Pittsburgh regions represent 
the mode of coordination and cooperation respectively in accordance with endogenous 
characteristics. In a coordinated mode of governance, the pattern of inter-organizational 
collaboration is defined as more of rule-following, while the cooperative mode of governance 
tends to produce cost-benefit sensitive decisions on collaboration. Concerning the fact the 
relations among public organizations such as cities, counties, and special districts are primarily 
influenced by formal rules and standard procedures, the frequency of formal engagement in 
collaboration by public organizations found in Minneapolis is quite understandable; 
communications and cooperation among these organizations are often regulated or required by 
state legislature, as shown in the last chapter. With little possibility of intergovernmental 
intervention, municipalities in the Pittsburgh region put more weight on local autonomy and 
discretion so that formal agreements that may harm jurisdictional independency can be 
strategically avoided. 
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Of course this statement is only valid in the comparison of these two cases. Not until 
more local governments from other metropolitan regions are systematically compared and 
evaluated, can we really know whether municipalities in Pittsburgh are individualistic.  
In sum, as with the network measure of actor centrality, the distributions of activity 
centrality are clearly different in the two regions. In general, networks are created for policy 
integration in Minneapolis, in which financial and personnel resources are more easily shared. In 
contrast, Pittsburgh networks are found mostly in non-essential policy collaboration such as with 
technical assistance. Although still substantial, formal policy integration never reaches the level 
that Minneapolis policy networks operate at. Resource exchanges are also comparatively 
dormant, and even networks for one-time collaborative partnerships for a particular project are 
slightly less reported than in Minneapolis.  
How can we utilize these two measures of network centrality most effectively? The next 
section wraps up the observations and descriptions from the modal approach to governance and 
collaboration. 
5.4 CONCLUSION: NETWORK ANALYSIS IN THE FIELD OF 
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Extending the explanatory analyses on the extent of inter-organizational collaboration, this 
chapter aimed to show that the patterns of collaboration are also inherently different in two 
regions. The results remind us of the modal approach to governance and collaboration. We 
already empirically proved that the coordinated mode of governance is more strongly associated 
with inter-organizational collaboration than the cooperative mode of governance. But we left the 
question of how each mode of governance differently structures collaboration among 
organizations unanswered. The results presented above provide the answer by characterizing the 
network connections built into the two regions. The modal approach to governance plays a 
central role here as well by providing the theoretical background for the descriptive network 
analyses. 
Three network-oriented questions were raised regarding „how‟ the patterns of 
collaboration are different. The first question was about identifying major network participants, 
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and it was answered by two related but different measurements of relative importance of network 
participants. Although the results from the two measures are not identical, it is possible to 
conclude that the inter-organizational relationships in Minneapolis are more regionally and 
horizontally integrated for two reasons: first, the Metropolitan Council seems to absorb a large 
part of the role of state government which is distinctively well observed in the Pittsburgh region, 
and second, neighboring cities take the most significant role in local issues, both as participants 
in development plans and network entrepreneurs or network brokers. The pattern of relationships 
in Pittsburgh is much less dominated by one particular actor. County government replaces the 
position that Metropolitan Council has in the Minneapolis region, and councils of governments 
emerge as the most central network provider. The Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission as a 
regional MPO plays a quite limited role in Pittsburgh, which partly represents the weak political 
and cultural integration at the regional level. 
Measures of dyadic and triad network clusters confirm the descriptive results in more 
detail. The measurement of actor centrality shows other cities are the most significant network 
partners regardless of policy activities in the Minneapolis region, while county governments 
become the most active network participants in Pittsburgh. 
Finally, measures of activity centrality display the differences in objectives of 
collaboration in the two regions. The hypotheses from the modal approach were proved in the 
sense that formal policy integration and resource exchanges take place more frequently in the 
Minneapolis region while short-lived and non-essential cooperation represents the pattern of 
relationship in the Pittsburgh region. 
Despite some limitations inherent, I could identify the important network actors in 
various policy activities and successfully address the different structure of inter-organizational 
relationships depending on region and policy activity. The regional differences in actor and 
activity centrality emphasized above are particularly important because this is significant 
practical information which can be utilized by municipal managers or any persons who seriously 
consider strategic perspectives on regional economic development policy-making. The network 
perspective permits strategic managers to take advantage of opportunities presented by the 
structural arrangement of networks so that they can significantly decrease transaction costs and 
fully appreciate structural advantages as network entrepreneurs at the same time.  
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A network system is not a panacea. Its methodological and practical value may be 
exaggerated, but we cannot argue that it has provided useful information for us. The catchphrase 
of „Compete Globally and Flourish Locally (Dodge, 1996)‟ seems to well represent the 
conclusions obtained from my network analysis. Only regions which have the wisdom to build a 
sustainable network into the economic development process have a chance to accomplish what 
the catchphrase is promoting. I argue that as public organizations are more participatory in 
development activities and local networks are bolstered by credible commitments by 
participants, collaboration on economic development will more efficiently function.  
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6.0  MAKING SENSE OF METROPOLITAN REGIONS 
In the last two chapters, we have identified the determinants of inter-organizational collaboration 
and described the patterns of network arrangements in the Minneapolis and Pittsburgh regions. 
Although both analyses are independent in terms of research objectives and main methodologies, 
they are in fact very closely related since both analyses are built on the micro view of regional 
governance. Accordingly, individual choices (Chapter 4) and network relationships among these 
individuals (Chapter 5) were taken as major research subjects and units of analyses. 
This chapter takes the opposite direction. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
emphasize the differences in the regional governance of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh at the macro 
level, enough for a certain level of systemic categorization to be generated. Instead of delving 
into causal explanation, this chapter begins with building descriptive models of regional 
governance. All measures and indexes are obtained at the group level, which indicates the level 
of analysis of this study.
29
 From this perspective, the metropolitan region is not what is made by 
its constituents‟ choices but a governing entity, as an „organic whole‟ consisting of multiple 
dimensions. To make sense of the idea of „region‟, it is thus necessary to fully understand these 
dimensions and systemize them into models of governance.  
This chapter will end with a presentation of two models of regional governance, based on 
the careful empirical observations of the regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. 
                                               
29 If the unit of analysis was the single local municipality, inter-organizational collaboration would be 
influenced by the level of regional integration. However, in a context where we have only two cases, 
building causal relationships between two variables is not only impossible but also irrelevant. 
 
  149 
6.1 REGIONS OF TWO KINDS 
One of the major findings presented in this dissertation is the regional variations in the four 
indexes which were created to measure the level of horizontal and vertical policy integration in 
the regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. The variations in these indexes display quite 
interesting results with regards to regional governance. <Table 6-1> summarizes mean values for 
the four indexes. 
 
Table 6-1. Integration Indexes and Collaboration Index 
Unweighted Weighted  
MN PA MN PA 
Regional Integration Index 4.11 0.86 5.16 0.99 
State Integration Index 4.09 4.36 5.24 5.26 
Federal Integration Index 2.22 2.32 2.56 2.67 
Collaboration Index 14.47 9.25 19.73 12.86 
 
 
The most distinctive observations in <Table 6-1> are first, the possible covariation of 
collaboration and regional integration index, and second, similar levels of policy integration at 
state and federal levels across regions. Given that there is almost no variation in the state and 
federal integration indexes, regional integration index (RI) seems to be the only factor that may 
engender the variation in the collaboration index (CI) or vice versa. As we compare only two 
cases, an explanatory mode of analysis is neither appropriate nor possible. Therefore, I decided 
to use a case-oriented method, where descriptions of significant social factors become the 
primary research objectives, instead of striving to prove hypothesized causal statements. 
Strategically this requires us to delineate covariation of regional RI and CI in a more 
sophisticated manner, and to explore the sources of this covariance in the framework of multiple 
dimensions of regional governance. 
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6.2 THREE DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
While the modal approach in chapter two correctly recognizes the multiplicity of dimensions of 
governance, it does not address other kinds of dimensional characteristics inherent in the 
structural aspect of regional governance. The structural dimension was conceptually defined as 
the level of fragmentation and empirically measured as the number of neighboring local 
municipalities in chapter four. 
However, not only does the level of structural fragmentation matter to the mode of 
regional governance but also the vertical, intergovernmental and inter-sectoral characteristics of 
metropolitan regions significantly influence regional modes of governance. 
Miller (2008) defines three structural dimensions of regional governance. The vertical 
dimension involves the fundamental relationship between a state government and the constituent 
local governments within its jurisdiction, while the horizontal dimension involves the 
relationship between the local governments within a metropolitan area.  
 
 
 
   State Government 
 
 
 
    
   Local Governments       Private &  
        Non-Profit Sector 
 
      Vertical Dimension 
  Intergovernmental Dimension 
    Inter-sectoral Dimension 
 
Figure 6-1. The Three Dimensions of the Structure of Regional Governance 
 
The third is also horizontal but involves the fundamental relationships between important 
constituent groups within a metropolitan area such as civic groups and institutions, private 
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businesses acting in the public domain, and mobilized citizens acting in a wide variety of 
capacities.  
From this conceptualization of regional governance, metropolitan regions are recognized 
as a structural web on which regional actors are connected and interrelated. But in the absence of 
a formal governing body to represent regional sovereignty, it is still hard to characterize „region‟ 
as a real political entity.  
Several attempts have been made to understand the ambiguities residing in regional 
politics. While some of these exclusively focus on one dimension, others make use of multiple 
dimensions for better description. The next section will introduce some of these cataloging 
approaches to regional governance. 
6.3 DIFFERENT REGIONS, DIFFERENT STRATEGIES 
Most cataloging approaches to regional governance do not address the multiple dimensions 
inherent in regional governance shown in <Figure 6-1>. For example, although Miller‟s 
Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index (MPDI) is one of the most accurate measures of degree of 
decentralization of metropolitan regions, it only measures the intergovernmental dimension of 
regional governance. Likewise, Hitching (1998)‟s, Miller (2002)‟s, and Frug (1999)‟s 
categorizations of regional governance are all only concerned with the intergovernmental 
dimension. 
Savitch & Vogel (1996) developed a continuum of metropolitan regions that range from 
highly centralized and government-centric to highly decentralized and less government-centric 
(Miller, 2008). They incorporate the inter-sectoral dimension of regional governance with the 
intergovernmental dimension. The intergovernmental components constitute single-tier, two-tier, 
and interlocal agreements, while the inter-sectoral dimension is represented by public/private 
partnerships. 
Hamilton et al (2004) focus on describing the interactive effects of the vertical dimension 
and the intergovernmental dimension of regional governance on long-term economic 
competitiveness. Using the centralized index developed by Stephens (Stephens, 1977; Stephens 
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& Wikstrom, 2000), they measure how much local discretion is available and assess the impact 
of structure on the quality of life in the metropolitan area. This study was based on the intuition 
that greater state centralization would improve the prospects for, and the effectiveness of, 
regional activity (Hamilton et al, 2004: 159).  
They also provide a conceptual framework that integrates vertical integration and 
horizontal fragmentation at the metropolitan level. The results suggest that a combination of a 
decentralized state and a centralized metropolis would produce the highest economic 
competitiveness at the regional level, while a decentralized metropolis located in a centralized 
state would tend to show lowest competitiveness. They conclude by arguing that “Governance 
structures do not create a form of economic determinism, but they do affect the long-term 
capacity to adapt. The conditions of competition change - and regional economies need to 
change with them – our governance, and political systems can either help or hinder this 
flexibility (Hamilton et al., 2004: 169).” 
Analyzing the two regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh from their perspective is 
beneficial for several reasons. First, in spite of possible inaccuracies inherent in the Stephens 
index, it gives a clue as to how to integrate the vertical dimension into models of regional 
governance. Second, it clearly proves that there are interactive effects that the dynamic 
relationships between the horizontal and vertical structural dimensions are collectively 
generating. Based on this idea, we can articulate the pattern of regional governance in 
Minneapolis as „integrated collaborative governance,‟ while the Pittsburgh region can be defined 
and „isolated‟ or „siloed‟ collaborative governance. Both models of regional governance 
incorporate all three structural dimensions of regional governance in which each region displays 
distinctive patterns of inter-organizational interactions and collaboration. However, we do not 
have enough empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of these models. Acknowledging 
this limitation, I will argue in the next section that by adding procedural aspects of regional 
governance to <Figure 6-1>, we can possibly provide appropriate evidence to distinguish the two 
models of regional governance. 
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6.4 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AT WORK: SOME DESCRIPTIONS 
Although the dimensional framework illustrated in <Figure 6-1> improves our understanding on 
regional governance to a great extent, it has fundamental limitations as well. First, in this 
framework we are not able to perceive metropolitan regions as real structural entities. Regional 
characteristics are possibly recognized only after we analyze all three dimensions thoroughly. 
But from the perspective that sees regions as organic wholes, metropolitan regions can be 
recognized independently as a structural reality.  
A second problem resides in the framework‟s single-dimensionality. It correctly depicts 
that regional governance comprises multiple structural dimensions including vertical, 
intergovernmental, and inter-sectoral. However, not only do these multiple structural dimensions 
determine regional governance, but also political interactions among regional actors either 
reinforce or disintegrate the patterns of regional governance. If we do not appropriately reflect 
this procedural dimension of regional governance, any conceptual framework is a partial 
description of reality at best. 
This problem is more or less empirical, and comes as no surprise given the fact that there 
is little empirical data accumulated measuring structural as well as procedural dimensions of 
regional governance. Where there is no data, their relevance is questionable and their usefulness 
is extremely limited.  
All three of these issues lend support to the fact that we need to reconceptualize the 
framework of regional governance. By incorporating procedural aspects of regional governance, 
as was already attempted in chapter 2, the framework of regional governance becomes more 
accurate as well as more comprehensive. 
In the following, I decide to add the intra-regional dimension to existing structural 
arrangements of regional governance. Even though it is weak, the metropolitan region itself has 
the capacity to advance its own policy objectives in some cases and negotiate with various actors 
within its aerial boundary.
30
 In this sense, I define metropolitan region as another level of 
governance which often effectively influences local decisions. 
                                               
30
 Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) are the most active useful regional institutions.  
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Figure 6-2.  The Eight Dimensions of Regional Governance 
 
Another important issue has to be raised here. As already mentioned in chapter two, 
exclusive dependence on the structural dimension of regional governance is methodologically 
incorrect and leads to incomplete empirical results. For our two regions of Minneapolis and 
Pittsburgh, we have limited sources of empirical data that do not allow a comprehensive 
comparison of the structural dimensions of the two regions. Additionally we are already aware 
that the procedural aspect of governance is as significant as the structural one, particularly in 
regional governance studies. For instance, my measures of collaboration and integration may 
look like they represent the structural arrangement between dimensions of regional governance, 
but what they really measure is purely procedural aspects, by which we are informed to what 
extent constituents of metropolitan region are vertically or horizontally integrated. Accordingly, 
it would be more accurate to describe regional governance as consisting of four structural 
dimensions and the same number of procedural dimensions.  
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6.4.1 Vertical Dimension 
The first structural dimension of regional governance is the vertical relationship between local 
governments and state government. State government is an integral part of regional governance 
because local governments, which are the building blocks of metropolitan regions, are creatures 
of their respective state legislatures. And because it is each state making decisions about the 
purpose and nature of the local governments within its boundaries, the American system could 
be said to have fifty different vertical approaches (Miller, 2008). 
There is no doubt that the two states of Minnesota and Pennsylvania are clearly 
distinguished in every aspect of governance. <Table 6-2> rearranges the measures of vertical 
relationships in the two regions and compares the extent to which the two regions are vertically 
integrated. 
 
Table 6-2.  Vertical Dimension of Regional Governance 
 MN PA 
Stephen’s Centralization Index (1957) 34.1 44.9 
Stephen’s Centralization Index (1995) 50.9 62.4 
State Integration Index (Unweighted) 4.09 4.32 
State Integration Index (Weighted) 5.24 5.21 
 
 
According to the Stephens‟ index in <Table 6-2>, both states have been significantly 
centralized for three decades, from 1957 to 1995.
31
 The state of Pennsylvania has always been 
more centralized than Minnesota. This is quite an interesting result when we consider the cultural 
approach to regions articulated by Elazar (1970).  From his observations, the individualistic 
culture of Pennsylvania should work against centralization of services, financial responsibility, 
and labor intensity, while the moralistic culture of Minnesota should allow for more state 
                                               
31
 This tendency was stimulated by three key factors: (1) the states becoming much more 
important as service-providing entities; (2) a federal court ruling of the 1960s that referred to the principle 
“one man, one-vote,” which reduced the representation of central cities in state legislatures while 
increasing that of suburban areas; and (3) federal requirements for the administration of federal grant 
funds (Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000: 124). 
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intervention in the life-style functions of local governments, which would need relatively high 
centralization.  
 The incompatibility between theoretical expectations becomes more complicated when 
we look this study‟s measure of intensity of policy integration at the state level. It is surprising 
that the two regions scored almost the same in state integration index as the significant 
differences in Stephens‟ index do not allow for such a convergence of the regional integration 
index. Looking in more detail, the unweighted measure in the fourth row demonstrates that 
municipalities in the Pittsburgh region are more vertically integrated than those in Minnesota, 
although the difference is marginal. However, when I give some weight to the activities that 
involve local policy adjustments to regional rules and standards, the difference disappears, and 
the Minneapolis region even surpasses Pittsburgh with respect to vertical integration. This seems 
to indicate that municipalities in Minneapolis are involved more in adjustment-seeking activities 
with the state government. As a result, we may argue that the vertical dimension in the two 
regions cannot be accurately described with the indexes at hand. Nevertheless, it seems safe to 
say that both regions are constantly centralizing, and the state of Minnesota is more involved 
with policy integration activities while the state of Pennsylvania is more connected with its 
constituent local governments by informal and technical relationships. 
6.4.2 Intergovernmental Dimension 
The second structural dimension of regional governance is intergovernmental relationships 
between local governments. In this section, local governments refer to general purpose 
governments, special districts, and county governments. Various studies have developed 
measures, among which Miller (2002)‟s Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index (MPDI) provides 
the most systematic knowledge of the structure of intergovernmental dimension. 
MPDI basically measures the political effects of structural fragmentation (Hamilton et al., 
2004: 160), or the distribution of authority between local governments (Miller, 2008). It is 
particularly helpful in identifying regional variations in the United States and the changing 
nature of the institutional relationships between governments in a metropolitan area (Miller, 
2008). Mathematically, the Miller scale generates a number from 1 to infinity. If a metropolitan 
region had one government that spent 100% of all local government expenditures, its score 
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would be 1. As the number of governments and resulting diffusion of expenditures increases, so 
does the score (Hamilton et al, 2004: 161). 
The information presented in <Table 6-3> reveals that in both regions structural 
fragmentations have intensified. We already know that compared to other regions, both regions 
are highly fragmented, ranked at 5
th
 (Pittsburgh) and 7
th
 (Minneapolis) out of the 311 
metropolitan regions in 1992 (Miller, 2002). We can argue from this observation that the two 
regions are comparatively similar in the intergovernmental dimension of regional governance. 
 
Table 6-3.  Intergovernmental Dimension of Regional Governance 
 MN PA 
MPDI (1972) 8.53 10.68 
MPDI (1992) 9.36 11.57 
Intergovernmental Collaboration Index (Unweighted) 8.40 3.96 
Intergovernmental Collaboration Index (Weighted) 12.07 5.37 
 
 
However, this is not necessarily the end of the description. According to my collaboration 
index, the two regions are fundamentally different from the intergovernmental perspective. The 
Intergovernmental Collaboration Index (ICI) was derived from the collaboration index and 
computed to measure only intergovernmental collaborations among general purpose 
governments, special districts, and county governments. According to this measure, the extent of 
interaction and collaboration between local governments is significantly higher in the 
Minneapolis region than in Pittsburgh. This is a very important fact that the structurally-oriented 
measure such as MPDI is not able to capture.  
In sum, two regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh can be said to be very similar in terms 
of structural fragmentation. However, as similar as they may be, the two regions have very 
different characteristics, which are well represented in the intergovernmental collaboration index. 
Intergovernmental collaboration in the Minneapolis region is more than twice as that in the 
Pittsburgh region. Therefore, structural fragmentation cannot be the only measure of 
intergovernmental dimension of regional governance.  
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6.4.3 Inter-Sectoral Dimension of Regional Governance 
The next dimension is closely related to the second, in that it represents the complementary set of 
intergovernmental interactions. The inter-sectoral dimension involves public-private, public-
nonprofit, and private-nonprofit relationships. However, this study does not include the private-
nonprofit relationship because first, our primary concern is to identify the pattern of relationships 
between local governments and organizations from other sectors, and second, private-nonprofit 
relationships were not relevantly measured by the collaboration index.
32
  
 
Table 6-4.  Inter-Sectoral Dimension of Regional Governance 
 MN PA 
Inter-Sectoral Collaboration Index (Unweighted) 6.16 (3.78) 4.92 (4.32) 
Inter-Sectoral Collaboration Index (Weighted) 7.69 (4.18) 6.36 (5.71) 
 
 
<Table 6-4> presents some interesting facts regarding inter-sectoral collaboration in the 
two regions. When regional institutions are included as a non-profit organization, the 
Minneapolis region shows a higher level of inter-sectoral collaboration, but not as much as in the 
intergovernmental case. However, there could be a debate about the sectoral characteristics of 
regional institutions. We selected Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) as the primary 
regional institutions in both regions, the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis and the 
Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in Pittsburgh. The SPC is indeed a non-profit council of 
governments operating with federal resources. But the Metropolitan Council is more than an 
ordinary regional MPO, and it works as a regional governing body capable of regulating a wide 
variety of regional issues such as transportation, land use, environment, regional parks, and 
waste control. Its legitimacy is grounded in the state legislature, which gave formal authoriy to 
                                               
32
 It should be noted that because the survey recipients were the chief administrative officers of general 
purpose governments, inter-sectoral collaboration involving county or special districts and organizations 
from other sectors could not be measured. Accordingly, the intergovernmental collaboration index does 
not include the relationships between county government and special districts. 
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the Council. Furthermore, council members are appointed by the governor, which makes them 
pure public officials who are supposed to serve public interests. 
Given this issue, I dropped the Metropolitan Council from the non-public group of 
organizations and recalculated the inter-sectoral collaboration index. The result is reported in the 
parentheses in <Table 6-4>, which presents the inter-sectoral collaboration between local 
municipalities and organizations from sectors except regional institutions. 
The results are quite interesting. Whereas there is relatively little change in the Pittsburgh 
region, the inter-sectoral index in Minneapolis drops significantly, about 60% in the unweighted 
case, and more than 80% in the weighted case. This demonstrates that the Metropolitan Council 
in the Minneapolis region plays a central role in inter-organizational collaboration, regardless of 
its sectoral identity. The other important aspect of this result is that it supports the observations 
which claim that Pittsburgh has a historical legacy of inter-sectoral cooperation (Jacob, 1996: 
Jezierski, 1996). In the last case, in which regional institutions are not considered as partners of 
local municipalities in either region, the Pittsburgh region surpasses Minneapolis in terms of 
inter-sectoral collaboration. Given the fact that the overall level of collaboration is almost twice 
as high in the Minneapolis region, this finding was unexpected.   
6.4.4 Intra-Regional Dimension of Regional Governance 
The final dimension of regional governance is intra-regional. While the literature on regional 
governance has examined multiple dimensions of metropolitan regions, little interest has been 
given to the intra-regional dimension - the intensity of policy integration of local municipalities 
at the regional level, or the level of interaction between local governments and regional 
institutions. The regional integration index (RI) represents the first definition, and the intra-
regional collaboration index (RCI) measures the level of interactions between local governments 
and regional institutions. 
The intra-regional dimension gets more complex when we correctly recognize its dual 
characteristics. The relationships between regional institutions and local municipalities within 
their boundaries are intrinsically horizontal, given the foundational principle of “Dillons‟ Law.” 
This organizing principle clearly states that no organization except a state has true overpowering 
authority over local municipalities.  
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However, more often than not, some regional institutions are given a certain amount of 
capacity to influence local municipalities‟ decisions on a wide range of policy issues. Less often 
are there authoritative regional institutions such as the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis and 
the Metro in the Portland region, both of which were created by state legislatures. These 
sometimes severely intervene in local decision-makings in the field of economic development 
planning, transportation, and waste control. Although they are hardly general-purpose regional 
governments, in the policy field they hold regulatory authority, and we can conceptualize the 
relationship between regional institutions and local governments as hierarchical rather than 
horizontal. 
 
Table 6-5. Intra-Regional Dimension of Regional Governance 
 MN PA 
Regional Integration Index (Unweighted) 4.11 0.77 
Regional Integration Index (Weighted) 5.16 0.88 
Intra-Regional Collaboration Index (Unweighted) 2.38 0.60 
Intra-Regional Collaboration Index (Weighted) 3.51 0.65 
 
 
The regional integration index measures this partial vertical relationship. Given the 
information in <Table 6-5> we can argue that the Minneapolis region is far more vertically 
integrated. It is natural that in the absence of any state government-appointed regional authority , 
the city and county governments in the Pittsburgh region are unlikely to place themselves under 
the authority of the SPC, its regional MPO. This expected behavior is well documented in 
<Table 6-5> as well. 
The other aspect of the intra-regional dimension is purely horizontal. This dimension is 
conceptualized by the intra-regional collaboration index, which measures the extent of 
collaborative activities between regional institutions and local municipalities. Results show that 
the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis is a comparatively more vital partner than the SPC.  
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Table 6-6. Perceptions of Regional Institutions 
 
MN PA 
Contact Agency 8 (17.8) 16 (21.3) 
Information Provider 18 (40.0) 34 (45.3) 
Policy Coordinator 20 (44.4) 16 (21.3) 
Policy Regulator 27 (60.0) 8 (10.7) 
Other 3 (6.7) 2 (2.7) 
 
 
<Table 6-6> informs us of how local administrative officers in the two studied regions 
perceive regional institutions. Both regional institutions are perceived as contact agencies and 
information providers to a similar extent in terms of percentage distributions. But the 
Metropolitan Council is perceived to be a policy coordinator (44.4%) or policy regulator (60.0) 
more than the SPC is. This confirms the finding in <Table 6-5> that a strong regional authority 
characterizes the Minneapolis region. 
6.4.5 Additional Evidences: Frequencies of Contact and Methods of Communication 
In addition to the indexes presented above, survey questionnaires also provided information on 
the frequency of contact of local municipalities with local, state, federal governments and 
regional institutions. Generally this information confirms the results observed from the 
collaboration indexes. 
<Table 6-7> summarizes the frequency of local governments‟ contacts with 5 
organizations in the two regions. The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage value of 
each contact. According to this table, 15 out of 45 local municipalities in the Minneapolis region 
have daily contact with their neighboring local governments, while 10 out of 75 municipalities in 
Pittsburgh region contact do the same. This observation can be differently put in terms of 
percentage distribution. 
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Table 6-7. Frequencies of Contacts 
 Local County State Federal Regional 
 MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA 
Daily 15(33.3) 10(13.3) 3(6.7) 6(8.0) 0(0.0) 1(1.3) 0(0.0) 1(1.3) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 
Weekly 13(28.9) 24(32.0) 20(44.4) 12(16.0) 6(13.3) 12(16.0) 1(2.2) 1(1.3) 9(20.0) 1(1.3) 
Monthly 14(31.1) 30(40.0) 17(37.8) 39(52.0) 26(57.8) 35(46.7) 9(20.0) 15(20.0) 24(53.3) 10(13.3) 
Never 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 0(0.0) 1(1.3) 1(2.2) 3(4.0) 13(28.9) 17(22.7) 0(0.0) 27(36.0) 
Other 2(4.4) 12(16.0) 4(8.9) 17(22.7) 12(26.7) 22(29.3) 20(44.4) 41(54.7) 11(24.4) 34(45.3) 
 
 
As there is a different number of observations available for the two regions (45 vs 75), a 
percentage measure of frequency distribution are a more accurate reflection of reality. Then, half 
(33.3%) of the local municipalities in Minneapolis have daily contact and almost two thirds 
(62.2%) of municipalities have regular contact with their neighbors on at least a weekly basis. In 
contrast, only 13.3 % of Pittsburgh municipalities have daily contact with their neighbors, and 
only 45.3% of them talk with their neighbors at least once a week. In sum, this table 
demonstrates that the Minneapolis region has a more active pattern of inter-municipal 
communication than the Pittsburgh region.  
The patterns of contact between municipalities and county governments look quite 
similar to those of the inter-municipal case. More than half of local governments in Minneapolis 
contact their respective county governments at least once a week, while the frequency of contact 
in the Pittsburgh region is less than that. 
In contrast, frequency of contact with state and federal agencies shows very similar 
results to those in <Table 6-7>, which in fact confirm the observation reported in <Table 6-1>. 
The other fact that distinguishes the two regions is the frequency of contact with regional 
institutions. As has been recurrently argued, the Metropolitan Council in the Minneapolis region 
is again shown to be much more powerful and useful than the SPC in Pittsburgh in the table 
above. While only 14.6% of local governments in Pittsburgh maintain regular contact with the 
SPC, more than 75% of Minneapolis cities are interacting with the Metropolitan Council on a 
regular basis.  
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In sum, a summary of the frequency distributions of inter-organizational contacts confirm 
that inter-local and intra-regional communication are the major factors that differentiate the two 
regions in the aspect of inter-organizational relationship. 
 
Table 6-8. Distribution of Communication Methods 
 Local County State Federal Regional 
 MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA 
Telephone 35(77.8) 68(90.7) 44(97.8) 62(82.7) 28(62.2) 61(81.3) 18(40.0) 44(58.7) 31(68.9) 26(34.7) 
E-mail 38(84.4) 52(69.3) 39(86.7) 43(57.3) 40(88.9) 50(66.7) 23(51.1) 32(42.7) 41(91.1) 24(32.0) 
Regular 
Meeting 
31(68.9) 25(33.3) 27(60.0) 11(14.7) 7(15.6) 12(16.0) 5(11.1) 5(6.7) 11(24.4) 10(13.3) 
Mail/Fax 15(33.3) 28(37.3) 14(31.1) 32(42.7) 18(40.0) 45(60.0) 22(48.9) 39(52.0) 25(55.6) 26(34.7) 
Other 5(11.1) 9(12.0) 0(0.0) 7(9.3) 1(2.2) 9(12.0) 1(2.2) 2(2.7) 1(2.2) 8(10.7) 
 
 
<Table 6-8> presents the frequency of communicative methods by which municipal 
officials contact other organizations. Since the survey questionnaire allows multiple choices, the 
total number of frequencies does not necessarily represent the number of survey respondents.  
Although telephone and E-mail are the primary communication tools regardless of the 
partnering organization corresponded with, there are some notable regional differences found 
here as well. The first important finding in this table is that „regular meetings‟ are far more 
common in the Minneapolis region, especially in the communications between neighboring 
municipalities and county governments. Regular meetings are qualitatively different from 
telephone and e-mail contact because they bring a considerable degree of formality into 
relationships. In addition, as social capital literature argues, face-to-face contact is far more 
effective in creating reciprocal norms between actors and decreases transaction costs in the long 
run. This again confirms that no matter which aspect you consider, the horizontal 
intergovernmental relations are more formal and integrated in Minnesota. 
This second finding supplies more evidence of the active involvement of regional 
institutions in Minneapolis in local businesses. It is not unexpected regarding the observations 
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presented throughout this dissertation, but it is still a valuable finding by which we can see in 
more detail the inter-organizational communication in the two regions. 
In sum, the information presented in this section confirms the findings in the previous 
chapters and supplies additional evidence to the cataloging approach to regional governance. The 
strong horizontal intergovernmental connections and strength of regional institution characterize 
the regional governance in Minneapolis, in which formal and face-to-face communication is as 
common as indirect tool such as mail and telephone calls. 
6.5 TWO REGIONS, TWO REGIONAL GOVERNANCES 
In this chapter I have scrutinized the two metropolitan regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh 
from both the structural and the procedural dimension of regional governance. As indicated, 
instead of deriving causal inferences from the dimensions, this chapter focuses on analyzing 
observed covariation in the regional integration index and collaboration index in detail.  
My analytic strategy in this section was to divide the collaboration index into 
intergovernmental, inter-sectoral, and intra-regional indexes and look for any considerable 
regional differences in each index. This strategy is based on the idea inherent in the dimensional 
approach to regional governance that the metropolitan region as a political entity is conceptually 
meaningful only when every dimensional attribute of the region is independently scrutinized and 
understood. The belief is that only when we can single out salient dimensional differences then 
we can possibly argue the source of differences in regional governance as a whole. 
Despite some considerable distinctiveness, the vertical and inter-sectoral dimensions do 
not seem to be dissimilar enough to cause differences in the patterns of regional governance.   
Stephens‟ indexes indicate that state intervention would be heavier in the Pittsburgh region, but I 
find no notable difference in the degree of policy integration at the state level.  
Inter-sectorally the two regions show relatively little variance. Considering the 
differences in overall level of collaboration, the Pittsburgh region‟s inter-sectoral activity is quite 
notable, even sometimes surpassing the level of inter-sectoral collaboration of the Minneapolis 
region.  
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Structural measures of the intergovernmental dimension display similar results. Miller‟s 
MPDI reveals that both regions are highly fragmented. However, we may not claim only from 
this result that intergovernmental dimension is where the regional divergence comes from.  
When I assess the extent of intergovernmental collaboration, there emerges a clear 
regional difference. Horizontal policy interaction between local governments is twice as strong 
in the Minneapolis region as in Pittsburgh. Given the nature of local governments, we can argue 
that the strong formal intergovernmental relationship in Minneapolis is the driving force for 
inter-organizational collaboration or horizontal policy integration. 
Similar logic can be applied to the intra-regional dimension of regional governance. I 
already argued that the intra-regional relationship may not be as real or observable as other kinds 
of relationships analyzed in this section. However, it is nonetheless a critical dimension of 
regional governance because it is the only direct measurement of regional governance, and using 
it we can perceive regions as existing political entities or organic creatures. 
Based on the observations of multiple dimensions of the two regions, two distinctive 
models of regional governance can be developed. The first model, labeled the integrated model, 
stands for the regional governance of the Minneapolis region. As demonstrated, local 
municipalities in this metropolis are strongly connected to diverse organizations from every 
social sector and highly interactive in most governance dimensions. The strength of relationships 
is denoted by the thickness of the lines in the <Figure 6-3>.  
In the graphical expression of “(b) isolated model of regional governance”, which 
represents governance in the Pittsburgh region, the conspicuous differences are threefold. First, 
the frequency and intensity of intergovernmental interactions among local governments are 
significantly lower than in the Minneapolis region. Second, it is an isolated or siloed model in 
that even though inter-local communication is not as active as in the Minneapolis case, 
interaction with state government is still strong and intensive. We can easily expect from this 
mode that local municipalities would try to adjust or adhere to state policy regulations while they 
casually ignore their neighbors‟ preferences or collective benefits at the regional level.  
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Figure 6-3.  Models of Regional Governance 
 
Third, the role of regional institution, the Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission in this 
case, is almost invisible in most of the economic development policy process. In comparison to 
Minneapolis, the regional institution in the Pittsburgh region does not have enough power and 
resources to initiate a regional approach to economic development. In sum, although the extent 
of inter-sectoral collaboration is quite comparable in the two regions, these three dimensional 
differences clearly show the differences between them.  
6.6 CONCLUSION 
In chapters 4 and 5, the modal approaches to regional governance were empirically tested at the 
micro level, where it was found that local municipalities‟ tendencies with respect to collaboration 
were primary deciding factors that characterized their metropolitan regions collectively.  
This chapter, however, provided an alternative view on regional governance. By taking 
regions as units of analysis, it attempted to capture the information embedded in the aggregate 
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data on inter-organizational collaboration, which was not available in the analysis from the micro 
perspective. From this macro level point of view, the two regions have multiple dimensional 
differences in both structures and political process. I have identified a total of 8 dimensions in 
regional governance and examined them in detail so that the dimensional distinctiveness of the 
regions could emerge in a natural manner. 
Based on the information obtained from this analysis, two models of regional governance 
were developed in this chapter. They are expected to provide theoretical guidance for future 
research.  Moreover, the dimensional approach to regional governance is thought to be a 
significant progress in the study of regional governance. In the integrated model of regional 
governance, local governments are actively involved with regional actors in all dimensions. In 
the isolated model, they are only vertically integrated with the state government, while 
intergovernmental and intra-regional policy integration is quite limited in all dimensions.  
In addition, we argue that intra-regional cooperation in the integrated model is the factor 
that increases the extent of collaboration. We cannot claim this as definitive with only two cases 
in hand. However, the fact that this relationship may exist can inform regional policy strategies 
involving economic developments and inter-organizational collaboration. By analyzing more 
metropolitan regions in future research, we can verify the effectiveness of the dimensional 
approach to regional governance and specify the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the 
models of regional governance as well. The analysis presented in this chapter is just the 
beginning of the long-term research goals of this dissertation. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines how governance structures or modes of governance affect the extent 
and patterns of inter-organizational collaboration in economic development policy processes in 
the metropolitan regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh. While the importance of metropolitan 
regions in economic competition is becoming increasingly recognized, their role is not well 
understood or evaluated. 
This dissertation began with creating a conceptual framework of governance by which 
the modes of governance and features of collective actions could be accurately described. Two 
main research questions were presented, which guided the empirical analyses, the first related to 
the determinants of the extent of collaboration, the second centered on defining the configuration 
of the network relationship in each region.  
A variety of existing theories of collective action, governance, and local and regional 
governance were scrutinized and integrated to enable development of the empirical part of this 
study. Testable hypotheses were developed from the theoretical speculations about inter-
organizational collaboration, and rigorous statistical methods were employed to test these 
propositions. 
This chapter highlights the major findings of this study and discusses the resulting 
theoretical development of governance and collaboration studies as well as the practical 
implications. 
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7.1 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
7.1.1 Theoretical Findings 
The first part of this dissertation was devoted to developing an integrative framework of 
governance, regional governance in particular. It found a fundamental limitation of governance 
studies in the single-dimensionality of the existing theoretical framework, and pointed out the 
complexity of the governing process, through which structural as well as procedural attributes of 
governance contexts are actively intermingled. The majority of empirical studies rely on the 
structural dichotomy of centralization and fragmentation making it extremely hard to take the 
procedural aspect of governance into consideration. 
Recognizing these limitations, I developed an integrative framework of governance, in 
which modal approaches to governance phenomena are introduced. In addition to the dimension 
of structural dichotomy, this integrative framework includes the procedural dimension of 
aggregation and integration. The interacting effect of the two dimensions made it possible for us 
to categorize modes of governance graphically. 
The modes of competition and command/control are a significant starting point in the 
modal approach, but their practical applicability is highly doubtful. No structural and procedural 
reality can meet the tough conditions these two modes require. In this sense, the modes of 
competition and command/control are regarded as only ideal types to which real governance 
experiences can be compared.  
In contrast the modes of cooperation and coordination were seriously considered as the 
guiding or organizing principles of governance. According to the structural perspective, network 
relations are a dominant structural attribute in both modes, while the procedural aspect of each 
mode is clearly distinguished in terms of logic of action. In the cooperative mode, actors are 
participating in governing networks because their participation is expected to decrease 
transaction costs, increase net benefits or both. In this sense actors are assumed to be rational 
decision-makers whose main rationale of action is the logic of consequentiality. Local and 
regional institutional infrastructures are perceived as one of the factors considered in the cost-
benefit calculation from which decisions on collaboration are made and supported. 
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In the mode of coordination, the roles of institutional structures are interpreted 
differently. Local actors sometimes make decisions which are incompatible with their interests in 
favor of collective benefits. Institutional infrastructures are interpreted here as social mechanisms 
regulating relationships between actors in a governing process. Decisions on collaboration are 
here influenced by socially constructed rules or norms, rather than sophisticated calculation of 
individual benefits. 
7.1.2 Empirical Findings 
7.1.2.1   Determinants of Inter-Organizational Collaboration 
The research question relating to which modes of governance are more effective in fostering 
inter-organizational collaboration was left to empirical analyses. The metropolitan regions of 
Minneapolis and Pittsburgh were selected as comparable cases, and these municipalities‟ 
behaviors of collaboration were carefully observed. Various types of variables were measured 
and their significances were carefully estimated. Along with the structural factors such as 
community characteristics, economic/fiscal factors, and institutional characteristics, this 
dissertation introduced three procedural variables measuring municipalities‟ intensities of policy 
integration at region, state, and federal levels. These variables also measured the influence of 
cultural factors on local decisions on collaboration. The two metropolitan regions were assumed 
to have different cultural legacies (Elazar, 1970), but no previous study systemically estimated 
cultural effects on inter-local collaboration. With appropriate variables measuring the cultural 
aspects embedded in the policy process, measures of structural effects can be more accurately 
estimated. This is what the integrative framework of governance contributes most. 
Results from empirical analyses were significant for a couple of reasons. First, they 
proved that the structural perspective on governance is moderately effective in explaining extent 
of collaboration. The variable of number of neighboring municipalities as the measure of level of 
structural fragmentation displays negative relationships in some cases. This confirms the results 
of previous research (Olberding, 2000; LeRoux, 2006; Wood, 2004), where structural 
fragmentation displayed a negative impact on collaboration.  
Other interesting findings come from several dummy variables. Along with a regional 
dummy that represented the influence of regional cultural and institutional differences, three 
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other dummy variables were employed. The first dummy captured how an institutional form of 
government influences the extent of collaboration. My study clearly indicates municipalities with 
a council/manager form of government are more likely to cooperate for economic development. 
This result contrasts with one recent study on inter-local joint venture formation (Feiock et al, 
2007), in which mayor-council systems are positively associated with local decisions on 
participation in joint ventures. The difference in the objective of the collaboration may explain 
this contradiction. But in a context of multiple collaborative policy activities, municipal 
managers‟ roles in fostering inter-organizational collaboration and advancing professional 
managerialism are particularly salient in the local governance context. 
The second dummy variable measured the effect of political and cultural legacy on 
collaboration. We started with the hypothesis that if a municipality has a history of inter-
jurisdictional or inter-sectoral cooperation for a considerable period of time, it may significantly 
increase the likelihood of collaboration at present. The regression results strongly support this 
hypothesis.  
The final dummy variable in the category of institutional characteristics was about was 
used to determine whether local municipalities have adopted a performance measurement 
system. This variable was not always statistically significant but sometimes showed marginal 
significance. We can argue that a built-in performance measurement system is generally 
positively associated with a tendency towards collaboration for a local municipality. We can also 
infer from this result that the more professionally managed the internal affairs of local 
government, the more it will pursue a collaborative strategy in economic development. 
It was found that Economic or Fiscal factors are generally unimportant in explaining 
collaboration, except at the relative poverty level. This confirms the need-based theory of 
collaboration, which states that municipalities with serious inequality problems are more likely 
to search for resources located outside of their jurisdictions.  
Probably the primary finding of the empirical analyses would be the effectiveness of 
procedural variables in explaining inter-organizational collaboration. Despite the difficulty in 
capturing procedural aspects of governance, three variables that represent the intensities of 
policy integration to regional, state, and federal levels were successfully measured. Among them, 
regional and state integration indexes were proven to be highly significant factors in influencing 
local decisions on collaboration. Especially provided that the overall intensities of policy 
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integration at the state level is almost identical in the two regions, we can strongly argue that the 
very factor fostering horizontal collaboration is the level of regional integration of local 
municipalities. The theoretical speculations of near-decomposability and market exchange 
mechanisms turn out to be inaccurate in the context of regional economic development.  
Finally, the model specification determined the most powerful regression model of inter-
organizational collaboration in economic development, in which regional differences are clearly 
displayed. 
On the whole, I found strong support for the integrative model of regional governance as 
an appropriate framework for collaborative policy activities. Both procedural and structural 
dimensions were derived from this conceptual framework, and various variables from both 
dimensions were proven to be significant. Collaboration can be exclusively explained neither by 
rational calculation (Feiock et al, 2007) nor by elaborate strategic management (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003). It always entails both aspects when it comes to decisions, which means both 
logic of consequentiality and appropriateness coexist and interact in the decision-making 
process. 
Although my analyses cannot address all issues regarding relationships between 
governance structures and collaboration, it could successfully generate an explanatory model of 
inter-organizational collaboration at local and regional levels.  
7.1.2.2   Patterns of Collaboration: Network Analyses on Relationships 
The objective of explaining the extent of collaboration was met and the value of this research 
project on regional governance is undeniable. However, it also provides valuable information 
about how collaboration is structured in a particular context and how locational differences affect 
the patterns of collaboration. This dissertation raises questions about the degree of participation 
of diverse actors in economic development and how the relationships between these 
organizational actors are differently arranged in two regions. 
The method of network analysis was expected to serve these inquiries best. Even though 
the extreme complexities of the relationships embedded in metropolitan politics did not allow 
this study to perform a rigorous network analyses, it still was able to produce valuable results 
regarding patterns of collaboration. Two kinds of relational data were gathered, and the measures 
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of actor and activity centrality played a central role in understanding the complexities stemming 
from countless interactions among local actors. 
The first analytic inquiry was to determine the most active participants in comprehensive 
economic development plans. Even in this simplest measure, patterns of interactions in the two 
regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh appear to be significantly different. In Minneapolis, the 
participation of neighboring cities is overwhelming in the planning process, while municipalities 
in Pittsburgh have fairly equivalent partnerships with other cities, county, and state government 
agencies. The notable difference is the active role of the Metropolitan Council, which partly 
represents strong regionalized policy process in the Minneapolis region. 
The second objective of the network inquiry was to find out who were the network 
brokers or entrepreneurs. Network brokers play an important role in the formation and 
distribution of information. By connecting organizations which do not have direct ties with each 
other, network brokers can advance their interests by leveraging this structural advantage. More 
than 50% of municipal managers in Minneapolis chose other cities, county, state agencies, and 
the Metropolitan Region in which neighboring cities as the most important network providers. 
While neighboring cities, county governments‟ and state governments‟ roles as network brokers 
are held to be significant in the Pittsburgh region, the large role played by councils of 
governments is quite notable. I argue from this observation that informal networks created by 
voluntary communication characterize this region. 
In order to understand how regional differences affect the pattern of inter-organizational 
collaboration in detail, two additional units of analyses were utilized- dyadic relationships 
involving relations between local municipalities and other organizations and triad cluster, which 
add one more actor to existing dyadic networks. This apparently increases the level of 
complexity exponentially. 
Two measures of actor centrality and activity centrality also highlighted differences in 
collaborative cultures. First, actor centrality in Minneapolis demonstrated that other cities and 
county governments are two central actors, regardless of policy activities. The Metropolitan 
Council followed, and its significance is particularly salient in joint policy efforts. Municipalities 
in Pittsburgh appear to have developed different kinds of clusters. County governments are most 
frequently connected with local government. The clear divergence from Minneapolis comes from 
the active involvement of councils of governments in the economic development policy process. 
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Councils of governments are particularly densely connected to local government in joint policy-
making and implementation. We can argue from this observation that they play catalytic role in 
formal joint policy efforts. 
As chapter 5 summarized, inter-organizational networks in the Minneapolis region are 
more public-oriented in the sense that there is active involvement by three public organizations: 
cities, counties, and the Metropolitan Council. In contrast, in Pittsburgh, councils of governments 
take the place of regional institution, and inter-sectoral partnerships are more significant than in 
the case of Minneapolis. Economic development corporations and neighborhood associations are 
more actively participating in networks, while special districts are least frequently sought and 
connected to local governments.  
The measure of activity centrality reported another distinctive aspect of inter-
organizational networks in the two regions. Activity centrality illustrated which collaborative 
policy activity is central to each of 11 organizations. According to the results, „Engage in Formal 
Partnership,‟ „Partnership for a Particular Project,‟ and “Pool/Share Financial Resources,‟ are the 
three most actively selected activities in general, while networks in Pittsburgh are most 
frequently structured around the activity of „Technical Assistantships.‟ Considering that the 
activity of short-term „Partnership for a Particular Project‟ is also highly significant in Pittsburgh, 
I conclude that networks in Pittsburgh perform more informal and short-lived collaborative 
activities than those in the Minneapolis region. 
In sum, I argue that the two independent empirical analyses in conjunction prove the 
effectiveness of the integrative framework of regional governance presented in this study. 
Explanatory analysis successfully showed the significance of procedural aspects of governance 
in explaining extent of collaboration. Descriptive analyses of the patterns of collaboration in the 
two metropolitan regions confirm the effectiveness of the modal approach to governance and 
collaboration as a theoretical framework. As expected, the Minneapolis region, which was 
regarded as a champion of the coordinated mode of governance, showed a strong public sector 
oriented, regional, and formal network patterns. In contrast, network formations in the Pittsburgh 
region were shown to be more likely to occur around informal, technical, and short-term policy 
activities, and to be densely connected to non-governmental and non-public organizations such 
as councils of governments. Purely regional networks were less observed in Western 
Pennsylvania, where the regional MPO is easily forgotten in the policy process. Instead, 
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partnerships with organizations such as county and councils of governments are salient, which 
characterize the network relationships in the Pittsburgh region as sub-regional and less 
integrated. Along with the hyper-structural fragmentation, the voluntary nature of network 
participation in Pittsburgh is clear enough to define Pittsburgh as an example of cooperative 
mode of governance. 
We can now safely claim that understanding economic development policy is in fact an 
understanding collaboration. We then argue that collaboration cannot be appropriately explained 
without a relevant theoretical model of governance. 
Economic development is inevitable for every local government. However, how much 
have we recently thought of fundamental values such as equity, accountability and stability in the 
competition for development? As we have recurrently witnessed, economic development often 
becomes a victim to collective action problems. In this sense economic development should not 
be regarded entirely as a benefit-maximizing strategy. It should be articulated as a constant 
search for „good governance,‟ in which collective action problems can be successfully overcome.  
Creating regional institutions may be hard. However, strong regional integration does not 
emerge automatically. My findings have implications for the role of regional governing agencies 
in inter-organizational collaboration. Almost everyone argues collaboration is important, but no 
one knows how to build a collaborative culture in the first place. Additionally, the concept of 
social capital is no longer a new catchphrase in public and urban administration, but we are still 
unaware of „how to‟ create it in the context of local and regional governance. We argue that 
building or strengthening regional institutions should be considered as a viable policy option for 
creating collaborative culture. It is true that there are still persistent political obstacles to the 
regional approach to local issues, but waiting for voluntary collaboration in a context of 
fragmented political structure is as unrealistic as controlling municipalities‟ behaviors for the 
sake of regional interests. Minneapolis‟s experience shows us it is possible to juxtapose the 
values of collective benefits and local autonomy at the same time. It seems that what we need to 
do is trigger inter-organizational interaction by any means and provides credibility and stability 
to local politics by strengthening existing regional institutions.  
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7.1.2.3   Making Sense of Metropolitan Regions 
The final research objective of this dissertation was to build empirically-based models of 
regional governance. Unlike the studies on inter-organizational collaboration presented in 
chapter four and five, this analysis takes a metropolitan region as a unit of analysis and delves 
into the differences in the two regions in both the structural and procedural dimensions of 
regional governance. Finally, it successfully introduced two models of regional governance, 
which are called the „integrated model‟ and the „isolated model.‟  
In Minneapolis, organizational actors are closely interconnected with one another, and 
the intensity of this relationship is relatively strong. These connections are particularly dense 
between public sector organizations, and at the center of the relationships is a strong regional 
institution. 
The Pittsburgh region, in contrast, displays a surprisingly different structural as well as 
procedural arrangement for regional governance. It may look like abundant „silos‟ that are 
scarcely connected to each other. In this model, local municipalities are highly independent of 
one another in terms of horizontal policy integration, while they maintain highly dynamic 
relationships with state government. The role of the regional institution is fundamentally limited 
in both formal and informal ways, so it is hardly able to mobilize inter-organizational 
communication or cooperation on economic development issues. In this type of regional 
governance, without relative state intervention, the autonomous local governments are more 
likely to pursue their parochial interests at the cost of collective ones.  
So, which model of regional governance works better? I did not attempt to provide a 
definitive answer to this question, but I would argue that in all respects the integrated region 
would be able to more easily solve collective action problems and address collective benefits 
with a lower transaction cost. The empirical support for this argument will follow as more and 
more regions are fit into my framework of regional governance. 
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7.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the empirical evidence presented above, this study is able to provide policy 
implications for regional governance and inter-organizational collaboration in the policy field of 
economic development. 
First, this dissertation shows that local governments‟ decisions on collaborative policy 
activities in economic development are basically multi-dimensional. Local municipalities decide 
to take joint actions for different reasons in accordance with their environmental context. It 
warns policy analysts to be exceptionally cautious when they build forecasting models. Since a 
majority of policy analysis instruments have been developed based on the assumption of 
rationality, they are not capable of policy decisions derived from other logics of actions. For 
example, as discussed in chapter 2, policy analysts cannot correctly comprehend the decisions 
made by logic of appropriateness with their rationality model of policy analysis. This may look 
like a small problem; however, even a small mistake in anticipation of future interactions 
between local governments in the condition of competition would result in a critical loss in the 
distribution game of scarce resources. 
Second, the results emphasize that economic development policies are heavily influenced 
by characteristics of macro-level environments as well. There is no empirical evidence as to how 
these contextual attributes directly impact local decisions on collaboration. However, these 
contextual factors organize interrelationships between actors and determine the long-term 
capacity for collective entities to adapt to a changing environment. Without knowing macro level 
influences, we are not able to select appropriate policy instruments for economic development.  
Third, it is clear that the effects of local economic development policies are in fact 
regional, in the sense that they inevitably produce collective results at the regional level. In other 
words, since economic development policies are integrated horizontally as well as vertically, a 
decision made in one municipality has both direct and indirect effects on its neighbors and other 
organizations from multiple social sectors. Therefore analyzing policy effects becomes a matter 
of understanding the degree of horizontal and vertical policy integration. At the same time, 
evaluating regional differences with respect to degree of integration has emerged as a primary 
research objective of economic development policy studies. 
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Fourth, it should be noted that all collaborative activities related to economic 
development are essentially different in terms of scope, content, function, and form. Some are 
more formal and collective and reciprocal while others are more informal, individual and short-
lived. Some municipalities prefer long-term joint actions whereas others tend to avoid 
commitments for future policy interactions. My analyses on inter-organizational collaboration 
support the idea that the more collaboration is formal and reciprocal, the more it will be intensive 
and sustaining. Reciprocal and long-term collaboration tends to be supported by formal 
relationships between public organizations, including various kinds of local governments such as 
cities, townships, villages, special districts and county governments.  
There is no doubt that economic development policy has gained considerable attention 
from academics and professionals alike. But most studies on economic development policy 
concentrate their interest on efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of policy outcomes that may 
maximize parochial local interests, while casually ignoring the importance of collective benefits 
that increase collective well-being at regional level. This is the reason why a collaborative form 
of local economic development policy has become critical. It is the fundamental issue that any 
kinds of economic development policy should address in the future. 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE RESEARCH 
Regional Governance and Collaboration is essentially a complex social phenomenon which 
requires multiple theoretical frameworks to explain. This dissertation employed both macro and 
micro perspectives for understanding collaboration related to economic development at the local 
and regional levels. Although I was able to show significant findings from the analyses at both 
levels, there are some limitations inherent in this study. 
First, at the micro level, there is a generalizability problem. Focusing on the field of 
economic development would make the analytic instruments such as measures of collaboration 
and policy integration irrelevant in studying collaboration in other policy fields. For example, 
collaboration studies have taken the field of public service delivery as a research subject for 
years. Their measurements of collaboration are a bit different from the one utilized in this 
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dissertation. In this respect, a serious question of commensurability about the method of 
measuring collaboration could be raised. Additionally, collaborative activities such as „joint 
policy efforts,‟ or „share/pool resources,‟ are too abstractly defined to capture the specifics 
inherent in every collaborative activity.  
Another concern with respect to measuring collaboration is since partner organizations in 
collaboration are defined too abstractly, it is hard to point to which particular organizat ion is 
really significant in economic development. It is recommended that future research should have 
enough time to identify specific organizations and provide survey recipients with their names as 
partners in collaboration.  
A second problem resides in the unproportional sampling of this study. The limitation of 
time and resources did not allow me to select as many municipalities as possible, so only 30% of 
the total municipalities in the two regions were included. Since the samples represent 
municipalities with a relatively large population size, we cannot confidently argue that 
conclusions drawn from these samples would be generalizable to all local governments. 
There exists a similar methodological limitation in the macro-level analysis. Only two 
cases as samples present a severe generalizability problem, so it is difficult to apply the 
conclusions to other metropolitan regions with any certainty. Future research should include 
more regions to verify the usefulness of the framework of regional governance. 
This dissertation raised a large number of questions, and some of them were answered. 
But while the metropolitan regions of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh are only two regions out of the 
entire U.S., I believe that the results from this analysis of their situations could engender a wide 
range of suggestions about regional governance. I also strongly believe that they provide a nice 
starting point from which other metropolitan regions can begin to search for „good governance.‟ 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
SURVEY OF REGIONAL ORIENTATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 
This survey is designed to determine the factors facilitating interorganizational collaboration in local 
governance and the field of economic development, and evaluate the effectiveness of a regional approach 
to collaborative activities. Please answer all questions based upon your belief and experience. 
 
 
All your answers and information are strictly confidential and will not be released. Neither you nor your 
government will be identified with the data you provide. Thank you for your cooperation. 
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QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Which of the following best describes your local government‟s primary economic base and focus of your primary 
economic development efforts? (Please check three and rank them according to their importance; 
1: most important) 
 
 
 
What is your current 
economic base? 
What is the focus of your 
economic development effort? 
a. Agricultural   
b. Manufacturing   
c. Retail/Service   
d. Institutional (military, government,  
nonprofit, universities, colleges, etc.) 
  
e. Residential community   
f. Tourism/hospitality   
g. Warehouse/Distribution   
h. Technology/Telecommunication   
i. Other (                        )   
j. Mixture (                      )   
Source: ICMA, Economic Development Surveys 
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2. Which of the following describes the condition of your local government‟s economic base (1) during the last three 
years, and (2) which do you think it will be over the next three years? (Check one in each column.) 
 
 
 Last three years Next three years 
a. Rapid Expansion (more than 25%)   
b. Moderate growth (10-25%)   
c. Slow growth (less than 10%)   
d. Economic base is stable – no real grow or decline   
e. Slow decline (less than 10%)   
f. Moderate decline (10-25%)   
g. Rapid decline (more than 25%)   
Source: ICMA, Economic Development Surveys 
 
 
3. What is your form of government? 
 
Mayor-Council _______   Council-Manager________   Other(Please Specify)_______________ 
 
 
4. Does your local government have a comprehensive development plan? 
 
Yes: ___________     No: ____________ (Skip to Question # 7) 
 
 
5. If yes, what is the year of adoption? 
 
Year ___________ 
 
 
6. If you do have a comprehensive plan, is your government required to communicate with external organizations in 
the process of plan development? 
 
Yes:___________     No:_____________ 
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7. Does your local government have an evaluation and performance measurement system? 
 
Yes: ___________     No: ____________ 
 
 
8. Has your government voluntarily participated in any form of economic development partnership? 
(Economic development partnership refers to a formal or informal institution by which multiple public, non-profit 
and private organizations jointly pursue economic development.) 
 
Yes: ____________           No: ______________ 
 
 
9. If yes, when did your government participate in the partnership(s)? 
(If your government is related to multiple partnerships, please check all applicable) 
 
Before 1968 ______    1969-1980 _____    1981-1992 _____    1993-2004 _____    After 2004 _____ 
 
 
10. Which of the following organizations participate in developing your local government‟s economic development 
plan? (Check all applicable, and rank them according to their importance, 1; most important). 
 
Organizations Participation Rank Organizations Participation Rank 
a. City   
h. Chamber of  
Commerce 
  
b. County   
i. Public/Private 
  Partnership 
  
c. State Government   
j. Neighborhood  
  Association 
  
d. Federal Government   
k. Council of 
Governments 
  
e. Special District   
l. Metropolitan 
  Council 
  
f. Planning Consortia   
m. Other  
(                   ) 
  
g. Economic 
Development 
  Corporation 
     
Source: ICMA, Economic Development Surveys 
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Definitions of organizations 
 
City: Any type of local government you are in contact with, regardless of its distance from your jurisdiction. 
State government: All organizations belonging to State governments, e.g. State‟s Department of Economic Development, 
State Legislatures, and Governor‟s Office, etc. 
Federal Government: All organizations belonging to Federal governments. e.g. Department of Economic Development,  
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Congressmen or Senators‟  
Offices, etc. 
Special District: A governmental organization which provides specialized services only to those persons who live within the 
specified boundaries. 
Planning Consortia: An association consisting of organizations from public, private, and non-profit sectors which primarily  
 collaborate for developing local comprehensive development plans. 
Economic development corporation: A non-profit organization whose mission is to promote economic development within a  
 specific geographical area. 
Chamber of Commerce: A private voluntary business network which aims to improve the business climate in a locality,  
typically through business networking, lobbying, and common projects and a selection of business services. 
Public/Private Partnership: A formal or informal relationship between local governments and private organizations for joint  
pursuit of local economic growth. 
Neighborhood Association: A voluntary, non-profit organization which represents civic values or a certain type of  
 development interests. 
Council of Governments: a voluntary association of county and municipal governments which coordinates economic issues  
 on regional, rather than local level 
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11. Which of the following organizations helps your local government connect to other organizations? (Check all 
applicable, and rank them according to their importance, 1; most important). 
 
 
Organizations 
Connection 
Providing 
Rank Organizations 
Connection 
Providing 
Rank 
a. City   
h. Chamber of 
Commerce 
  
b. County   
i. Public/Private 
  Partnership 
  
c. State Government   
j. Neighborhood  
  Association 
  
d. Federal Government   
k. Council of 
Governments 
  
e. Special District   
l. Metropolitan 
  Council 
  
f. Planning Consortia   
m. Other 
(                      ) 
  
g. Economic  
Development 
  Corporation 
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QUESTIONS ABOUT COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES 
 
 
Questions in this section ask about your collaborative experiences with diverse organizations in the 
economic development policy process during last three years.  
 
 
Instructions for questions 12 and 13 
 
 
- Look through the second column of the table, which is a list of policy activities, and make a „√‟ in the 
first column if your local government is employing that policy activity. 
 
- For each policy activity selected, please check all organizations involved with the selected policy 
activities by making a „√‟ in all appropriate boxes provided in the table. 
 
- If you want to add any specific policy activities or partner organizations which are not shown in the 
table, please specify in the „other‟ cell. 
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Questions about Horizontal Collaborative Activities 
 
  12. Please select policy activities your local government has engaged in during the last three years. Then check all participating organizations in the activities you selected. 
 
 Partner 
 
 
Policy Activity 
City County 
Special 
District 
Planning 
Consortia 
Economic 
Development 
Corporation 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Public/ 
Private 
Partnership 
Neighbor- 
hood 
Association 
Council of 
Governments 
Metropolitan 
Council 
Other 
(          ) 
 
Receive Technical 
Assistance 
           
 
Engage in  
Formal 
Partnership 
           
 
Engage in 
Joint Policy- 
making 
           
 
Engage in 
Joint Policy 
Implementation 
           
 
Pool/ Share 
Financial 
Resources 
           
 
Pool/Share  
Personnel 
Resources 
           
 
Contracting-out 
Planning  
           
 
Partnership for  
a particular 
project 
           
 
Other 
(             ) 
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Questions about Vertical Collaborative Activities 
 
 
13. Please select policy activities your local government has engaged in during the last three years. 
Then check all participating organizations in the activities you selected. 
 
 
Federal State Regional  Partner 
 
 
 
 Policy Activity 
Federal Government State Government 
Metropolitan 
Council 
 
Seek general program 
Information 
   
 
Seek new funding of  
programs and projects 
   
 
Seek financial assistance 
through grants 
   
 
Seek interpretation of 
standards and rules 
   
 
Seek policy guidance 
   
 
Seek technical assistance 
   
 
Request Statutory/Regulatory  
relief, flexibility, or waiver 
   
 
Request change of  
official policy 
   
 
Request resolution of conflicts  
with other local governments 
   
 
Other 
(                         ) 
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QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
 
 
 
This section asks about your collaborative experiences with governments at all levels. If you select an 
answer „Other,‟ please specify in the space provided. 
 
 
Questions about intergovernmental relations with neighboring local governments 
 
 
14. How often do you communicate with neighboring local governments? 
 
Daily_________   Weekly__________   Monthly_________   Never__________   Other_____________ 
 
 
15. How do you usually communicate with these governments? (Choose all) 
 
Telephone_______   E-mail_______   Regular Meeting ______   Mail/Fax _______   Other___________ 
 
 
16. Which of the following characteristics would best describe the pattern of your government‟s communication 
with your neighboring governments?  
 
Negotiation________   Persuasion_________   Command/Control________   Other __________________ 
 
 
17. How do you describe your relationship with your neighboring governments?  
 
Competitive________   Cooperative________   Command/Control________   Other__________________ 
 
 
Questions about intergovernmental relations with County government 
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18. How often do you communicate with the county government? 
 
Daily_________   Weekly__________   Monthly_________   Never__________   Other_____________ 
 
 
19. How do you usually communicate with the county government? (Choose all) 
 
Telephone_______   E-mail_______   Regular Meeting ______   Mail/Fax _______   Other___________ 
 
 
20. Which of the following characteristics would best describe the pattern of your government‟s communication 
with the county government?  
 
Negotiation________   Persuasion_________   Command/Control________   Other __________________ 
 
 
21. How do you describe your relationship with the county government?  
 
Competitive________   Cooperative________   Command/Control________   Other__________________ 
 
 
Questions about intergovernmental relations with State government 
 
 
22. How often do you communicate with State government? 
 
Daily_________   Weekly__________   Monthly_________   Never__________   Other_____________ 
 
 
23. How do you usually communicate with State government? (Choose all) 
 
Telephone_______   E-mail_______   Regular Meeting ______   Mail/Fax _______   Other___________ 
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24. Which of the following characteristics would best describe the pattern of your government‟s communication 
with State government?  
 
Negotiation________   Persuasion_________   Command/Control________   Other __________________ 
 
 
25. How do you describe your relationship with State government?  
 
Competitive________   Cooperative________   Command/Control________   Other__________________ 
 
 
Questions about intergovernmental relations with Federal government 
 
 
26. How often do you communicate with Federal government? 
 
Daily_________   Weekly__________   Monthly_________   Never__________   Other_____________ 
 
 
27. How do you usually communicate with Federal government? (Choose all) 
 
Telephone_______   E-mail_______   Regular Meeting ______   Mail/Fax _______   Other___________ 
 
 
28. Which of the following characteristics would best describe the pattern of your government‟s communication 
with Federal government?  
 
Negotiation________   Persuasion_________   Command/Control________   Other __________________ 
 
 
29. How do you describe your relationship with Federal government?  
 
Competitive________   Cooperative________   Command/Control________   Other__________________ 
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Questions about intergovernmental relations with Metropolitan Council 
 
 
30. How often do you communicate with Metropolitan Council? 
 
Daily_________   Weekly__________   Monthly_________   Never__________   Other_____________ 
 
 
31. How do you usually communicate with Metropolitan Council? (Choose all) 
 
Telephone_______   E-mail_______   Regular Meeting ______   Mail/Fax _______   Other___________ 
 
 
32. In your opinion, the Metropolitan Council could be described best as 
 
______ Contact Agency 
______ Information Provider 
______ Policy Coordinator 
______ Policy Regulator 
______ Other (Please specify) _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
33. Which of the following characteristics would best describe the pattern of your government‟s communication 
with Metropolitan Council?  
 
Negotiation________   Persuasion_________   Command/Control________   Other __________________ 
 
 
34. How do you describe your relationship with Metropolitan Council? 
 
Competitive________   Cooperative________   Command/Control________   Other__________________ 
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Demographic Information 
 
 
Name of your Local Government: _________________________________ 
 
Name of your Position:_____________________________ 
 
Name of Department:______________________________ 
 
Phone: _______________________   Fax:_____________________   E-mail:________________________ 
 
Address: __________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 City:______________________  County:______________________  Zip Code:________  
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APPENDIX B 
COVER LETTER FOR SURVEY 
Dear City Manager 
 
 
 
I am writing to ask for your help with research I am conducting with the University of 
Pittsburgh‟s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. This research is evaluating the 
effectiveness of a regional approach on collaborative policy activities, entitled “Building a 
Region: A Comparative Study on Governance and Collaboration in Minneapolis and Pittsburgh 
Regions.” My goal of this research is to increase knowledge of local and regional governance 
and provide applicable information about collaborative management for local practitioners. 
 
Your answer to this survey is very important. The survey questionnaire will ask about 
your government‟s experiences of collaboration with other organizations in the policy process of 
economic development. The responses you provide will be confidential and will not be revealed 
to anyone who is not associated with this project. Your data will be combined with that of other 
participating governments and reported as summary data only. Your participation is voluntary, 
and you may withdraw from this research at any time. 
 
Once the questionnaire is complete, please return it in the envelope provided. No potage 
is necessary. I would be very grateful if you would return this survey by August 15, 2007. 
Completing the survey will take approximately 15-20 minutes. And please find a small gift 
enclosed as a token of my appreciation. 
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This study is approved by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board: IRB. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me at (614)886-6602 or JHL7@pitt.edu. 
 
I would be very grateful for your cooperation for this research. 
 
Sincerely 
 
 
Joo Hun Lee 
Ph.D Candidate 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
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APPENDIX C 
FOLLOW-UP NOTICE 
Dear Survey Recipient 
 
 
A questionnaire entitled “Survey of Regional Orientation of Local Government” was 
mailed to you two weeks ago. I would like to make sure that the survey had delivered to you 
safely. 
 
If you have returned the survey, thank you very much. 
 
If you received but haven‟t completed the questionnaires, I hope you will find time to do 
so. I would be very grateful if you would return this survey by September 15, 2007. Your 
participation is valuable and much appreciated.  
 
If you did not received the survey, or have mislaid it, please reply to this mail, 
JHL7@pitt.edu, or contact me at 614-886-6602, and I will send you another copy. 
 
Thank you for your time and assistance 
 
 
 
Joo Hun Lee 
Ph.D Candidate 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
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APPENDIX D 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS OF STRUCTURAL VARIABLES IN TWO REGIONS (UNREPRESENTED MUNICIPALITIES) 
 MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM SD 
 MN PA MN PA MN PA MN PA 
Municipality Characteristics         
  Population 35133.76 11422.17 287151 33556 5630 5103 52203.55 6569.22 
  Land Area 19.30 18.16 38.40 67.30 2.10 0.80 12.52 16.18 
  Density 2382.60 2336.44 10959.96 18407.50 156.82 127.09 2203.51 3189.61 
  Number of Neighboring Municipalities 6.17 6.62 12.00 14.00 3.00 1.00 2.21 3.17 
  Community Heterogeneity 7.47 4.89 30.40 59.20 1.40 0.40 5.87 8.08 
  Regional Dummy         
Economic/Fiscal Factors         
  Community Wealth 28667.14 19134.85 65825.00 39204.00 20216.00 11129.00 8918.27 4732.90 
  Community Fiscal Health 286.64 120.23 432.98 347.46 119.00 0.00 82.60 79.11 
  Community Social inequity 4.32 10.85 15.60 29.40 0.90 3.50 3.00 6.19 
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APPENDIX E  
 
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 4 
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Appendix E-3.  Pittsburgh: Unweighted 
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Appendix E-12.  Minneapolis: Weighted 
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Appendix E-15.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Regional Dummy 
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Appendix E-16.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Regional Integration Index 
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Appendix E-17.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Regional Integration Index 
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Appendix E-18.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Regional Integration Index 
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Appendix E-19.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Both Regional Dummy and RI 
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Appendix E-20.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Both Regional Dummy and RI 
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Appendix E-21.  Integrated: Unweighted – With Both Regional Dummy and RI 
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Appendix E-22.  Integrated: Weighted – With Regional Dummy 
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Appendix E-23.  Integrated: Weighted – With Regional Dummy 
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Appendix E-24.  Integrated: Weighted – With Regional Dummy 
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Appendix E-25.  Integrated: Weighted – With Regional Integration Index 
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Appendix E-27.  Integrated: Weighted – With Regional Integration Index 
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Appendix E-28.  Integrated: Weighted – With Both Regional Dummy and RI 
3210-1-2
Regression Standardized Residual
20
15
10
5
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
Mean =-2.27E-16
Std. Dev. =0.935
N =120
Dependent Variable: CIW5
Histogram
 
 
  214 
 
Appendix E-29.  Integrated: Weighted – With Both Regional Dummy and RI 
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Appendix E-30.  Integrated: Weighted – With Both Regional Dummy and RI 
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